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stand his S-box constructions, Renè Peralta for his kind explanations about his combinational logic
minimization techniques, Christof Paar for helpful pointers and his timely advice, and Nele Mentens
for her help and example Magma code. These profoundly influential people have shown me the true
benefits of collaborative research.
I would also like to thank my friends for their help and support during this work. Greg Knox
and Khrystin Matero have spent many years showing me how to balance work and life, and I cannot
thank them enough for their continued support and encouragement. I could not ask for better friends.
Kaitlin Corbin has also been nothing but supportive, caring, and compassionate during this work.
I truly appreciate everything she has done for me. Sam Skalicky has also been a wonderful friend
over the past couple of years who helped me a great deal with this research. In addition to his very
thorough paper edits and discussions of various hardware-related topics I encountered along the
way, he also teared me away from the lab for several much-needed meals and coffee breaks to help
keep me sane. I hope I can return the favor as he continues with his PhD. I would also like to thank
Ganesh Khedkar for his extensive help with the Synopsys tool and many discussions about gate-
level optimizations. I’m very fortunate to have spent the last couple weeks in Rochester working by
his side and filling up on mango custard at the Indian food buffet.
I would like to give special thanks to my family, especially my older brother, Robert. As the
middle child, I’m fully aware that I can be somewhat bothersome, so I appreciate all the late-night
telephone calls and emergency paper edit sessions that we had together. It will be a long time
before I can adequately thank him for every sacrifice he made to help me, but it will happen soon
enough. Also, I would like to thank my sister, Jessica, who has always been supportive throughout
my studies at RIT.
Finally, I would like to thank my parents. I would not be where I am today without their endless
love, support, and encouragement. The sacrifices they have made, and continue to make, to help
me in my endeavors do not go unnoticed. Perhaps my biggest challenge in life will be to somehow




with Efficient Combinational Implementations
Christopher A. Wood
Supervising Professor: Stanisław Radziszowski
At a fundamental level, the security of symmetric key cryptosystems ties back to Claude Shannon’s
properties of confusion and diffusion. Confusion can be defined as the complexity of the relationship
between the secret key and ciphertext, and diffusion can be defined as the degree to which the
influence of a single input plaintext bit is spread throughout the resulting ciphertext. In constructions
of symmetric key cryptographic primitives, confusion and diffusion are commonly realized with the
application of nonlinear and linear operations, respectively. The Substitution-Permutation Network
design is one such popular construction adopted by the Advanced Encryption Standard, among
other block ciphers, which employs substitution boxes, or S-boxes, for nonlinear behavior. As a
result, much research has been devoted to improving the cryptographic strength and implementation
efficiency of S-boxes so as to prohibit cryptanalysis attacks that exploit weak constructions and
enable fast and area-efficient hardware implementations on a variety of platforms. To date, most
published and standardized S-boxes are bijective functions on elements of 4 or 8 bits. In this work,
we explore the cryptographic properties and implementations of 8 and 16 bit S-boxes. We study
the strength of these S-boxes in the context of Boolean functions and investigate area-optimized
combinational hardware implementations. We then present a variety of new 8 and 16 bit S-boxes
that have ideal cryptographic properties and enable low-area combinational implementations.
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The cryptographic strength of symmetric key cryptosystems is traditionally based on Claude Shan-
non’s properties of confusion and diffusion [69]. Confusion can be defined as the complexity of
the relationship between the secret key and ciphertext, and diffusion can be defined as the degree
to which the influence of a single input plaintext bit is spread throughout the resulting ciphertext.
Substitution-permutation networks (SPNs) are natural constructions for symmetric-key cryptosys-
tems that realize confusion and diffusion through substitution and permutation operations, respec-
tively [72]. In SPN designs for symmetric-key cryptosystems, the substitution step is a nonlinear
operation that improves the overall confusion, while the permutation step is a linear operation that
increases the measure of diffusion. Formally, an SPN design is defined as follows.
Definition 1. Let l, m, and Nr be non-negative integers and SS : {0, 1}l → {0, 1}l and SP :
{1, ..., lm} → {1, ..., lm} be permutations. Let P = C = {0, 1}lm, and let K ⊆ ({0, 1}lm)Nr+1)
consist of all possible key schedules that could be derived from an initial key K using the key
scheduling algorithm. For a key schedule (K1, ...,KNr+1), we encrypt the plaintext x using algo-
rithm 1.
Typically, the substitution step (layer), often referred to as the S-box, is the only nonlinear op-
eration in a symmetric-key crpytosystem. As such, it is critically important in the construction of
cryptographically strong block ciphers that are resilient to common cryptanalysis attacks, includ-
ing linear, differential, and algebraic attacks, among others. Furthermore, as these cryptanalysis
efforts have evolved over the past few decades, and with the selection of the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) as the standard for symmetric-key block ciphers [28], the construction of crypt-
graphically “strong” S-boxes with efficient hardware and software implementations has become a
topic of critical research.
1.2 Contribution of the Thesis
To the best of our knowledge, the largest S-boxes in the literature and in existing standards are
defined for elements of 8 bits, as in the AES standard [29]. In this work, we study alternative AES
S-box constructions and hypothetical 16-bit S-boxes.
2
Algorithm 1 SPN(x, SS , SP , (K1, . . . ,KNr+1))
w0 ← x
for r = 1→ Nr − 1 do
ur ← wr−1 ⊕Kr
for i = 1→ m do
vr<i> ← SS(ur<i>)
end for





uNr ← wNr−1 ⊕KNr





y ← vNr ⊕KNr+1
return y
Combinational implementations of the AES S-box have been well-studied for over a decade
[65, 67, 53, 13, 10]. To date, the best known AES S-box from an area perspective requires only
32 AND and 83 XOR/XNOR gates. Following in the spirit of reducing this area requirement even
further, we found an AES S-box candidate that uses the same construction as the one of Canright
in [13] but uses a different pair of basis change matrices. If Boyar and Peralta’s logic minimization
techniques are applied to this particular representation we may be able to bring the gate count be-
low the current record. In addition to studying AES S-box alternatives, we also programmatically
explored area-optimized S-boxes over GF (28) defined by all other 29 possible irreducible polyno-
mials. We found another suitable S-box that has even less gates than Canright’s construction prior
to logic gate optimizations, which may be of use in other cryptographic algorithms that need an
8-bit S-box. The security properties of this S-box are fully explored using the metrics we identify
in Chapter 2.
Our work on programmatically finding area-optimized S-boxes was then scaled up to GF (216).
For the 21 smallest degree 16 irreducible polynomials over GF (2), we found several S-box con-
structions from the set of all candidate constructions that have minimized area footprints without
combinational logic optimizations. We were not able to analyze the security properties of these
S-boxes due to the complexity of computing each metric, though we expect that its similarity to the
AES S-box leads to very similar, and appropriately stronger security properties due to the increased
bit size.
It is uncertain whether or not the 16-bit S-boxes will ever be used or needed. Nevertheless, the
security and implementation aspects of such S-boxes may reveal new avenues of research that can be
further explored in the context of smaller S-boxes. For example, combinational logic minimization
techniques such as factoring are much more computationally intensive for 16 × 16 matrices over
GF (2) than 8 × 8 matrices. As a result, we explored parallel implementations of minimization
algorithms and heuristic techniques. It is our hope that this work inspires similarly new perspectives
for cryptographic research.
3
A more tangible contribution of this work is the development of software tools for the following
tasks:
1. Composite Galois field arithmetic (Python)
This software is capable of performing arithmetic in GF (p), GF (pn), and GF ((pn)m). It is
useful for learning the fundamentals of Galois fields and simple composite fields.
2. Optimized linear and nonlinear circuit minimization (Java)
This suite of programs are capable of optimizing linear and nonlinear circuits using the com-
binational minimization techniques discussed in Chapter 4. We use these programs to re-
duce the overall area requirements for our candidate S-box constructions and analyze the area
footprint of inversion circuits for the fields GF (24) and GF ((22)2). The linear circuit opti-
mizations come with sequential and parallel implementations that enable larger circuits to be
processed in less time.
3. Cryptographic mapping security analysis (Python)
This compact program implements all of the metric computations discussed in Chapter 2.
It does not rely on any external libraries outside of the core Python libraries for all of its
implementations. It supports a complete workflow for analyzing any arbitrary mapping F :
GF (2n)→ GF (2n).
4. S-box construction and combinational area counting (Magma)
This suite of programs was leveraged to programatically derive area-optimized combinational
circuits for all candidate 8 and 16-bit S-boxes. One may use these programs to determine
minimized gate counts for many Galois field arithmetic operators, including addition, multi-
plication, squaring, scaling (multiplication by a constant), and inversion. In addition, one may
use these programs to search for suitable affine transformations used to construct S-boxes.
We describe each of these software deliverables in their respective chapters of this work. As we
note in the conclusion, future work will entail continued development of these tools for crypto-
graphic research. In particular, we plan on including normal basis arithmetic in the Galois field
library, developing advanced circuit minimization techniques (e.g. SAT solver reductions [34]), and
integrating our security analysis code into the SAGE software package [71].
The rest of this thesis is outlined as follows. In the remainder of this chapter we first discuss
the mathematical fundamentals necessary to understand this work, and then continue with the cryp-
tographic properties of S-boxes, including common cryptanalysis attacks that exploit poor S-box
constructions, as well as algorithms to efficiently measure the “strength” of a particular S-box in the
context of Boolean functions and Galois field power mappings. Chapter 3 then presents the S-box
constructions we considered in this work, focusing mainly on S-boxes based on Galois field power
mappings, and techniques for finding appropriate affine transformations for such S-boxes. Chapter
4 then discusses related work and our results for optimizing combinational logic, which is criti-
cally important in producing area-efficient (in terms of gate counts) implementations of S-boxes for
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ASICs. With this preliminary work, we then discuss the methodology in which we count the number
of required gates to implement a particular S-box construction based on the Galois field multiplica-
tive inverse in Chapter 5. Our results consist of an extension of Canright’s [13] optimizations using
mixed basis representations of Galois field elements. We then conclude in Chapters 6 and 7 with a
presentation of our proposed 8-bit AES alternative S-boxes and 16-bit S-box constructions, as well
as a discussion of future work.
1.3 Mathematical Foundations
Galois Fields, commonly referred to as finite fields, and Boolean functions play a critical role in
the design, development, and analysis of a variety of cryptographic primitives. Galois fields are
commonly used to define efficiently computable cryptographic functions, such as the S-box in SPN
designs, whereas Boolean functions typically serve as tools for measuring the strength and resilience
of cryptographic operations to common cryptanalysis attacks. In this section we provide an intro-
duction to these mathematical constructs as a foundation for the rest of the thesis.
1.3.1 Galois Fields
Much of number-theoretical cryptography is founded upon the mathematical structures of groups,
rings, and fields. For completeness, we define these structures and their relevant properties below.
The reader may find a more rigorous treatment in [48].
Definition 2. An abelian group 〈G,+〉 consists of a setG and an operation + defined on its elements
that satisfies the following properties:
• G is closed under + (for all a, b ∈ G it is true that a+ b ∈ G)
• Associativity holds with respect to the + operator (for all a, b, c ∈ G it is true that (a+b)+c =
a+ (b+ c))
• Commutativity holds with respect to the + operator (for all a, b ∈ G it is true that a + b =
b+ a)
• There exists an identity element 0 ∈ G such that for all a ∈ G it is true that a+ 0 = a
• For all elements a ∈ G there exists a corresponding inverse element b ∈ G such that a+b = 0
A very common example of a group is 〈Z,+〉, that is, the set of integers with respect to the
addition operator.
Definition 3. A ring 〈R,+, ·〉 consists of a set R with two binary operations +, · defined on its
elements that satisfy the following properties:
• The structure 〈R,+〉 is an abelian group.
• The operation · is closed and associative over R.
• There is a neutral element for · in R.
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• The two operations + and · are related by the law of distributivity. That is, for all a, b, c ∈ R
it is true that (a+ b) · c = (a · c) + (b · c).
Again, a common example of a ring is 〈Z,+, ·〉, that is, the set of integers with the binary
addition and multiplication operators.
Definition 4. A structure 〈F,+, ·〉 is a field if the following two conditions are satisfied:
• 〈F,+, ·〉 is a commutative ring.
• For all elements of F, there is an inverse element in F with respect to ·, except for the element
0, the neutral (identity) element of 〈F,+〉.
More specifically, a structure 〈F,+, ·〉 is a field if and only if both 〈F,+〉 and 〈F \ {0}, ·〉 are
abelian groups and the law of distributivity applies. If the set of elements in F is finite, then F is a
Galois field. Such fields are commonly denoted as GF (p), where p is prime.
The set of polynomials over a field F is defined as F[x]/p(x), where p(x) is some irreducible
polynomial over F. If F is finite with p elements, making F a cyclic field, then GF (pn) defines the
set of polynomials over GF (p) modulo an irreducible polynomial p(x) of degree n. For complete-
ness, polynomial irreducibility is defined as follows.
Definition 5. A polynomial p(x) is irreducible over the field F if and only if there does not exist two
polynomials q(x) and r(x) with coefficients in F such that p(x) = q(x) × r(x), where q(x) and
r(x) are of degree > 0.
It is well known that for every cyclic Galois field GF (pn) there exists at least one element α
such that every element in the field, with the exception of the neutral element, can be computed
as αi for some 0 ≤ i ≤ 2p − 1. In this case, α is said to be a primitive element, or a generator,
of GF (pn). With the notion of a primitive element, we now introduce the concept of a primitive
polynomial.
Definition 6. A polynomial p(x) of degree n is primitive over the field GF (p) if and only if it is
irreducible over GF (p) and the element x is a primitive element of GF (pn).
Another important property to note is the characteristic of a Galois field GF (p), which is the
smallest positive integer k such that a+ a+ · · ·+ a︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
= 0 and a ∈ GF (p). In this work we focus
primarily on fields with characteristic 2, often referred to as binary Galois fields.
It is also useful to note the concept of a trace, given in the following definition.
Definition 7. The trace of an element α ∈ GF (pn) relative to the subfield GF (p) is defined as
TrGF (pn)/GF (p)(α) = α+ α
p + αp
2
+ · · ·+ αpn−1 .
In this case, the set {α, αp, αp2 , . . . , αpn−1} is the set of conjugates of α.
Finally, the cyclotomic coset Cs modulo 2n − 1 [50] is defined as
Cs = {s, s · 2, · · · , 2 · 2ns−1},
where ns is the smallest positive integer such that s ≡ s2ns−1 mod 2n − 1. Also, s is denoted as
the coset leader of the cyclotomic coset Cs. Computations of these sets deal with elements in the
residue integer ring modulo 2n − 1 (i.e. Z2n−1).
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1.3.2 Bases of Galois Fields
It is natural to represent an element in the field GF (pn) as a standard polynomial of the form
p(x) = an−1x
n−1 + an−2x
n−2 + ...+ a2x
2 + a1x+ a0,
where ai ∈ GF (p) are the coefficients of the polynomial.
However, when a more rigorous treatment of Galois field bases is needed, GF (pn) may be
viewed as an n-dimensional vector space over GF (p). As a vector space, we see that a basis must
exist for the field. For cryptographic applications, the standard (polynomial), normal, and dual basis
representations are important elements of study, though in this work we restrict ourselves to only
polynomial and normal bases. With a standard or polynomial basis for elements in GF (pn), the
basis elements are represented as successive powers of a primitive element of the field, denoted θi
for 0 ≤ i < n. That is, the basis β may be viewed as [θ0, θi, . . . , θn−1]. As a proper basis, every




n−2 + · · ·+ a1θ + a0,
where ai ∈ GF (p) for all 0 ≤ i < n.
With a normal basis representation for elements in GF (pn), the basis elements are defined as
θq
i
for 0 ≤ i < n, where θ is a primitive element of the field and all basis elements are linearly




, . . . , θp
n−1
]. With this basis, each
element α in the field may be represented as a linear combination of its elements, as shown below,
α = an−1θ
pn−1 + an−2θ
pn−2 + · · ·+ ap1θp + a0θ,
where ai ∈ GF (p) for all 0 ≤ i < n.
1.3.3 Composite Fields
Let GF (2k) be defined by the degree k irreducible polynomial r(z). We may define a polynomial
basis for this field as a set of k linearly independent elements as follows:
B1 = [1, α, α
2, ..., αk−1],




j , where aj is the coefficient for the αj term and aj ∈ GF (2). With this
representation, the field arithmetic operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and inversion
are defined with respect to B1 and the subfield GF (2) [1]. In this sense, we say that GF (2k) is
a degree k extension of GF (2), which means that polynomial coefficient arithmetic of GF (2k)
is performed over the subfield GF (2). However, we may refine these arithmetic operations by
choosing a different basis or by using a different construction method for the field. Recent research
has focused on the latter using composite fields [65, 67, 53, 13, 9].
Let k = nm, where n,m ∈ Z. With this constraint, it is possible to define GF (2k), which is
uniquely represented by the irreducible polynomial r(z), as a degree m extension of GF (2n). Any
extension field not defined over GF (2) is commonly referred to as a composite field (i.e. it is the
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functional composition of more than one extension field, where one of the fields in this composition
is an extension of GF (2)). We denote this composite field as GF ((2n)m), where GF (2n) is the
ground field over which the composite field is defined.
More specifically, a composite field is a pair {GF (2n), p(x) = xn +
∑n−1
i=0 pix
i, pi ∈ GF (2)}
and {GF ((2n)m), q(y) = ym +
∑m−1
i=0 qiy
i, qi ∈ GF (2n)} where GF (2n) is constructed from
GF (2) by p(x), and GF ((2n)m) is constructed from GF (2n) by q(y). We state that GF ((2n)m)
is a degree m extension of GF (2n). This form of extension means that the coefficients of the
polynomials in GF ((2n)m) are themselves elements of GF (2n), and thus all coefficient arithmetic
is performed in GF (2n).
Now, we represent elements in GF ((2n)m) using a new polynomial basis B2 as follows:
B2 = [1, β, β
2, ..., βm−1]
Note that now we have m linearly independent elements as opposed to k. Also, β is the root of
a primitive irreducible polynomial of degree m whose coefficients are in the base field GF (2n).






a′j ∈ GF (2n) for 0 ≤ j < m.
1.3.4 Boolean Functions
A Boolean functions is a function f : Fn2 → F2. For convenience, let Ωn be the set of all Boolean
functions on n variables, where |Ωn| = 22
n
. For all Boolean functions f ∈ Ωn there exists a unique
truth table (TT) or Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) representation [27]. The TT for a Boolean
function f is simply the vector (f(0̄), . . . , f(1̄))), where each element corresponds to an element
in F2 ∼= GF (2). The distance between two Boolean functions f, g ∈ Ωn is simply the number of
elements in the TT representation of f that need to change to make f = g. This can easily computed
by the Hamming distance between the respective truth tables for f and g.
Alternatively, we may represent Boolean functions in their ANF format as polynomials with
coefficients in F2. The process of translating a Boolean function f to its ANF representation is
called the the algebraic normal transform, and is defined as follows:
f(x0, . . . , xn−1) =
⊕
(a0,...,an−1)∈Fn2




1 . . . x
an−1
n−1 ,
where h is a Boolean function.
We denote the Hamming weight of a vector (x0, . . . xn−1) = x̄ ∈ Fn2 as HW(x̄). We denote
the dot product of two vectors x̄, ȳ ∈ Fn2 as x̄ ⊕ ȳ, and is defined as the scalar value x1y1 ⊕
x2y2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xnyn. The inner product of two vectors x̄, ȳ ∈ Fn2 , defined as the vector z̄ =
(x1y1, x2y2, . . . , xnyn), is denoted as x̄ · ȳ [27].
If we consider the ANF representation of a Boolean function as a nonzero polynomial function








where Ak ∈ F2nk , A2n−1 ∈ F2, γ(n) is set of all coset leaders modulo 2n − 1, and nk is the size
of the coset Ck. If f(x) is a balanced Boolean function, meaning that |{x : f(x) = 1}| = |{x :






The Walsh and Discrete Fourier transforms are also immensely useful in the mathematical study
of Boolean functions. In fact, Boolean functions f on Fn2 can be uniquely identified by their Walsh






= 2n − 2× HW(f(x̄)⊕ x̄ · w̄).
Informally, the Walsh transform of a given vector w̄ is the difference between the number of input
vectors x̄ for which f(x̄) = w̄ · x̄ and the number of input vectors x̄ for which f(x̄) 6= w̄ · x̄. Thus,
in a sense, we may interpret the Walsh transform of a particular Boolean function as the collective
similarity between f(x̄) and the linear function w̄ · x̄.
It is well known that F2n is isomorphic to Fn2 , so we may represent an element α ∈ F2n as an
n-dimensional vector w̄ over F2. With this observation, we may then seek to measure the similarity
of f(x̄) to all linear functions w̄ · x̄ by applying the Walsh transform to each possible input vector
w̄i, 0 ≤ i < 2n. The result of this procedure is the Walsh spectrum, which simply corresponds to
the vector [Wf (α0 ∼= w̄0),Wf (α1 ∼= w̄1), . . . ,Wf (α2n−1 ∼= w̄2n−1)].
1.3.5 S-Boxes as (n,m) Boolean Functions
S-boxes are traditionally defined as functions S : GF (2n)→ GF (2m), where n = m. In the case of
Rijndael, n = m = 8. In order to study such S-boxes using one-dimensional Boolean functions, it is
necessary to extend the definitions and representations of Boolean functions to multiple dimensions.
To do this, we define a vectorial Boolean function F : GF (2n) → GF (2m) (e.g. an (n,m) S-
box) using a vector of m component Boolean functions [17]. More specifically, we let F (x) =
(f1(x), . . . , fm(x)), where fi : GF (2n) → GF (2) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. S-boxes can therefore be
defined as (n,m) Boolean functions. In Section 2.2 we describe common measurements for (n,m)
Boolean functions as they are used in the context of cryptography.
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Chapter 2
Cryptographic Aspects of the Substitution Layer
2.1 Cryptanalysis Attacks
The substitution layer plays a critical role in the security of block ciphers designed with a substi-
tution layer for nonlinearity. Over the past several decades, many forms of cryptanalysis attacks
have been devised, implemented, and tested on full-size and “toy” versions of block ciphers. In this
section, we describe some effective attacks that exploit specific properties of the S-box during the
attack. Such attacks have already been studied by Kaminsky et al. [44] in the context of the AES,
who cover this topic in more breadth with additional information about side channel attacks, for
example. We refer the reader to their survey for more information on recent AES-specific crypt-
analysis results. In this work, we use the following attacks as motivation for measuring the strength
of S-boxes, which can be perceived as their relative resistance to these attacks. As we will show in
Chapter 3, these metrics are then used when designing cryptographically strong S-boxes. We stress
that this list of attacks is by no means exhaustive; it simply contains some of the most important
published attacks. For the purposes of this work, we chose to focus on this particular subset as they
are, in a sense, the most known.
2.1.1 Linear Cryptanalysis
Since S-boxes are typically the only source of nonlinearity and, consequently, confusion, in an
SPN design, it is critically important to understand the degree to which they can be approximated
as linear equations [72]. For the purposes of this section, we consider only bijective S-boxes S :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. In the context of linear cryptanalysis, we say that for each input element of the
S-box, which may be viewed as an n-dimensional vector of coordinates (x0, x1, . . . , xn−1), there
is a corresponding set of n independent random variables Xi, 0 ≤ i < n. Similarly, for each
output element of the S-box ȳ = (y0, y1, . . . , yn−1), there are n corresponding random variables
Yi, 0 ≤ i < n. However, these variables are not specifically independent from each other or from
the Xi variables, since the probability of the output depends on the input.
The underlying goal of linear cryptanalysis is to find and exploit some linear combination Xi,1⊕
Xi,1⊕· · ·⊕Xi,s = Yj,1⊕Yj,2⊕· · ·⊕Yj,t that is satisfied with a high (or low) probability. For an
ideal SPN, such relationships will be satisfied exactly half of the time for any selection of random
variables Xi,1, . . . ,Xi,s,Yj,1, . . . ,Yj,t. Should there exist some selection of random variables for
a linear combination such that the probability of satisfying the relationship is not 1/2, then this
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deviation, or bias, from the relationship can be exploited in a linear cryptanalysis attack. With
this goal as motivation, we begin our discussion of linear cryptanalysis with some more formal
definitions.
Definition 8. Let pi be the probability that Pr[Xi = 0]. We define the bias of xi, denoted εi, as the
quantity:




Now, we consider all possible 2n random variable combinations for n variables. For an S-box
with a 4-bit domain and range, we have a total of 8 random variables to examine, which, together,
correspond to the 4 input and 4 output bits. Therefore, there are 28 possible combinations that
can be used to calculate biases. Let the n-dimensional vectors a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) and b =
(b1, b2, . . . , bn), where ai, bi ∈ {0, 1} for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n correspond to these input and output
























Using the Piling-Up Lemma presented by Matsui [51], we have













where ε1,2,...,n is the bias of Xi⊕· · ·⊕Xn. This leads to the fundamentally simple (albeit very clever)
counting-based attack that is linear cryptanalysis. More specifically, if we use a counting-based
method for determining the bias for all possible linear combinations of input and output variables
Xi and Yj, we can identify input and output variables that are suitable candidates for conducting
a linear cryptanalysis attack. Treating the a and b vectors as binary numbers a and b, we may
tabulate NL(a, b), the number of tuples (x1, x2, ..., xn, y1, y2, ..., yn) such that (y1, y2, ..., yn) =












With the NL(a, b) table, we then compute the bias ε1,2,...,n by (NL(a, b) − 2n−1)/2n, and from
this, the probability pi that the linear combination Xi ⊕ · · · ⊕ Xn = 0 was satisfied, i.e. pi =
1/2− ε1,2,...,n.
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Algorithm 2 General Linear Cryptanalysis Attack
Require: P,K,Bx,By,S−1, l, m
1: Count[K]← [0...2lm]
2: for each K ∈ K do
3: Count[K]← 0
4: end for
5: for each (x, y) ∈ P do
6: for K ∈ K do
7: V ← []
8: for i = 1 to |By| do
9: v ← S−1(K ⊕ yBy [i])







13: if z = 0 then





19: K∗ = {0}lm
20: for each K ∈ K do
21: if Count[K] > max then
22: max← Count[K]




Using the example linear cryptanalysis attack presented in [72], we give a generalized procedure
for realizing this type of attack in Algorithm 2. We borrow the same notation from Stinson in which
plaintext elements x and ciphertext elements y are bit strings of length lm, which can be viewed as
the concatenation of l separate m-bit strings. With this notation, we refer to the ith block of length
m in a plaintext (ciphertext) element x (y) as xi (yi), 0 ≤ i < l. In our procedure we use P to
denote the set of all plaintext and ciphertext pairs collected prior to evaluation, and Bx and By are
sets of block (random variable) indexes that are used in the predetermined linear combination of
S-box input and output elements, respectively. That is, the indexes in Bx and By correspond to a
selection of random variables corresponding to a linear combination of input and output bits that
is satisfied with relatively high or low probability, as determined from the NL(a, b) table. Finally,
we denote the inverse S-box as S−1 and the set of all possible candidate keys as K, where for each
K ∈ K we have that |K| = |x| = |y| = lm.
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As previously stated, the goal of linear cryptanalysis is to find a set of linear approximations
of active S-boxes that help approximate an entire SPN algorithm throughout all of the rounds (with
the exception of the last). Matsui [51] showed that the complexity of this known-plaintext attack
(i.e. the number of plaintexts required for a successful attack) is proportional to ε−2, where ε is
the bias from 1/2 that a linear expression exhibited for the entire SPN-like block cipher. It is
generally known that larger S-box biases correspond to larger biases for every round of the block
cipher, which is expected since they are typically the only nonlinear components of the algorithm.
Therefore, studying the resiliency of S-boxes to this type of attack is critically important in the
design of cryptographically strong S-boxes. In Section 2.2 we will discuss the properties of S-boxes
in SPN designs that improve the algorithm’s resiliency to this type of attack.
2.1.2 Differential Cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis, first introduced as an attack on the Data Encryption Standard [4], is a
chosen plaintext attack that attempts to find and exploit certain occurrences of input and output
differences in the last round of a cipher that occur with a high probability [72]. Put another way, for
an ideally randomizing block cipher with a sufficiently strong S-box, the probability that a certain
output difference ∆Y = Yi ⊕ Yj will occur given an input difference ∆X = Xi ⊕ Xj is exactly
1/2n (where n denotes the number of bits in the input X). For future reference, the pair (∆X,∆Y )
is referred to as a differential. Thus, by finding output differences that occur with high probability
for each round of a target cipher, one can establish a relationship between the plaintext and input
to the last round of the cipher. Such a relationship is loosely referred to as a differential trail [29].
Then, by sampling a large number of plaintext and ciphertext pairs, the attacker can guess the key
by counting the number of times a given differential trail holds for a candidate key. In ciphers where
the round key schedule is invertible, this enables the attacker to uncover the secret key. Clearly, the
nonlinearity of the S-box plays a pivotal role in the establishment of the differential characteristic
for the entire cipher. Also note that in SPN designs, the key does not influence the coordinates of a
differential. For example, given the differential (∆X,∆Y ), we have the following:
∆Y = Yi ⊕ Yj
= (Xi ⊕K)⊕ (Xj ⊕K)
= Xi ⊕Xj ⊕K ⊕K
= Xi ⊕Xj
= ∆X
To carry out this attack, the attacker must collect a large sample of plaintext and corresponding
ciphertext pairs (X,Y ). Given that the S-box is the key to preventing this attack, the attacker then
computes a difference distribution table ND, where
ND(∆X,∆Y ) = |{(Xi, Xj) ∈ ∆X : S(Xi)⊕ S(Xj) = ∆Y }|.
One may observe that in an ideal S-box, ND(∆X,∆Y ) = 1 for all ∆X and ∆Y . However, this is
not possible with bijective S-boxes because ND(∆X,∆Y = ∆X) = 2n.
We denote the propagation ratio RD(∆X,∆Y ) = ND(∆X,∆Y )/2n, which may be inter-
preted as the probability that an output difference ∆Y occurs given a certain input difference ∆X .
Now assume that for a certain round r of a SPN cipher we find a differential (∆X,∆Y ) with a high
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propagation ratio, and further assume that ∆Y is equal to ∆X ′ in a differential (∆X ′,∆Y ′) with a
high propagation ratio in round r+ 1. We may then combine these differentials together, forming a
subset of the previously mentioned differential trail, and compute the resulting propagation ratio as
RD(∆X,∆Y ) · RD(∆X ′,∆Y ′). By continuing this process, we may obtain the propagation ratio
for a differential trail of the allNr−1 rounds of the block cipher (up to the last round). The attacker
can then use this differential trail to determine which candidate keys satisfy the input and output
difference with the highest probability. A generic description of this process is given in Algorithm
3. Note that we now require a new parameter Bt that contains the indexes that of the output elements
y and y′ such that yi = y′i for all i ∈ Bt. Counting keys that do not satisfy this constraint would
introduce random noise into the attack, and should thus be avoided.
2.1.3 XL and XLS Algebraic Attacks
Thanks to Courtois et al. [21], we know that it is possible to represent block ciphers as overdefined







bi,kxi + ck = 0,
and ai,j,k, bi,k, ck ∈ GF (2). Solving such a system is known to be an NP-hard [33] problem.
However, solving a system of linear equations can be done in polynomial time using techniques
such as Gaussian elimination. In 2000, Shamir, Courtois, Klimov, and Patarin [21] introduced a
technique known as eXtended Linearization (XL), which transforms a MQ problem of m equations
and n variables into a (much) larger system of solvable linear equations. This technique is an
extension of the “linearization” technique first introduced in [46].
The procedure works by first generating a set of D − 2 (D ≥ n/
√
m) new variables with all
powers less than or equal to D − 2. Referring to the example given in [47], if we have a set of
variables {x, y, z} with D = 4, then the resulting set of variables is {x, y, z, x2, y2, z2, xy, xz, yz}.
Each variable in this set is then multiplied by the original m equations. Then, for each resulting
equation, the individual monomial terms are all replaced by a distinct new variables. For example,
for an equation li = x3yz + xy = 0, we would generate a corresponding equation li = a+ b = 0,
where a = x3yz and b = xy, respectively. From here, we have a set of linear equations that can be
solved in polynomial time. Of course, the complexity of this process depends greatly on the selec-
tion of D and the original n and m parameters in the MQ system. Since the algebraic expression
of SPN ciphers has a direct impact on the form of the MQ system, it is clear that improving the
complexity of this expression helps thwart the success of this attack. A formal description of the
XL algorithm is shown in Algorithm 4.
To date, the XL attack has failed to break popular ciphers such as Rijndael and Serpent. How-
ever, Courtois and Pieprzyk [22] discovered a way to modify the XL attack to account for the sparse
set of equations that are introduced in the process. This variation, coined as the eXtended Sparse
Linearization (XSL) attack, is different in that the process by which new variables are defined and
then subsequently multiplied by the m equations in the MQ system is modified to only work with a
select set of monomials. This reduces the overall size of the resulting equations, and thus simplifies
the solving process. Courtois and Pieprzyk noticed that this select set of monomials in the multi-
plication step corresponds to those that already appear in other equations (i.e. they carefully select
monomials that do not introduce new variables into the resulting l′i equations). The most important
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Algorithm 3 General Differential Cryptanalysis Attack
Require: P,K,Bx,By,Bt,S−1, l,m
1: for each K ∈ K do
2: Count[K]← 0
3: end for
4: for each (x, y, x′, y′) ∈ P do
5: R← True
6: for i = 1 to |Bt| do




11: if R = True then
12: for each K ∈ K do
13: D ← []
14: for i = 1 to |By| do
15: v ← S−1(K ⊕ yBy [i])
16: v′ ← S−1(K ⊕ y′By [i])
17: D ← Append(D, v ⊕ v′)
18: end for
19: match← 1
20: for i = 1 to |By| do
21: match← match ∧ (D[i] = ∆Y ∗)
22: end for
23: if match = 1 then






30: K∗ ← {0}lm
31: for each K ∈ K do
32: if Count[K] > max then
33: max← Count[K]





Algorithm 4 Extended Linearization
Require: F,m, n,A = {l1, . . . , lr}




li, where k ≤ D − 2.
2: varMap = {}
3: for l′i = l′1 to l′k do
4: for j = 1 to |l′i| do . For each term in l′i
5: if pj 6∈ varMap then
6: v = |varMap|+ 1 . Generate a new variable not in the map
7: varMap[v] = l′i[j]
8: end if
9: l′i[j] = varMap[l
′
i[j]] . Perform substitution
10: end for
11: end for
12: Perform Gaussian elimination for the modified system of equations {l′1, . . . , l′r}.
13: while There exists at least one univariate equation l′i in the powers of xi do
14: Solve l′i over the field F
15: Simplify the set of equations {l′1, . . . , l′r}
16: end while
17: Perform backwards substitution to find the original variables
implication of this attack is that it does not grow with the number of rounds in the cipher, as is
the case with the traditional linear and differential cryptanalysis attacks. Rather, the complexity is
based solely on the structure of the cipher, and more specifically, on the complexity and degree of
the S-box algebraic expression.
2.1.4 Interpolation Attacks
Interpolation attacks consider the problem of representing a cipher as a high-order polynomial with
key-dependent coefficients [42]. The intuition behind this representation is that by then solving for
these coefficients it is possible to deduce the secret key. Given a field GF (2k), such a polynomial
p(x) is obtained using Lagrangian interpolation. In particular, with n = 2k distinct input elements










Jakobsen et al. [42] prove that for a given block cipher of block size l, one may express the ciphertext
as a polynomial of the plaintext, wherem is the number of coefficients in the polynomial. If l < 2m,
then it is possible to conduct an interpolation attack to find a polynomial to solve for computing the
output ciphertext of the cipher using input with a fixed number of bits. Furthermore, this process
can be carried out in O(l) time using l plaintexts encrypted with the same secret key. The authors
then extended this technique to solve for the actual secret key. Their attack is generalized in the
following theorem.
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Theorem 1. [42] Given an iterated block cipher of block size l, it is possible to express the ouput
from round Nr − 1 as a polynomial of the plaintext with m coefficients. With b key bits in the last
round, there exists an interpolation attack of time complexity O(2b−1(l + 1)) that requires l + 1
known plaintexts which can successfully deduce the secret key.
In the case of Rijndael, the polynomial used to represent the S-box is:
p(x) = 05x254 + 09x253 + F9x251 + 25x247 + F4x239 + 01x223 +B5x191 + 8Fx127 + 63,
where all coefficients are hexadecimal numbers, and thus elements of the field GF (28). This al-
gebraic expression was obtained using Lagrangian interpolation [29] (this technique is discussed in
more detail in Chapter 3). Since the degree of p(x) is 9, and so this class of interpolation attack is
not feasible. However, the algebraic simplicity of Rijndael’s S-box, which is directly correlated to
the complexity of the polynomial representation for the entire cipher, leaves many cryptographers
skeptical about its security and future susceptibility to related attacks.
2.2 Efficient Computations of Cryptographic Properties of S-Boxes
The strength of S-boxes can be measured in the context of Galois fields and Boolean functions.
In this section, we focus on several important measurements of the cryptographic strength of S-
boxes. We then present security metrics that can be used in the context of Boolean functions, such
as nonlinearity, resiliency, the strict avalanche criterion, and algebraic immunity. We also present
source code that may be used to efficiently compute such metrics.
2.2.1 Linear Approximation and Difference Distribution
With the advent of linear and differential cryptanalysis on SPN block ciphers, the contents of the
linear approximation and difference distribution tables, which are highly dependent on the S-box
used in such block ciphers, are critical in determining a particular construction’s susceptibility to
these attacks. Based on the definitions given in the preceding section, we can compute the NL(a, b)
matrix using the procedure outlined in Algorithm 5. The exhaustive nature of this algorithm yields
a time complexity of O(24n). As such, when n ≈ 16, computing this table cannot be done easily
on a normal computer. An ideal S-box will have probabilities around 0.5 for all input and output
combinations, meaning that linear combinations do not occur with non-random frequency, which is
needed to carry out a successful linear cryptanalysis attack.
As discussed in the previous section, differential cryptanalysis relies on the difference distribu-
tion table, ND(∆X,∆Y ). Since this table is generated from an exhaustive check of all input and
output differences, we compute it very similar to NL(a, b) using Algorithm 6. However, we now
only have a time complexity of O(22n).
2.2.2 Nonlinearity
Since Boolean functions are natural representations for S-boxes, the nonlinearity of Boolean func-
tions becomes fundamental in the assessment of the cryptographic strength of S-boxes. This is
particularly true with the advent of linear cryptanalysis attacks. Intuitively, a higher measure of non-
linearity means that linear approximations of an n-bit S-box will be satisfied with less frequency,
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Algorithm 5 NL(S, n)
1: NL ← zeros(1...2n − 1, 1...2n − 1)
2: for a = 0 to 2n − 1 do
3: for b = 0 to 2n − 1 do
4: for x = 0 to 2n − 1 do
5: for y = 0 to 2n − 1 do
6: if S(x) = y and HW((x ∧ a)⊕ (y ∧ b)) = 0 then






Algorithm 6 ND(S, n)
1: ND ← zeros(1...2n − 1, 1...2n − 1)
2: for x1 = 0 to 2n − 1 do
3: for x2 = 0 to 2n − 1 do
4: ∆X = x1 ⊕ x2
5: ∆Y = S(x1)⊕ S(x2)




which means that there will be less input and output sums for the S-box with high magnitude biases.
This will typically lead to more evenly distributed entries in the NL(a, b) table that are close to
2n−1, which yield biases of 0.
For a Boolean function f , the nonlinearityNl is defined as the minimum distance between f and




where d(f, g) =HW(f ⊕ g) (i.e. the Hamming distance between two functions f and g). The
maximum value forNl is 2n−1−2n/2−1. It is also convenient to use the Walsh-Hadamard transform
of a Boolean function f as Wf (u) =
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)f(x)⊕(u·x), where w ∈ Fn2 and w · x is the inner
product of the two vectors w, x ∈ F2 [27], to define the nonlinearity of a function f as






If n is odd then a Boolean function f is called maximally nonlinear if every element of the Walsh
spectrum belongs to the set {0,±2(n+1)/2} [54]. The same cannot be said for even values of n,










1 + 1 = 2
0 + 1 = 1
1 + 0 = 1
0 + 0 = 0
−1 + 1 = 0
−1 + 0 = −1
−0 + 1 = 1
−0 + 0 = 0
2 + 1 = 3
1 + 0 = 1
−1 + 2 = 1
−0 + 1 = 1
0 + 1 = 1
−1 + 0 = −1
−1 + 0 = −1
−0 +−1 = −1
3 + 1 = 4
−1 + 3 = 2
1 + 1 = 2
−1 + 1 = 0
1 +−1 = 0
−(−1) + 1 = 2
−1 +−1 = −2
−(−1) +−1 = 0
Figure 2.1: Visual depiction of the Fast Walsh Transform that is used to calculate the Walsh spec-
trum for the Boolean function f = (10101100).
nonlinearity for such functions is 2n−1 − 2n/2, and we call a function F maximally nonlinear if
it reaches this bound [31]. Maximally nonlinear Boolean functions are also called bent functions,
and were first introduced by Rothaus in 1976 [64]. Nyberg studied the properties and constructions
of bent functions using the discrete Fourier transform in [57]. Inspired by the notion of perfect
nonlinearity, we measured the nonlinearity of all bijective S-boxes over GF (28). The results of this
experiment are shown in Chapter 6.
In order to efficiently compute the nonlinearity of a Boolean function we use the Fast Walsh
Transform (FWT) to compute the Walsh spectrum of Boolean function [68]. A visual depiction of
how this algorithm operates given the truth table representation for a Boolean function is shown in
Figure 2.2.2. It is well known that the time complexity of the FWT is O(n lnn) (as observed in the
visual example). To illustrate this complexity, our Python code that implements the FWT is shown
in Listing 2.1.
Given the definition of nonlinearity based on the Walsh transform in Equation 2.1, we may com-
pute the nonlinearity of a Boolean function by taking the FWT of its truth table and then subtracting
half of the maximum absolute value entry in the output vector from 2n−1. We may use this same
approach to compute the nonlinearity of an S-box. First, observe that the definition of nonlinear-
ity for one-dimensional Boolean functions naturally extends to the nonlinearity of (n,m)-Boolean
functions, denoted asNl(F ), by considering the minimum nonlinearity over all linear combinations
of the m coordinate functions of F . We formalize this definition in the following [17]:
Nl(F ) = min
c∈Fm2
{Nl(c · F )} = min
c∈Fm2
{Nl(c0f0 ⊕ c1f1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ cm−1fm−1)}
Cryptographically strong S-boxes have high measures of nonlinearity, meaning that it is increasingly
difficult to approximate the S-box using a linear affine function. When constructing S-boxes we
must consider this as one of the primary metrics to optimize. To do so, we used the snippet of
Python code in Listing 2.2 to compute the nonlinearity of an (n, n) S-box, which essentially finds
the minimum nonlinearity among all 2n−1 non-zero linear combinations of the coordinate functions
of the S-box using the FWT.
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Listing 2.1 Python source code to compute the FWT for a Boolean function f .
def fwt(f): # f is a Boolean function represented as a TT of length 2ˆn
wf = []
for x in f:
if x == 0:
wf.append(1)
else: # Assume a proper truth table of only 1 or 0 entries
wf.append(-1)
k = len(f) # k = 2ˆn
n = int(math.log(k, 2))
sw = 1
bs = k - 1
while True:
li = 0
bs = bs >> 1
for b in range(bs, -1, -1):
ri = li + sw
for p in range(0, sw):
a = wf[li]
b = wf[ri]
wf[li] = a + b
wf[ri] = a - b
li = li + 1
ri = ri + 1
li = ri
sw = (sw << 1) & (k - 1)
if (sw == 0):
break
return wf
Listing 2.2 Python source code to compute the nonlinearity of an (n, n) S-box.
def bf_nonlinearity(f, n):
fw = fwt(f)
for i in range(len(fw)):
fw[i] = abs(fw[i])
return ((2**(n-1)) - (max(fw) / 2)) # nonlinearity from the Walsh transform
def nonlinearity(S):
order = len(S)
n = int(math.log(order, 2))
nl = 1 << order # over the top
for mask in range(1, order):
f = []
for x in range(0, order):
s = 0
for i in range(0, n):
if ((mask & (1 << i)) > 0) and ((S[x] & (1 << i)) > 0):
s = s ˆ 1;
f.append(s)
bfnl = bf_nonlinearity(f, n)





First introduced in 1994 by Nyberg [58], we say that an S-box S : GF (2n) → GF (2m) is δ-
differentially uniform if for all α ∈ GF (2n) and β ∈ GF (2m) we have
|{x ∈ GF (2n)|DαS(x) = β}| ≤ δ,
where DαS(x) = S(x + α) + S(x), α ∈ GF (2n), and β ∈ GF (2m). Equivalently, we say that
such an S-box S : GF (2n) → GF (2m) is δ-differentially uniform if S(x + α) + S(x) = β has
at most δ solutions in GF (2n). Differential cryptanalysis exploits the lack of uniformity in the
nonlinear S-box step of SPN block ciphers. Intuitively, an uneven distribution implies that there
exists a single element β ∈ GF (2m) that is mapped to with higher frequency given two different
input elements x and α. In an ideal SPN block cipher, the probability that a given input difference
∆X will yield a specific output difference ∆Y should be exactly 2−n, where n = m is the size
of the input and output elements. If an S-box is not differentially 1-uniform, then there will exist a
value β ∈ GF (2m) such that for any two randomly selected input elements x and α, DαS(x) = β
will be the output more than once. From an attacker’s perspective, this means that there will exist
an output difference ∆Y that occurs with higher probability for a select of input differences ∆X .
Cryptographically strong S-boxes have low values for δ, as this means the output of S is rel-
atively uniform and the frequency of a single output value cannot be easily exploited for an at-
tack. Differential uniformity was first studied in the context of the Data Encryption Standard, and
it was proven in [58] that if the round functions of Feistel-based ciphers similar to DES are δ-
differentially uniform, then the average probability to obtain a non-zero output for input x+ α, for
all x, α ∈ GF (2n), after 4 rounds (in a DES-like cipher) is bounded by 2( δ2n )
2.
Functions achieving this bound with δ = 1 are referred to as perfectly nonlinear. Functions
achieving this bound with δ = 2 are referred to as almost perfectly nonlinear functions [57]. In
practice, S-boxes with δ ∈ {1, 2} are rarely used because functions with simple algebraic expres-
sions that exhibit this property are difficult to find. Instead, S-boxes with δ = 4 are quite common
due to the use of the inverse power mapping in the AES [29]. More specifically, S-boxes of the form
S(x) : x−1 were shown to have δ = 4 with a Nl lower bound of 2n−1 − 2
n
2 in [58].
Our Python code to compute the differential uniformity of an S-box S : GF (2n) → GF (2n)
is shown in Listing 2.3. Given the exhaustive nature of this algorithm, its time complexity is on
the order of O((2n)3) = O(23n), making it a computationally difficult procedure for large values
of n. The time complexity is quite reasonable for n = 8, and as a result, we used this procedure
to compute δ for all bijective power mappings over GF (28). The results of this experiment are
discussed in Chapter 6.
2.2.4 Resiliency
Resiliency is a combination of balancedness and correlation immunity. Balancedness is a simple
property of Boolean functions; a Boolean function is balanced if the (Hamming) weight of its truth
table vector is 2n−1. A Boolean function f on n variables is said to have a correlation immunity
of order t, 1 ≤ t ≤ n, if the output is statistically independent for any fixed subset of at most t
variables. In other words, the output distribution probability is unchanged when at most t input
variables are kept constant. A Boolean function is said to be t-resilient if it is t-correlation immune
(CI) and balanced. Similar to the nonlinearity metric for (n,m) Boolean functions, an (n,m)
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for alpha in range(1, n):
for beta in range(n):
c = 0
for z in range(n):
if ((S[(z ˆ alpha)] ˆ S[z]) == beta):
c = c + 1
if (c > delta):
delta = c
return delta
Boolean function F is said to be t correlation immune if and only if all 2m − 1 Boolean functions
v · F, v ∈ Fm∗2 are t-th order correlation immune, and similarly, F is t-resilient if and only if all
functions 2m − 1 Boolean functions v · F, v ∈ Fm∗2 are t-resilient [16]. Resiliency is an important
property of cryptosystems with the advent of correlation attacks on stream ciphers [15] (a topic we
omitted from the previous section), which can be deterministically transformed to block ciphers and
vice versa. Higher orders of resiliency, and as a result, correlation immunity, are ideal for S-boxes.
Fortunately, there exists a very efficient way to determine if a Boolean function f is t-CI using
its Walsh spectrum [35]. In particular, it is a known fact that f is t-CI if and only if Wf (u) = 0 for
all u ∈ Fn2 , 1 ≤HW(u) ≤ t. Furthermore, by the properties of the Walsh transform, f is balanced
if and only if Wf (0̄) = 0. Using these two facts, we may easily determine the maximum t such that
f is t-CI and t-resilient using the two snippets of code shown in Listings 2.4 and 2.5.
Listing 2.4 Python code to compute the correlation immunity of an (n, n) S-box.
def correlationImmunity(S):
order = len(S)
n = int(log(order, 2))
for t in range(n):
if isCorrelationImmune(S, order, n, t) == False:
return t - 1
def isCorrelationImmune(S, order, n, t):
for mask in range(1, order): # omit the 0 function
f = []
for x in range(0, order):
s = 0
for i in range(0, n):
if ((mask & (1 << i)) > 0) and ((S[x] & (1 << i)) > 0):
s = s ˆ 1
f.append(s)
spectrum = fwt(f)
for x in range(order):




Listing 2.5 Python code to compute the resiliency of an (n, n) S-box.
def resiliency(S):
order = len(S)
n = int(math.log(order, 2))
for t in range(n):
for mask in range(1, order): # omit the 0 function
f = []
for x in range(0, order):
s = 0
for i in range(0, n):
if ((mask & (1 << i)) > 0) and ((S[x] & (1 << i)) > 0):
s = s ˆ 1
f.append(s)
spectrum = fwt(f)
if (spectrum[0] == 0): # balanced
for u in range(order):
if (wt(u) <= t and spectrum[u] != 0):
return t - 1
else:
return t - 1
With a time complexity ofO(n lnn) for the FWT, it is easy to see that each of these procedures
has a time complexity of O(n(2n(2n(n lnn)2n))) = O(n2 lnn23n). The exponential complexity
comes from the fact that for every 2n linear combinations of the n coordinate functions of the S we
must compute a new Boolean function of size 2n, perform the FWT, and then check all 2n entries
of the Boolean function to see if those indexes with weight at most t have a non-zero value in the
Walsh spectrum. We did not explore further optimizations to these procedures.
2.2.5 Algebraic Immunity
This metric is used to determine a Boolean functions resilience to attacks based on annihilators,
which are used to deduce a multivariate equation in the output of the function that have a low enough
degree to solve efficiently. Formally, an annihilator of a Boolean function f is another a Boolean
function g such that f ⊕ g = 0. Using low-degree annihilators it is sometimes possible to reduce
the degree of a Boolean function in a system of multivariate equations to a small enough value
such that the system of equations relating the Boolean function and state bits of a cryptosystem can
be solved in a reasonable amount of time. Motivated by the presence of low-degree annihilators,
the component algebraic immunity AIc(S) of an (n,m) S-box F is then defined in terms of the
algebraic immunity AI of the m component functions as follows:
AIc = min
c∈Fm2
{AI(c · F )} = min
c∈Fm2
{AI(c0f0 ⊕ c1f1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ cm−1fm−1)}
It is important to note that this metric is only really suited for LFSR-based ciphers, which is why we
did not discuss this type of algebraic attack in the preceding section. The concept of algebraic im-
munity for block ciphers not constructed on LFSRs has since been modified due to the introduction
of the XL and XSL attacks by Courtois et al. [22]. As the XL and XSL are algebraic attacks, their
establishment led to a new notion of algebraic immunity, which Courtois et al. defined as the values
Γ(r, s, t) = (t/s)dt/re and Γ′(r, s, t) = ((t − r)/s)d(t−r)/se. These metrics denote the resistance
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of an S-box (used in block ciphers) against the XSL attacks, where r is the number equations that
represent the S-box, s is the size (in bits) of the S-box (i.e. s = n), and t is the number of terms -
the sparsity of terms - that appear in the r equations. The difference between Γ and Γ′ depends on
the type of XSL attack; Γ corresponds to the attack that exploits knowledge of the key schedule of
a block cipher, whereas Γ′ does not rely on such information and, as a result, is more of theoretical
interest. If biaffine equations are used in the XSL attack, then t = s(s+2)+1, and if fully quadratic
equations are used in the XSL attack, then t = s(2s+ 1) + 1 [23]. If we know the dimension of the
S-box s, then the only remaining task is to determine r, the number of linearly independent biaffine
or fully quadratic equations. Courtois proved exact values for r for a variety of cryptographically
significant power mappings in [23]. Building upon this work, Yassir [54] generalized these results
into an algorithm to compute the number of linearly biaffine and fully quadratic equations for ar-
bitrary power mappings, which are transcribed in Algorithms 7 and 8, respectively. Both of these
algorithms have a very efficient time complexity of O(n2), making it very easy to determine the
effectiveness of the XSL attack on a particular S-box used in a block cipher.
2.2.6 Algebraic Complexity
As we briefly discussed earlier, S-boxes are traditionally based off of power mappings of the form
S(x) = xd for some exponent d. In the case of the AES, Fermat’s Little Theorem tells us that
d = 254 ≡ −1 over GF (28). The inverse power mapping inside this S-box is then augmented with
the affine transformation shown below:
l(x) =

1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0























Together, we have S(x) = g ◦ l ◦ f , where g(x) = x⊕ 63 and f(x) is the inverse power mapping.
Since l(x) is a GF (2)-linear mapping over GF (28), we may represent it as a linearized polynomial







(λ0, λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, λ5, λ6, λ7) = (05, 09, F9, 25, F4, 01, B5, 8F ),
in hexadecimal notation (i.e. elements in GF (28)). Together with the final GF (2)-linear addition



















Algorithm 7 Number of Linearly Independent Bi-Affine Equations (modified from [54])
Require: a, n > 1
1: cstl ← []
2: csts ← []
3: cs← Coset(a, 2n − 1)
4: cstl ← Append(cstl,Min(cs))
5: csts ← Append(csts, Len(cs))
6: for k = 0 to n− 1 do
7: cs← Coset(2k + a, 2n − 1)
8: cstl ← Append(cstl,Min(cs))
9: csts ← Append(csts, Len(cs))
10: end for
11: Sort cstl in ascending order and rearrange csts accordingly (i.e. if two elements in cstl are
swapped then the corresponding elements in csts should be swapped as well).
12: eqns← 0
13: for k = 0 to n do
14: if HW(cstl[k]) = 0 then
15: eqns← eqns+ (n− 1)
16: else if HW(cstl[k]) = 1 then
17: eqns← eqns+ n
18: else
19: if csts[k] < n then
20: eqns← eqns+ (n− csts[k])
21: end if
22: if k 6= n and cstl[k] = cstl[k + 1] then





We define the algebraic complexity as the number of terms in this linearized polynomial. So, for
the AES, the algebraic complexity is equal to 9. Some researchers fear that this is too low and
may render variations of interpolation attacks successful. As such, there has been ample work done
to increase the algebraic complexity to higher values. We discuss these results, in addition to our
method for finding suitable affine transformations to be used in S-box constructions, in Chapter 3.
2.2.7 Avalanche Effect
The avalanche effect is a very desirable property of block ciphers related to its measure of diffusion.
In general, a block cipher is said to exhibit the avalanche effect if for a single change in one bit
of the input, the output changes significantly [76]. We may classify this output change by saying
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Table 2.1: Strict Avalanche Criteria (SAC) visualization for the AES S-box.
Bit 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 132 132 116 144 116 124 116 128
1 120 124 144 128 124 116 128 136
2 132 132 128 120 144 128 136 128
3 136 136 120 116 128 136 128 140
4 116 128 116 132 128 128 140 136
5 116 132 132 120 120 140 136 136
6 136 136 120 132 120 136 136 124
7 132 144 132 136 124 136 124 132
that it changes each output bit to the same degree, in which case the cipher is said to exhibit the
strict avalanche effect (SAC). In the case of the AES S-box, the SAC can be visualized in Table 2.1,
where for each input bit we count the number of times each output bit changes. Since n = 8, we
expect that each entry should be close to 2n−1 = 27 = 128, which is exactly the case. Our code to
compute the SAC table for an S-box is shown in Listing 2.6 and has an obvious time complexity of
O(n2 lnn).
2.2.8 Branch Number
While not directly related to an attack specific to the S-box, the branch number Bn corresponds to




{HW(a) + HW(F (a))}
Nonzero elements are referred to as active because they determine which S-box elements will be
used in the subsequent round of the cryptographic primitive. As such, if the branch number is high,
then the diffusion of input (plaintext) bits will be high among the output (ciphertext) bits a single
round, which is an important criteria for the S-box.
It is also important to note that Ullrich et al. [74] define Bn in a different manner. In particular,
they consider the branch number across all rounds of the cryptographic primitive under analysis,
not just one. In doing so, they change the definition as follows:
Bn = min
a,b 6=a
{HW(a+ b) + HW(F (a) + F (b))}
Given the earlier definition of the difference distribution table, one can see that the branch number
depends on its contents. As a direct result, the branch number is influenced by the affine transforma-
tion that is part of the S-box step in a primitive. Therefore, we reserve the calculation of this value
until the final S-box has been constructed with the select power mapping and affine transformation
(see the following chapter for more details).
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Algorithm 8 Number of Linearly Independent Quadratic Equations (modified from [54])
Require: a, m, n = 2m > 1
1: cstl ← []
2: csts ← []
3: cstml ← 0, cstms ← 0
4: cs← Coset(a, 2n − 1), cstl ← Append(cstl,Min(cs)), csts ← Append(csts, Len(cs))
5: for k = 0 to n− 1 do
6: cs← Coset(2k + a, 2n − 1)
7: cstl ← Append(cstl,Min(cs))
8: csts ← Append(csts, Len(cs))
9: end for
10: for k = 1 to m− 1 do
11: cs← Coset((2k + 1)× a, 2n − 1)
12: cstl ← Append(cstl,Min(cs))
13: csts ← Append(csts, Len(cs))
14: end for
15: cs← Coset((2m + 1)× a, 2n − 1)
16: cstml ←Min(cs), cstms ← Len(cs)
17: Sort cstl in ascending order and rearrange csts accordingly (i.e. if two elements in cstl are
swapped then the corresponding elements in csts should be swapped as well).
18: eqns← 0
19: for k = 0 to n+m− 1 do
20: if 0 <HW(cstl[k]) ≤ 2 then
21: eqns← eqns+ n
22: else
23: if csts[k] < n then
24: eqns← eqns+ (n− csts[k])
25: end if
26: if k 6= n+m and cstl[k] = cstl[k + 1] then




31: if 0 <HW(cstml) ≤ 2 then
32: eqns← eqns+m
33: else
34: if cstms < m then





Listing 2.6 Python code to compute the SAC matrix of an (n, n) S-box.
def sac(S):
order = len(S)
n = int(log(order, 2))
bitBucket = []
for i in range(n):
bucket = []
for j in range(n):
bucket.append(0)
bit = 1 << i
for x in range(order):
xorDiff = S[x] ˆ S[x ˆ bit]
for b in range(n):
if (((1 << b) & xorDiff) != 0):






With the release of the Data Encryption Standard in 1977 [30] and the AES in 2001 [28], the
design of S-boxes as the primary nonlinear operation in SPN-like ciphers has received a great deal
of scrutiny from the research community. Cryptographically strong S-boxes must be resilient to
the attacks discussed in Section 2.1 of Chapter 2. Using the security metrics discussed in Section
2.2 we can determine the extent to which such attacks would be successful. In general, we seek to
build S-boxes that have high nonlinearity, low differential uniformity, high resiliency, high algebraic
immunity, and high algebraic complexity.
S-boxes built from power mappings over Galois fields, i.e. S(x) = xd where x ∈ GF (2n)
and 0 ≤ d < 2n, are quite common designs. While other possibilities exist, such as those based
on the cryptographic properties of Boolean functions, there are several limitations that make them
difficult to use in practice. For instance, they do not have simple algebraic expressions, which
means that hardware and software implementations must generally use lookup-table approaches for
storing the mappings. This may be acceptable for (n, n) S-boxes if n ≤ 8, but for larger values of
n this requirement severely hinders their practicality. As such, in this section we focus primarily on
power mapping constructions for 8 and 16-bit S-boxes and describe our rationale for the selection
of the inverse power mapping, as well as our algorithmic approach to constructing larger AES-like
S-boxes.
3.1 Galois Field Power Mapping Constructions
Nyberg’s 1994 paper entitled, “Differentially Uniform Mappings for Cryptography,” [58] is a fun-
damental piece of literature for constructing ideal power mappings. In fact, Rijndael’s selection of
the inverse mapping (i.e. f(x) = x−1 ≡ x2n−2) is credited to Nyberg’s work [29]. Power mappings
over the field GF (2n), that is, functions of the form f(x) = xd, are common functions used for
S-boxes because they generally have very elegant algebraic representations and may be efficiently
computed online. These functions are typically classified based on their exponents d. The known
exponents of power mappings over GF (2n) (n even) with substantially high nonlinearity and good
differential uniformity properties are shown in Table 3.1.
For S-boxes based on power mappings, it makes sense to impose the additional requirement
that they are bijective. Due to Fermat’s Little Theorem, it is easy to see that this only occurs when
gcd{d, 2n− 1} = 1. Interestingly, with this restriction and the constraint n = m = 16, many of the
possible values for d are discarded. For example, under the constraint that gcd{k, n} = 1 for Gold
exponents d = 2k + 1, it must be true that d ∈ {3, 9, 33, 129, 513, 2049, 8193, 32769}. However,
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Table 3.1: Table of highly nonlinear power mappings with good differential uniformity properties.
Name Exponent (d) Ref.
Inverse −1 ≡ 2n − 2 [58]
Gold 2k + 1, gcd{k, n} = 1 for some 1 ≤ k ≤ 2n − 1 [23]
Kasami 22k − 2k + 1, gcd{k, n} = 1 for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n/2 [23]
Dobertin 24k+3k+2k+k − 1 over GF (2n) with n = 5k [23]
Niho 2m + 2m/2 − 1 over GF (2n) with n = 2m+ 1 and m even [23]
2m + 2(3m+1)/2 − 1 over GF (2n) with n = 2m+ 1 and m odd
Welch 2m + 3 over GF (2n) with n = 2m+ 1 [23]
for each of these exponents, it can be checked that gcd{d, 2n − 1} 6= 1, and therefore we have no
Gold functions to consider for n = 16. The same holds true for all Welch, Niho, Dobbertin, and
Kasami exponents, as we prove in the following theorems.
Theorem 2. The set of Gold exponents {d : d = 2k + 1, gcd{d, 2n − 1} = 1, gcd{k, n} = 1} = ∅
if n = 16.
Proof. Observe that gcd{3, 216−1} = 3 and that the only eligible values for k such that gcd{k, 16} =
1 are k ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15}. We can generalize this to say that only odd values of k will form
Gold exponents. Thus, it suffices to show that gcd{3, 22m+1 + 1} = 3 for m ≥ 0. Equivalently, we
may prove that 22m+1 + 1 = 3q, which can be rewritten as 4m = 3q−12 for some integer q > 0. We



















2(3q − 1) = 3q
′ − 1
2
4(3q − 1) = 3q′ − 1
3q′ = 12q − 3
q′ = 4q − 1
Therefore, q′ is an integer that satisfies 4m+1 = 3q
′−1
2 .
Theorem 3. The set of Kasami exponents {d : d = 22k− 2k + 1, gcd{d, 2n− 1} = 1, gcd{k, n} =
1, 1 ≤ k ≤ n/2} = ∅ if n = 16.
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Proof. Observe that gcd{3, 216} = 3 and that the only eligible values for k such that gcd{k, 16} =
1 are odd positive integers. Thus, it suffices to show that gcd{3, 22(2m+1) − 22m+1 + 1} = 3.
Equivalently, we may show that 22(2m+1) − 22m+1 + 1 = 3q for some nonnegative integer q > 0.
We do this by induction on m. First, if m = 0, then we have
22 − 2 + 1 = 3,
where q = 1. If we assume that 22(2m+1) − 22m+1 + 1 = 3q, q > 1, then we must now show that
22(m+1)+1 − 22(m+1)+1 + 1 = 3q′ for some nonnegative integer q′ > q. We can solve for q′ as
follows:
22(2(m+1)+1) − 22(m+1)+1 = 3q′ − 1
22(2m+1)+4 − 22m+1+2 = 3q′ − 1
16(22(2m+1))− 4(22m+1) = 3q′ − 1
16(22m+1 + 3q − 1)− 4(22m+1) = 3q′ − 1
16(3q) + 12(22m+1)− 15 = 3q′
3(16q + 4(22m+1)− 5) = q′
Therefore, q′ is an integer that satisfies 22(m+1)+1 − 22(m+1)+1 + 1 = 3q′.
It is trivial to see that the sets of Niho, Dobbertin, and Welch exponents is also empty when
n = 16. The Dobbertin exponent set is empty because there does not exist a k ∈ Z such that
16 = 5k. Similarly, the sets of Niho and Welch exponents are also empty because n is even. As a
result, the only remaining power mapping choice from this list is the inverse exponent. However, for
the sake of exploring S-box alternatives for the AES, we exhaustively explored the nonlinearity and
differential uniformity of all bijective power mappings over GF (28). The results of this experiment
are discussed in Chapter 6.
3.1.1 Affine Transformations for Algebraic Complexity
While the power mappings discussed in the previous section provide ideal nonlinearity and differen-
tial uniformity, the algebraic expression of S-boxes defined solely by these functions only consists
of a single term. In order to avoid interpolation attacks, such expressions should have more terms
(be more complex), and the most common technique for increasing the complexity is to “surround”
the power mappings with an affine transformation. We already discussed the algebraic complexity
of the AES in Section 2.2.6. This metric was determined by finding the unique univariate linearized
polynomial, which must exist as a result of the Lagrangian Interpolation Formula (stated below),
for the S-box mapping over GF (2k), and then simply counting the number of terms in this poly-
nomial. In order to assess the affine transformation composed of a power mapping over GF (216)
we can reconstruct the linearized polynomial using Lagrangian interpolation. For completeness, we
illustrate this technique with a small example and a snippet of Magma code that can be used and
modified to determine the algebraic complexity of an arbitrary power mapping combined with any
affine transformation.
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Theorem 4. (Lagrangian Interpolation Formula, from [48]) For n ≥ 0, let a0, . . . , an be n + 1
distinct elements of a field F, and let b0, . . . , bn be n+ 1 arbitrary elements of F. Then, there exists
exactly one polynomial f ∈ F[x] of degree at most n such that f(ai) = bi for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. This










We may construct the Lagrangian interpolation polynomial manually or programmatically. For
illustration purposes, consider the following small example with the fieldGF (22) = {0, 1, α, α+1}
defined by the irreducible polynomial p(x) = x2 + x + 1. Given this field polynomial, we clearly
have that α2 ≡ α+1. Now, let z ∈ GF (22). In order to perform Lagrangian interpolation, we need
polynomials fz(x) with the property fz(z) = 1 and fz(y) = 0 if y ∈ GF (22) and y 6= z. We begin
by constructing f0(x), as we can then find the remaining polynomials f1(x), fα(x), and fα+1(x)
by means of linear substitution.
To find f0(x), we first construct the polynomial
g(x) = (x− 1)(x− α)(x− (α+ 1)).
Clearly, if x ∈ GF (22) \ {0}, then f0(x) = 0. Therefore, by the previously stated requirement, we
let f0(x) = g(x)/g(0) = g(x)/[(0− 1)(0− α)(0− (α+ 1))] = g(x)/(α2 + α) = g(x). Now, we
expand the terms in g(x) as follows:
g(x) =(x− 1)(x− α)(x− (α+ 1))
=(x2 − x− xα+ α)(x− (α+ 1))
=x3 − x2 − x2α+ xα− x2α− xα− xα2 − α2 + x2 − x− xα+ α
=x3 − x2(α2 + α+ 1) + 1(α2 + α)
=x3 + 1
Therefore, f0(x) = x3 + 1, and we can now construct f1(x), fα(x), and fα+1(x) as follows:
f1(x) = 1 + (x− 1)3
fα(x) = 1 + (x− α)3
fα+1(x) = 1 + (x− (α+ 1))3
Observe that, for all polynomials f1(x), fα(x), and fα+1(x), if x = z then fz(z) = f0(z − z) = 1,
and conversely, if x = y ∈ GF (22) and y 6= z, then fz(y − z) = 0 because f0(z) = 0 for all
non-zero elements in GF (22).
Finally, we arrive at the computation of the interpolation polynomial f(x). We may choose any
function F : GF (22)→ GF (22) and find the corresponding f(x) as follows:
f(x) = F (0)f0(x) + F (1)f1(x) + F (α)fα(x) + F (α+ 1)fα+1(x).
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In this example, assume we seeking an interpolation polynomial for the function F (x) = x+ 1,
x ∈ GF (22). We then derive f(x) as follows:
f(x) =F (0)f0(x) + F (1)f1(x) + F (α)fα(x) + F (α+ 1)fα+1(x)
=1(1 + x3) + α(1 + (x− 1)3) + (α+ 1)(1 + (x− α)3) + 0(1 + (x− (α+ 1))3)
=1 + x3 + α(1 + x3 + x2 + x+ 1) + (α+ 1)(1 + (x− α)3)
=x2α2 + x(α3 + α2 + α) + α4 + α3 + α
=x2(α+ 1) + x(1 + α+ 1 + α) + 1
=x2(α+ 1) + 1
We can now easily verify that f(x) is correct by plugging in each element z ∈ GF (22) and
comparing it to the expected output from F , as shown below:
f(0) =02(α+ 1) + 1 = 1
f(1) =12(α+ 1) + 1 = α
f(α) =α2(α+ 1) + 1 = (α+ 1)(α+ 1) + 1 = α2 + 1 + 1 = α+ 1
f(α+ 1) =(α+ 1)2(α+ 1) + 1 = (α+ 1)(α+ 1)(α+ 1) + 1 = α3 + α2 + α = 0
The Magma code used to compute the algebraic complexity of the AES S-box is shown below.
This code can be modified to support any type of affine transformation and power mapping combi-
nation with little effort. The (modified) output of this program is also shown below. As one can see,
it matches the derived linearized polynomial presented in [29].
f(x) = 05x254 + 09x253 + F9x251 + 15x247 + F4x239 + x223 +B5x191 + 8Fx127 + 63
Cui and Cao [26] proved that the algebraic complexity for any AES-like S-box (i.e. a function
S(x) = A ◦ P ) over GF (2n) is bounded by n + 1. For S-boxes over GF (216), an algebraic
complexity of 17 is well above the threshold for successful interpolation attacks, though its relatively
small value might still be cause for concern. To remedy this discomfort, Cui and Cao proposed the
affine-power-affine construction of the AES S-box, which is a function S(x) = A ◦ P ◦ B, where
A and B are affine transformations and P is the power mapping. This construction increases the
algebraic complexity without changing other cryptographically significant properties [26]. It is well
known that the nonlinear and differential properties of an S-box remain unchanged under affine
transformations. For that reason, we searched for an appropriate affine transformation separately
from the work of defining the underlying power mapping.
To find an such a transformation, we randomly created invertible matrices over GF (2), and for
each candidate matrix, performed the affine transformation with a random low-weight element in
the fieldGF (216). An example of one AES-like S-box using an affine transformation and its inverse
that did not yield any fixed points is shown below, where the irreducible polynomial for the field
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0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0





























































0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1








































The interpolation polynomial p(y) for the forward S-box, which is shown below, has 17 terms,
thus achieving the upper bound proved by Cui and Cao, and the inverse S-box likely has even
more. Unfortunately, due to memory constraints imposed by Magma, we were not able to finish the
Lagrangian interpolation process for the inverse S-box. Note that we use y as the indeterminate in
p(y) because we chose x as the primitive element of GF (216) in Magma, and thus we use powers
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of x to represent distinct elements in the field.
p(y) = x29186y65534 + x65006y65533 + x57441y65531 + x62505y65527+
x2287y65519 + x26263y65503 + x37821y65471 + x36087y65407+
x56248y65279 + x62458y65023 + x62964y64511+
x37304y63487 + x2571y61439 + x24416y57343 + x11823y49151+
x777y32767 + x1137
Algorithm 9 provides a non-deterministic procedure to search for an appropriate affine transfor-
mation for a field F, which, in our case, is the field GF (2k) defined by the irreducible polynomial
p(x). Using the same rationale for the affine transformation selection presented by Dameon and
Rijmen in [29], we search for affine transformations that have a “complex algebraic expression if
combined with the inverse mapping” and, together with the inverse operation, have “no fixed points
and no opposite fixed points.” In this context, a fixed point or opposite fixed point occurs when there
exists an element a ∈ GF (2k) such that one of the following hold
S(a)⊕ a = {0}k
S(a)⊕ a = {1}k
Also, due to the randomized, non-deterministic nature of this procedure, we cannot place any bound
on its running time. However, during the course of this work, we did not encounter a case where the
algorithm failed to terminate in a reasonable amount of time. It is conceivable that for k > 16, this
procedure would not terminate quickly.
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// Build GF(2ˆ8), an extension of GF(2)
Q := Xˆ8 + Xˆ4 + Xˆ3 + X + 1;
F256<x> := ext<F | Q>;
// Powers for the S-box function (affine function matrix and power map exponent).











constant := xˆ6 + xˆ5 + x + 1;
power := -1;
// Build up the input/output pairs for interpolation.
Input := [];
Output := [];
for e in F256 do
Input := Append(Input, e);
// 0 has no inverse.





// Perform the matrix product (linear mapping).
v := Transpose(Matrix([Reverse(s)]));
prod := affine * v;







elem := SequenceToElement(Reverse(es), F256) + constant;
Output := Append(Output, elem);
end for;
// Perform Lagrangian interpolation and display the polynomial.




Algorithm 9 AffineSearch(F, n, d)
1: done← False
2: repeat
3: A← RandomMatrix(GF (2), n, n)
4: c← RandomElement(F)
5: if det(A) 6= 0 then . Only consider invertible matrices
6: valid← True
7: for each e ∈ F do
8: if e is not a fixed point then







15: if valid = True then
16: p(y)← Interpolate(S(x))
17: p−1(y)← Interpolate(S−1(x))
18: if #p(y) > n and #p−1(y) > n then




23: until done = False
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Chapter 4
Combinational Logic Minimization Techniques
4.1 Optimizing Linear Transformations
As we will show in Chapter 5, the isomorphism functions and their inverses can be seen as binary
matrix multiplications. Therefore, it is natural to attempt to optimize these matrix multiplications
by reducing the total number of XOR gates required in a combinational implementation. Formally,
this problem is known as the Shortest Linear Program (SLP) problem. We borrow the notation of
[7] to describe it in sufficient detail. Let F be a field and let E be a set of m linear forms over the
field F, similar to those shown below.
α1,1x1 + α1,2x2 + · · ·+ α1,n
α2,1x1 + α2,2x2 + · · ·+ α2,n
. . .
αm,1x1 + αm,2x2 + · · ·+ αm,n,
where αi,j ∈ F, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are variables over F. For later reference,
note that it is often convenient to store the coefficients αi,j in an m× n matrix A over GF (2). We
can model this computation as a linear straight-line program, in which each line of the program is
of the form u := λv+µw, where λ and µ are elements in F and u, v, and w are variables, and some
lines map directly to the output of the corresponding linear form. Linear straight line programs
are also constrained in that variables cannot be multiplied together. An optimal linear straight line
program is the shortest such linear program that computes a set of linear forms, where the length of
the program is measured in terms of the number of lines. If we consider linear forms over GF (2),
then minimal straight line linear programs correspond to the smallest linear circuit consisting of
only XOR gates that compute the same set of linear forms.
A linear straight line program over GF (2) is said to be cancellation free if and only if for every
line u := v + w, the expressions for v and w do not contain any shared variables. For example, if
v = x1 +x2 and w = x1 +x3, then u = v+w+(x1 +x2)+(x1 +x3) = x2 +x3 after cancellation.
If the x1 variables were factored out of the expressions for v and w, then we would obtain a shorter,
possibly cancellation-free program. However, this process of factorization does not always yield
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optimal linear straight line programs. To show this, consider the following set of linear forms:
y0 := x1 + x2
y1 := x1 + x2 + x3
y2 := x1 + x2 + x3 + x4
y3 := x2 + x3 + x4
The equivalent optimal cancellation-free program for computing this linear form is as follows:
u1 := x1 + x2 (y0)
u2 := u1 + x3 (y1)
u3 := u2 + x4 (y2)
v1 := x2 + x3
u4 := v1 + x4 (y3)
However, if we allow cancellation, we may compute this same program in only four lines:
u1 := x1 + x2 (y0)
u2 := u1 + x3 (y1)
u3 := u2 + x4 (y2)
u4 := u3 + x1 (y3)
Obtaining the optimal straight line linear program (represented as a linear circuit) for a particular
set of linear forms is an NP-hard problem; there exists a polynomial time reduction from VERTEX-
COVER [7], one of Karp’s 21 NP-COMPLETE problems [45]. Boyar and Peralta also showed that
techniques for producing optimal cancellation-free straight line programs has an approximation ratio
of at least 3/2 [7], making the most approximation techniques for optimizing sets of linear forms
with 16 equations (i.e. those used for 16× 16 binary matrix multiplications) far from optimal.
4.1.1 Heuristic-Based Optimizations
The majority of the work focused on trying to find optimal straight line linear programs is based on
greedy algorithms flavored with decision heuristics. To date, some of the most effective heuristics
are those based on the greedy factorization technique presented by Paar [61]. The algorithm is quite
simple and works as follows. At each iteration the pair of distinct variables xi + xj that occurs
most frequently among the set of linear forms is determined. Then, a new variable xµ = xi + xj
is introduced and substituted into all linear forms that contained the pair xi + xj . During the next
iteration of the algorithm, the new variable xµ is considered when selecting the new most frequently
occurring pair, and the variable selection and substitution process repeats. The algorithm terminates
when there are no pairs of variables that are shared across more than one form. Algorithm 10 gives
a complete description of this procedure. As indicated by Paar, the greedy nature of this algorithm
means that it only achieves a locally optimal solution; it is not globally optimal. However, he
does not a modification to the algorithm that can improve the results, where instead of considering
a single pair of variables that is shared with the highest frequency among all linear forms, one
considers all pairs of variables that occur with the highest frequency.
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Algorithm 10 Greedy linear form optimization [61]
Require: A binary matrix A representing a set of linear forms, where each linear form has length
n




5: maxj ← 0
6: repeat
7: for i = 0→ m− 1 do
8: for j = 0→ m do
9: coli←GETCOLUMN(M, i)
10: colj ←GETCOLUMN(M, j)
11: if HW(coli & colj) > hmax) then
12: hmax←HW(coli & colj)
13: maxi← coli




18: if hmax > 1 then
19: maxcoli←GETCOLUMN(M,maxi)
20: maxcolj ←GETCOLUMN(M,maxj)
21: newcol← maxcoli & maxcolj
22: PUTCOLUMN(M, newcol,m+ 1)
23: PUTCOLUMN(M,NEGATE(newcol & maxcoli),maxi)
24: PUTCOLUMN(M,NEGATE(newcol & maxcolj),maxj)
25: m← m+ 1
26: end if
27: until hmax ≤ 1
28: return M
For 16 × 16 matrices, Paar’s algorithm was shown to provide an improvement (in terms of the
number of XOR gates required) of approximately 47.2%. As an example of this algorithm, consider
the following set of linear forms:
y0 := x0 + x1 + x2
y1 := x1 + x3 + x4
y2 := x0 + x2 + x3 + x4
y3 := x1 + x2 + x3
y4 := x0 + x1 + x3
y5 := x1 + x2 + x3 + x4
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We may represent this set of linear forms with the binary matrix A as follows:
A =

1 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 1

This can then be computed using a linear circuit with 8 XOR gates. However, upon careful inspec-
tion it is clear that there exists many redundancies in this circuit (e.g. the sum x1 + x2 is computed
more than once). If we remove all such redundant computations through greedy factorization, we
find an equivalent linear circuit with a smaller gate count shown below in matrix form.
A =

0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1

In 2009, Daniel Bernstein [3] published another algorithm for optimizing software implemen-
tations of linear maps modulo 2 (i.e. linear forms with coefficients in F2). The main idea of
this algorithm is as follows: given the linear forms L0, L1, . . . , Lq−1, input vector x and out-
put vector y, both of length q, compute the q dot products L0 · x, L1 · x, . . . , Lq−1 · x, where
L0 ≥ L1 ≥ · · · ≥ Lq−1 and store the results in the coordinates of y. Motivated by the Bos-Coster
approach [63], the algorithm recursively computes (L0−L1) ·x, L1 ·x, . . . , Lq−1 and then adds y1
into y0 (i.e. y0 + y1 = L0 − L1 + L1 = L0). A modified description of the algorithm is given in
Algorithm 11.
For 16× 16 matrices, Bernstein reported that the average cost after zero elimination, divided by
16× 16 = 256, was 0.2694, meaning that the average cost for a 16× 16 matrix multiplication over
GF (2) was 16× 16× 0.2694 = 68.9664 XOR gates, which is more than the reported 59.1 average
from Paar’s technique. In general, our experiments confirm that, on average, Bernstein’s technique
yields linear programs with a larger number of gates than Paar’s greedy factorization technique.
Boyar and Peralta [10] introduced another heuristic in 2012, which appears to offer the best
results since Paar’s technique. At a high level, the algorithm greedily searches for the smallest
linear circuit that is equivalent to the input set of linear forms by building new linear combinations
of functions from a set of “known” functions. More formally, the algorithm works by continually
decreasing the distance δ(S, f), which is the minimum number of additions from functions in S
necessary to obtain the predicate f , for each f0, . . . , fn−1, where f0, . . . , fn−1 are the n linear forms
being optimized. The original “base” of S consists of the functions corresponding to the predicate
variables x0, . . . , xn−1. The algorithm iterates while the δ(S, fi) 6= 0 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, and at
each iteration adds a new base function Sµ = Si + Sj for some pair of base functions Si and Sj to
S, updates the distances δ(S, fi) for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, and then repeats. The selection of Si and Sj
is made such that the new distances are minimized, where ties are handled according to one of the
following rules:
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Algorithm 11 Bernstein recursive optimization (transcribed from [3])
Require: q Linear forms L0, L1, . . . , Lq−1, each of length p, and input and output vectors x and y
such that |x| = |y| = q
1: if q = 0 then
2: Stop.
3: end if
4: if p = 0 then
5: Generate code that sets yi = 0 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1.
6: Stop.
7: end if
8: Find j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} that maximizes Lj in reverse lexicographical order.
9: if Lj [p− 1] = 0 then
10: Recurse with L′k = (Lk[0], . . . , Lk[p− 2]) for each k = 0, 1, . . . , q − 1.
11: Stop.
12: end if
13: if q ≥ 2 then
14: Find i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} \ {j} that maximizes Li in reverse lexicographical order.
15: if Li[p− 1] = 1 then
16: Recurse with L′k = Lk for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q− 1} and L′j = Lj ⊕Li, and “insert” one
XOR gate that adds xi and xj and stores the result in xj .
17: Stop.
18: end if
19: Recurse with L′k = Lk for each k = 0, 1, . . . , q − 1 except that L′j [p− 1] = 0, and “insert”
one XOR gate that adds xp−1 into output bit yj .
20: Stop.
21: end if
1. Maximize the Euclidean norm of the vector of distances.
2. Maximize the square of the Euclidean norm minus the largest distance.
3. Maximize the square of the Euclidean norm minus the difference of the largest two distances.
4. With probability p = 0.5 select the first possible base pairs out of the set of possibilities, and
with probability 1− p = 0.5 apply the Euclidean norm rule and choose the largest one.
In cases where optimal linear programs are needed, these heuristic-based approximations are not
always effective. Fuhs and Schneider-Kamp [34] were able to cleverly encode a linear program of
length k for set of linear forms f1, . . . , fm into first order propositional logic. If a satisfiable model
for the equivalent Boolean formula φ exists, then the shortest linear program is easily reconstructed
from the model. Otherwise, there does not exist a straight line linear program of length k that
computes the m linear forms.
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Table 4.1: Comparison of different optimization algorithms for the target 16 × 16 and 32 × 16
matrices in this work. The average XOR counts were gathered by populating the entries of matrices
with nonzero entries with probability p = 0.5 over a series of 500 trials.
Matrix Size Algorithm Average XOR Count
16× 16 Paar Factorization 58.14
16× 16 Boyar-Peralta Optimization #1 50.09
16× 16 Boyar-Peralta Optimization #2 50.11
16× 16 Boyar-Peralta Optimization #3 50.09
16× 16 Boyar-Peralta Optimization #4 53.1
16× 16 Bernstein Optimization 85.0
32× 16 Paar Factorization 103.89
32× 16 Boyar-Peralta Optimization #1 83.22
32× 16 Boyar-Peralta Optimization #2 83.27
32× 16 Boyar-Peralta Optimization #3 83.22
32× 16 Boyar-Peralta Optimization #4 88.15
32× 16 Bernstein Optimization 146.66
For a system of m linear forms with input coefficients represented with a binary matrix A, the
optimal length k∗ of an equivalent straight line linear program lies in the closed interval [m, |A|1−
m − 1]. Using this fact and the provably correct method to determine if a linear program of length
k exists for a particular set of linear forms, the authors then search for the optimal solution by
iteratively applying the SAT solver technique for consecutive values of k in decreasing order until
an unsatisfiable instance is found. Once this limit is reached, the optimal value of k∗ must be then
k + 1.
This technique was tested on the upper and lower linear transformations that make Boyar and
Peralta’s area-efficient S-box. It was able to verify their k∗ = 23 linear program length presented in
[10]. While, the k = 20 case is trivially shown to be unsatisfiable due to the pigeonhole principle,
the SAT instance for k ∈ {21, 22} proved to be too difficult for modern SAT solvers to solve, even
with various preprocessing and tuning techniques presented in the paper. Since replicating this work
and implementing this procedure is nontrivial, we leave the experimentation with this technique on
the matrix candidates in this work to future work.
4.1.2 Improving Linear Circuit Minimization Efficiency
We implemented the previously discussed algorithms in our circuit optimization library and tested
the results of each one for 16× 16 and 32× 16 matrices, which are of interest in this work. Our re-
sults, which are summarized in Table 4.1, clearly show that the Boyar-Peralta heuristic optimization
technique yields the smallest values for all cases with little difference between the four different tie
breaking rules.
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While these heuristic-based optimization techniques may come close to optimal solutions, doing
so is not guaranteed. In the context of cryptographic applications, Canright was the first to utilize
an exhaustive, tree-based search for optimal cancellation-free linear programs [13]. The algorithm
works by recursively inserting a new variable xµ = xi + xj for all pairs of variables xi and xj that
are shared by more than one linear form and returning the selection that yields the smallest number
of gates. We give a complete description of the procedure in Algorithm 12. Due to the combinatorial
complexity of the algorithm, it is difficult to quantify its exact running time.
Algorithm 12 SequentialExhaustiveFactor(M , m, g)
1: g′ ← g
2: for i = 0→ m− 1 do
3: for j = 0→ m do
4: coli←GETCOLUMN(M, i)
5: colj ←GETCOLUMN(M, j)
6: if HW(coli & colj) > 1) then
7: M ′ ← COPY (M)
8: newcol← maxcoli & maxcolj
9: wt←HW(newcol)
10: PUTCOLUMN(M ′, newcol,m+ 1)
11: PUTCOLUMN(M ′,NEGATE(newcol & maxcoli),maxi)
12: PUTCOLUMN(M ′,NEGATE(newcol & maxcolj),maxj)
13: gc←SequentialExhaustiveFactor(M ′,m+ 1, g − wt+ 1)
14: if gc < g′ then






The only optimizations applied to this algorithm were elementary pruning techniques to avoid
redundant tree branches. To our knowledge, no one has explored parallel implementations of this
algorithm. Therefore, this is a fruitful opportunity to increase the dimension of matrices which
can be fully optimized, thereby aiding our optimization step for 16 × 16 matrices. The parallel
implementation of the algorithm, written in Java, makes use of the fork/join parallel programming
pattern to perform a breadth first traversal of the matrix factorization tree. The algorithm is driven
by a collection of worker threads which retrieve matrices from a pool of those discovered during the
breadth-first traversal of the tree. The worker threads are managed by the Java ForkJoinPool service
which execute an optimize() method in a class entitled ParallelMatrixOptimize. A thorough
snippet of the source code for the parallel factorization program is shown in Appendix C, and the
pseudocode description of the entire parallel algorithm is presented in Algorithm 13.
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Algorithm 13 ParallelExhaustiveFactor(M , m, g)
1: g′ ← g
2: P ← []
3: for i = 0→ m− 1 do
4: for j = 0→ m do
5: coli←GETCOLUMN(M, i)
6: colj ←GETCOLUMN(M, j)
7: if HW(coli & colj) > 1) then




12: T ← []
13: for (i, j) ∈ P do
14: M ′ ← COPY (M)
15: newcol← maxcoli & maxcolj
16: wt←HW(newcol)
17: PUTCOLUMN(M ′, newcol,m+ 1)
18: PUTCOLUMN(M ′,NEGATE(newcol & maxcoli),maxi)
19: PUTCOLUMN(M ′,NEGATE(newcol & maxcolj),maxj)
20: T ← Append(T, (M ′,m+ 1, g − wt+ 1))
21: end for
22: R← invokeAll(ParallelExhaustiveFactor(T ))
23: for r ∈ R do
24: if r.gc < g′ then




We present a comparison of the performance against the Canright’s sequential version (trans-
lated from his C program to Java) and our parallel factorization algorithm in Table 4.1.2. On average,
factoring matrices larger than 10 × 10 and 14 × 7 took an unreasonable amount of time to finish
for the purpose of this experiment, as insinuated by Canright [13]. This led us to not pursue any
further techniques for optimizing this particular algorithm. As a result, an exhaustive factorization
for 16× 16 and 32× 16 matrices, which are the focus in this work, needed to be done with different
and more efficient optimization techniques.
In addition to parallelizing the exhaustive factoring algorithm, we also implemented a parallel
version of Boyar and Peralta’s technique using the Parallel Java library [43]. During the course of
our preliminary experiments we observed that the computation of δ(S, f) was responsible for a large
portion of program’s overall execution time. Therefore, to speed up this computation, our parallel
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Table 4.2: Comparison of the factorization time using the sequential and parallel factorization pro-
grams.
m× n Sequential Time (msec) Parallel Time (msec)
7× 7 16 15
8× 8 16 17
9× 9 188 79
10× 10 4625 1703
12× 6 9 9
14× 7 247 93
version of this technique evenly distributes and performs computation of δ(S, f) using multiple
threads on an shared-memory multiprocessor (SMP) machine, thus enabling faster speedups as the
dimension of the input set of linear forms increases (small sets of linear forms suffer from overhead
of the parallel computing framework - i.e. thread team configuration and synchronization). See
Appendix C for a snippet of the source code for this program.
To study the performance gains of the parallel equivalents of this algorithm, we first denote the
input problem size N as the number of elements in the matrix representing the linear forms, T as
the execution time for a particular program run, and K as the number of processors available for
computation. We define sizeup as the ratio of the problem size solved for a given execution time to
the number of processors available for computation, captured below as
Sizeup(T,K) = Npar(T,K)/Nseq(T, 1)
Similarly, we define speedup as the ratio of the problem execution time for a given problem size to
the number of processors available for computation, captured below as
Speedup(N,K) = Tseq(N,K)/Tpar(N,K)
Since both sizeup and speedup are important when scaling up to 16× 16 and 32× 16 matrices, we
measured each for K = 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8 processors to see how the parallel implementations scaled
and approached the limit imposed by Amdahl’s law. The results from these experiments for the
first tie breaker in Boyar and Peralta’s technique on an eight-processor SMP machine with with four
UltraSPARC-IV dual-core processors, a 1.35 GHz clock frequency, and 16 GB of main memory are
shown in Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. Notice that, although we appear to achieve efficient speedups
limited by Amdahl’s law, our the parallel implementations do not achieve efficient sizeups. This is
an indication that running these programs on larger problems may not yield improved running times.
Even still, our results show significant improvements for the 16× 16 and 32× 16 matrices that are
the focus of this work, thus enabling us to process many more linear programs in a shorter amount
of time. As a result, these parallel implementations should prove useful for related research.
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Figure 4.1: Speedup metrics for the parallel implementation of Boyar and Peralta’s technique using
tie breaker #1 with 16×16 matrices. In these graphs we useN = 1 to denote 7×7 matrices,N = 2
to denote 8× 8 matrices, etc.
Figure 4.2: Speedup metrics for the parallel implementation of Boyar and Peralta’s technique using
tie breaker #1 with merged 32 × 16 matrices. In these graphs we use N = 11 to denote 22 × 11
matrices, N = 2 to denote 24× 12 matrices, etc.
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Figure 4.3: Sizeup metrics for the parallel implementation of Boyar and Peralta’s technique using
tie breaker #1 with merged 16 × 16 and unmerged matrices. This data was collected by running
tests for matrices of size 7× 7 to 16× 16 matrices.
Figure 4.4: Sizeup metrics for the parallel implementation of Boyar and Peralta’s technique using
tie breaker #1 with merged 32 × 16 and unmerged matrices. This data was collected by running
tests for matrices of size 22× 11 to 32× 16 matrices.
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4.2 Optimizing Nonlinear Circuits
While effective heuristics exist for optimizing linear circuits to reduce the number of required XOR
gates, the problem becomes significantly more difficult if variables the straight line program can be
multiplied together. As multiplication can usually be regarded as a more expensive operation than
addition, we are generally interested in minimizing the number of multiplications required to com-
pute a particular function. In NAND-based CMOS technology, AND/NAND gates are significantly
cheaper than XOR gates because the former are used to build the latter. We disregard this detail for
the purpose of working on the more general problem of minimizing the required multiplication op-
erations, which is known as the multiplicative complexity. In fact, this is the problem that motivated
the two-step Boolean logic minimization technique pioneered by Boyar and Peralta [10]. Shannon
[70] and Lupanov [49] showed that almost all Boolean functions on n inputs have a Boolean circuit
complexity of about 2
n
n , and Boyar et al. [6] later showed that the common multiplicative complex-
ity is 2n/2. Of course, these upper bounds do not hold for all Boolean functions, and as such, the
problem of optimizing nonlinear circuits (or parts of a circuit) is related to the difficulty of attain-
ing functions with polynomial multiplicative complexity. In this work we assume that the Boolean
functions are not symmetric. That is, the output of such functions does not depend solely on the
Hamming weight of the input. Given that this is a much more difficult problem to solve than sym-
metric Boolean functions [6], the more effective techniques for finding minimal nonlinear circuits
have been randomized, heuristic-based searches. In the following section we describe some relevant
techniques that have been applied in the context of cryptography and discuss our modifications on
multiplicative inversion circuits for GF (24).
4.2.1 Ad-Hoc Heuristics
Perhaps the most effective heuristic to date for optimizing small nonlinear components of large
circuits is the ad-hoc search heuristic developed by Boyar and Peralta [10]. Inspired by techniques
from automatic theorem proving, the core of their algorithm tries to construct an equivalent small
area and low depth function for a given input function. Boyar and Peralta refer to the input columns
of the truth table for a Boolean function f as known signals, and the output column of the same
truth table as the signal of f . Then, for any two known signals u and v for functions g and h, the
sum u⊕ v (product u ∧ v) is equivalent to the signal of the function g ⊕ h (g ∧ h).
Their ad-hoc optimization algorithm wraps this function construction technique with a ran-
domized search for an optimal function g that is equivalent to the input function f but has a lower
multiplicative complexity. The iterations of this search are then divided into XOR and AND rounds,
each of which will randomly select a specified number of signal pairs (u, v) from the signal set of a
working function f and then compute their sum or product, depending on the type of round. Then,
the algorithm checks to see if the resulting function u ⊕ v or u ∧ v is equivalent to the input func-
tion f , and if so, returns the result as g. Otherwise, the new function is added to the set of known
signals for the working function and the rounds continue. If at any point the number of AND gates
exceeds a given threshold, or if the size of the known signal set exceeds a predefined depth, then the
randomized algorithm restarts.
This general procedure is followed for all input functions f1, . . . , fn, and in an effort to maxi-
mize signal reuse among each of the input functions, all of the signals computed during the XOR
and AND rounds of a single function fi are saved for use optimizing all functions fj , j > i. Since
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the functions that are stored vary depending on the order in the input functions f1, . . . , fn are opti-
mized, Boyar and Peralta tried all n! permutations of the input set to find an optimized circuit for
the nonlinear inversion circuit for GF ((22)2) using the normal bases [V, V 2] and [W,W 4] (see the
following chapter for more information). We modified and applied their optimization technique to
the other 17 inversion circuits for GF ((22)2). The modifications include the ability to specify the
number of gates added per AND/XOR round, as well as two evolving probabilities px and pa that
determine whether or not a gate is added in each round.
4.2.2 An Application to Small Galois Field Inversion Circuits
Given the input and output size for the inversion circuits forGF ((22)2), we may also forgo algebraic
computations and implement direct inversion circuits that can be optimized using the combinational
minimization technique discussed in the previous section. For example, suppose we want to com-
pute the multiplicative inverse of an element in GF ((22)2), which is defined by p(v) = v2 + v + 1
and q(w) = w2 +w+v2. If elements inGF (22) are represented using the normal basis [V, V 2], and
elements inGF ((22)2) are represented in the normal basis [W,W 4], then the inverse of x, y = x−1,
can be computed with the following nonlinear circuit [10].
y1 = x2x3x4 + x1x3 + x2x3 + x3 + x4
y2 = x1x3x4 + x1x3 + x2x3 + x2x4 + x4
y3 = x1x2x3 + x1x4 + x1 + x2
y4 = x1x2x3 + x1x1 + x1x4 + x2x4 + x2
There are 17 other possible inversion circuits depending on the basis used forGF (22) andGF ((22)2)
and the value of Σ coefficient in the irreducible polynomial q(w). For completeness, we list the 17
circuits below. Some basis selections yield the same minimized circuits, and we group them to-
gether in such case, yielding only 8 unique inversion circuits. For the first time we give complete




y0 = x1 + x0x2 + x0x1x2 + x0x3 + x1x3
y1 = x0 + x1 + x0x2 + x0x3 + x0x1x3
y2 = x0x2 + x1x2 + x3 + x1x3 + x0x2x3
y3 = x2 + x0x2 + x1x2 + x3 + x1x2x3
Cases: 6 and 3
y0 = x1x2 + x3 + x0x2x3
y1 = x2 + x3 + x0x3 + x1x2x3
y2 = x0 + x0x2 + x1x2 + x0x1x2 + x3 + x0x3 + x1x3 + x0x2x3
y3 = x1 + x2 + x0x2 + x3 + x0x1x3 + x1x2x3
Cases: 8 and 16
y0 = x0 + x0x2 + x1x2 + x1x3 + x0x1x3
y1 = x1 + x0x2 + x0x1x2 + x0x1x3
y2 = x2 + x0x2 + x0x3 + x1x3 + x1x2x3
y3 = x0x2 + x3 + x0x2x3 + x1x2x3
Cases: 5, 2, 13, and 10
y0 = x2 + x0x3 + x1x2x3
y1 = x1x2 + x3 + x0x3 + x0x2x3 + x1x2x3
y2 = x1 + x2 + x0x2 + x1x2 + x0x3 + x1x3 + x0x1x3 + x1x2x3
y3 = x0 + x1 + x0x2 + x1x2 + x0x1x2 + x3 + x0x3 + x0x1x3 + x0x2x3 + x1x2x3
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Cases: 7 and 17
y0 = x0 + x1 + x0x2 + x0x3 + x0x1x3
y1 = x0 + x0x1x2 + x1x3 + x0x1x3
y2 = x2 + x0x2 + x1x2 + x3 + x1x2x3
y3 = x2 + x1x3 + x0x2x3 + x1x2x3
Cases: 4, 1, 14, and 11
y0 = x2 + x3 + x0x3 + x1x2x3
y1 = x2 + x1x2 + x0x3 + x0x2x3 + x1x2x3
y2 = x1 + x2 + x0x2 + x3 + x0x1x3 + x1x2x3
y3 = x0 + x1 + x2 + x1x2 + x0x1x2 + x0x3 + x1x3 + x0x1x3 + x0x2x3 + x1x2x3
Cases: 18
y0 = x0 + x1 + x1x2 + x0x1x2 + x1x3
y1 = x0 + x0x2 + x1x2 + x1x3 + x0x1x3
y2 = x2 + x3 + x0x3 + x1x3 + x0x2x3
y3 = x2 + x0x2 + x0x3 + x1x3 + x1x2x3
Cases: 15 and 12
y0 = x2 + x1x2 + x3 + x0x2x3
y1 = x2 + x0x3 + x1x2x3
y2 = x0 + x2 + x0x1x2 + x3 + x1x3 + x0x2x3
y3 = x1 + x2 + x0x2 + x1x2 + x0x3 + x1x3 + x0x1x3 + x1x2x3
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We optimized these 8 distinct circuits for reduced area using a 120nm feature size library with
the Synopsys ASIC design tool. To test the effectiveness of our modified Boyar-Peralta minimiza-
tion technique, we compared the synthesis results from Synopsys generated using SLP represen-
tations of each circuit with this technique to the synthesis results generated from a typical Sum of
Products (SOP) representation. More specifically, both representations for each of these circuits
were translated to corresponding HDL and then synthesized using a Synopsys to obtain an approxi-
mate number of NAND gate equivalents (GEs). We list the results of these two techniques in Table
4.3. We also include results for the three different inversion circuits forGF (24) defined by the three
unique irreducible polynomials p(v) = v4+v+1, p(v) = v4+v3+1, and p(v) = v4+v3+v2+v+1
for elements in a polynomial basis. Note that different area results might be achieved using a dif-
ferent CMOS technology. However, we expect the GEs to remain virtually the same in such cases.
Also, since the Synopsys tool does not provide the ability to extract the number of logic gates used
to implement a particular circuit after the synthesis task, we estimated the GEs by synthesizing and
optimizing a single two-input NAND gate using the same cell size library. The result was a combi-
national area footprint of 1.0. Thus, to find the gate equivalents for a particular circuit, we simply
read the total combinational area footprint.
It is interesting to note that the smallest synthesized circuit for inversion in GF ((22)2), which
has a total of 20.50 GEs obtained with the SOP representation, is that which uses a polynomial
basis [1, V 2] for GF (22) and normal basis [W,W 4] for GF ((22)2). The RTL schematic for this
particular circuit, as synthesized in Synopsys, is shown in Figure 4.5(a). Interestingly, the inversion
circuit for the field representation used in Canright’s optimized S-box has 27.75 GEs [13]. We
leave the investigation of substituting this smaller inversion circuit into the GF (28) and GF (216)
inversion circuits for future work. It is also important to note that for every case the Synopsys tool
was able to generate a smaller circuit using the SOP representation than the one obtained by our
modified Boyar-Peralta minimization heuristic. Given the time constraints for this work, we were
not able to explore the various optimizations and modifications to the algorithm that are noted in
[10], and credit the discrepancies in the synthesis results from these two approaches to insufficient
SLP optimizations.
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Table 4.3: Hardware area requirements for a variety of inversion circuits for fields isomorphic to
GF (24). The Sum of Products (SOP) entries are unoptimized circuits derived directly from the
corresponding truth table, and the optimized entries are those minimized using our modified version
of the Boyar-Peralta technique.
Case Field q(w) Bases SOP (GEs) Ad-Hoc Optimization (GEs)
1 GF ((22)2) w2 + w + v [1, V ] and [1,W ] 26.00 51.5
2 GF ((22)2) w2 + w + v [1, V 2] and [1,W ] 27.25 49.75
3 GF ((22)2) w2 + w + v [V, V 2] and [1,W ] 31.50 44.0
4 GF ((22)2) w2 + w + v [1, V ] and [1,W 4] 26.00 51.5
5 GF ((22)2) w2 + w + v [1, V 2] and [1,W 4] 27.25 49.75
6 GF ((22)2) w2 + w + v [V, V 2] and [1,W 4] 31.50 44.0
7 GF ((22)2) w2 + w + v [1, V ] and [W,W 4] 22.75 36.75
8 GF ((22)2) w2 + w + v [1, V 2] and [W,W 4] 20.50 22.25
9 GF ((22)2) w2 + w + v [V, V 2] and [W,W 4] 27.75 37.5
10 GF ((22)2) w2 + w + v2 [1, V ] and [1,W ] 27.25 49.75
11 GF ((22)2) w2 + w + v2 [1, V 2] and [1,W ] 26.00 51.5
12 GF ((22)2) w2 + w + v2 [V, V 2] and [1,W ] 29.00 41.75
13 GF ((22)2) w2 + w + v2 [1, V ] and [1,W 4] 27.25 49.75
14 GF ((22)2) w2 + w + v2 [1, V 2] and [1,W 4] 26.00 51.5
15 GF ((22)2) w2 + w + v2 [V, V 2] and [1,W 4] 29.00 41.75
16 GF ((22)2) w2 + w + v2 [1, V ] and [W,W 4] 20.50 22.25
17 GF ((22)2) w2 + w + v2 [1, V 2] and [W,W 4] 22.75 36.75
18 GF ((22)2) w2 + w + v2 [V, V 2] and [W,W 4] 29.25 34.75
19 GF (24) w4 + w + 1 [1,W,W 2,W 3] 36.50 NA
20 GF (24) w4 + w3 + 1 [1,W,W 2,W 3] 22.00 NA
21 GF (24) w4 + w3 + w2 + w + 1 [1,W,W 2,W 3] 26.00 NA
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(a) Inversion circuit corresponding to cases 8 and 16 in Table 4.3
(b) Inversion circuit corresponding to case 20 in Table 4.3
Figure 4.5: RTL schematics for the smallest GF ((22)2) and GF (24) inversion circuits generated
with the Synopsys tool.
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Chapter 5
Area-Optimized Implementations of the Galois
Field Multiplicative Inverse
There are many methods for computing the multiplicative inverse of an element in a Galois field,
including the well-known Extended Euclidean Algorithm, an application of Fermat’s Little Theorem
with the square and multiply algorithm for fast exponentiation, and most importantly, reduction to
the inversion in the subfield. This work focuses on the latter technique.
5.1 Reduction to Subfield Inversion
It is a well-known fact that computing the multiplicative inverse can be done by reducing the oper-
ation to those in subfields [40, 60, 62]. There exists many isomorphic tower field representations of
GF (216) that we can use in this reduction, all of which are shown in Figure 5.1. Depending on the
algorithm used to decompose the multiplicative inverse calculation, certain tower field representa-
tions may be more or less optimal than others. To date, degree 2 extensions of GF (2) have been
shown to yield the smallest area S-boxes for the AES [13, 67, 53, 9]. We follow this approach and
selectGF ((((22)2)2)2) as the field isomorphic toGF (216). We also consider the fieldsGF ((28)2),
GF ((24)2), and GF ((22)8) in the context of the Itoh-Tsujii inversion algorithm (discussed later),
though our preliminary results indicate that algebraic computations in tower fields of degree 2 ex-
tensions yield smaller area inversion circuits.
5.1.1 Direct Inversion using Polynomial and Normal Bases
Computing the multiplicative inverse of an element in GF ((((22)2)2)2) can be done by systemat-
ically reducing the inversion computation to the subfield GF (((22)2)2), which in turn reduces the
inversion operation to the subfield GF ((22)2), and so on. Ultimately, all arithmetic operations in
GF ((((22)2)2)2) operations reduce to bitwise operations in GF (2), making algebraic decomposi-
tion a very effective strategy for constructing small area inversion circuits.
To begin, we show that it is indeed possible compute the inverse of element α ∈ GF ((2n)m),
α−1, by solving the equation αα−1 = 1 for α−1. Before solving this equation, we first introduce
some consistent notation. Let t(z) be the degree 16 irreducible polynomial that defines the field
GF (216), s(y) = y2 + Ψy + Λ, be the irreducible polynomial that defines the field GF ((28)2),
r(x) = x2 + Θx + Π be the irreducible polynomial that defines the field GF ((24)2), q(w) =
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GF (216)
GF ((28)2) GF ((22)8) GF ((24)4)
GF (((24)2)2) GF (((22)4)2) GF (((22)2)4)
GF((((22)2)2)2)
Figure 5.1: All possible tower field representations for GF (216). Our constructions use the isomor-
phic field GF ((((22)2)2)2).
w2 + Ωw + Σ be the irreducible polynomial that defines the field GF ((22)2), and finally p(v) =
v2 + v + 1 be the only irreducible polynomial that defines the field GF (22). Note that we enforce
the Ψ = Θ = Ω = 1 so as to simplify all field arithmetic.
Furthermore, note that Ψ,Λ ∈ GF (28), Θ,Π ∈ GF (24), and Ω,Σ ∈ GF (22). With this
set of polynomials, it is clear that we can construct the field GF ((((22)2)2)2) with the tuple of
polynomials (p(v), q(w), r(x), s(y)). Finally, for consistency we will denote θ as an element in
GF (216), ζ as an element inGF (28), ε as an element inGF (24), δ as an element inGF (22), and γ
as an element in GF (2) (i.e. a single bit). We now begin with the multiplicative inverse derivation
for elements in each of the tower fields contained in GF ((((22)2)2)2), starting with GF (22), the
first extensions field in the full tower. Computing the inverse in GF (22) is trivial in both normal
and polynomial bases. One may easily verify that for an element δ = γ1v + γ2 represented in the
polynomial basis [1, V ], the inverse δ−1 = γ1v + (γ1 + γ2). If δ was represented using the normal
basis [V, V 2], then by Fermat’s Little Theorem we have that δ−1 = δ2, so δ−1 = (γ1v2 + γ2v)2 =
(γ2V
2 + γ1V ).
Computing the inverse of an element ε ∈ GF ((22)2), ε = δ1w+δ2, represented in a polynomial
basis is not as trivial as in the previous computation. We derive a simplified expression for the
inverse ε−1, ε = δ3w+δ4 using operations in the subfieldGF (22) by solving the equation ε×ε−1 =
1 as follows:
ε× ε−1 =(δ1w + δ2)(δ3w + δ4)
=δ1δ3w
2 + δ1δ4w + δ2δ3w + δ2δ4
=k(w2 + w + Σ) + 1
=1,
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for some k ∈ Z. If we match coefficients on the left and right-hand side of this equation, we obtain
the following three equations:
k = δ1δ3 (5.1)
δ1δ4 + δ2δ3 = k (5.2)
δ2δ4 = kΣ + 1 (5.3)
If we substitute k = δ1δ3 into equations 5.2 and 5.3, we obtain two equations with two unknowns
(δ3 and δ4):
δ1δ4 + δ2δ3 = δ1δ3 (5.4)
δ2δ4 = δ1δ3Σ + 1 (5.5)
Solving for δ3 in equation 5.4 yields:
⇒ δ1δ4 = δ2δ3 + δ1δ3
⇒ δ3(δ2 + δ1) = δ1δ4
⇒ δ3 = δ1δ4(δ2 + δ1)−1
Substituting this expression for δ3 into equation5.5 and solving for δ4 yields:
⇒ δ2δ4 = δ1Σ[δ1δ4(δ2 + δ1)−1]
⇒ δ2δ4(δ2 + δ1) = δ21Σδ4 + (δ2 + δ1)
⇒ δ22δ4 + δ1δ2δ4 + δ21Σδ4 = (δ2 + δ1)
⇒ δ4(δ22 + δ1δ2 + δ21Σ) = (δ2 + δ1)
⇒ δ4 = (δ2 + δ1)(δ22 + δ1δ2 + δ21Σ)−1
Now we substitute this expression into the one for δ3 as follows:
δ3 = δ1[(δ2 + δ1)(δ
2











Therefore, we have that ε−1 = δ1(δ22 + δ1δ2 + δ
2
1Σ)
−1w + (δ1 + δ2)(δ
2




circuit for this computation is shown in Figure 5.2.
δ1 Σ× δ21 δ3
δ−1
δ2 δ4
Figure 5.2: Polynomial basis inverter in GF ((22)2).
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We now consider computing the same inverse for an element represented with the normal basis
[W,W 4] in GF ((22)2). Given an element ε1 = δ1w4 + δ2w, we may compute the inverse ε−11 =
ε2 = δ3w
4+δ4w by solving ε1ε2 = 1 using the derivation given by Canright [13]. For completeness,
we describe this technique here. First, notice that both W and W 4 are roots of q(w), as shown
below:
q(w) = w2 + w + Σ
= (w +W )(w +W 4)
= w2 + wW + wW 4 +W (W 4)
= w2 + (W +W 4)w +W (W 4)
Therefore, by matching coefficients in q(w) to the right hand side of this expression, we see that
TrGF (22)/GF (2)(w) = W +W
4 = 1 and the norm of W over GF (2), defined as W (W 4), is equal










4 + Σ) + (δ1δ4 + δ2δ3)Σ + δ2δ4(w + Σ)
=δ1δ3w
4 + δ2δ4w + ((δ1δ3 + δ2δ3 + δ1δ4 + δ2δ4)Σ)
=δ1δ3w
4 + δ2δ4w + (δ1δ3Σ + (δ2δ3 + δ1δ4)Σ + δ2δ4Σ)
=δ1δ3w
4 + δ2δ4w + ((δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4)Σ)
−1(w4 + w)
=(δ1δ3 + (δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4)Σ
−1)w4 + (δ2δ4 + (δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4)Σ
−1)w
=1
Following the techniques from earlier the inverse derivation using a polynomial basis, we match
coefficients on the left and right-hand sides of these expressions to produce two equations with two
unknowns (δ3 and δ4):
1 = δ1δ3 + (δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4)Σ (5.6)
1 = δ2δ4 + (δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4)Σ (5.7)
To solve for δ3, we first add equations 5.6 and 5.7 together to produce:
δ1δ3 + δ2δ4 = 0 (5.8)
Next, by distributing the right-hand expression of equation 5.6 and substituting equation 5.8, we get
the following:
1 =δ1δ3 + (δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4)Σ
1 =δ1δ3 + (δ1δ3 + δ2δ3 + δ1δ4 + δ2δ4)Σ
1 =δ1δ3 + (δ2δ3 + δ1δ4)Σ
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δ1 Σ× δ2 δ3
δ−1
δ2 δ4
Figure 5.3: Normal basis inverter for GF ((22)2).
We now multiply by δ2 to yield the following:
δ2 =δ1δ2δ3 + (δ
2
2δ3 + δ1δ2δ4)Σ (5.9)
(5.10)
From equation 5.8, we see that δ1δ3 = δ2δ4, and so δ1δ2δ4 = δ21δ3. If we substitute this into
equation 5.9 we get the following:










And finally, solving for δ3 yields:










with little effort. Therefore, since Σ = W (W 4), we now have:












=((δ1δ2 + (δ1 + δ2)
2Σ)−1δ2)w
4 + (δ1δ2 + (δ1 + δ2)
2Σ)−1δ1)w
If we avoid redundant computations, we can compute this inverse with the following two steps:




This only requires two addition, three multiplication, one square, and one inversion operation. The
full circuit for this computation is shown in Figure 5.3.
Since we enforce a trace of unity for r(x) and s(y), we may following a similar approach to
derive analogous versions of these inversion expressions for both polynomial and normal bases.
Therefore, we omit these details for brevity.
5.2 Combinational Complexity of Galois Field Arithmetic
Given the inverse derivations from the previous section, it is clear that we are most concerned with
inversion, addition, multiplication, squaring, and scaling (multiplying by a constant) operations in
the subfield. The combinational complexity (i.e. the number of logic gates - AND and XOR -
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required to implement the operation) changes depending on what basis is used to represent these
elements in a particular field. We discuss the complexity of these operations following the tower
construction approach used by Satoh et al. [67] and Canright [13] in which we build the field
GF ((((22)2)2)2) with degree 2 field extensions, starting with GF (2). To make this document
largely self-contained, we fully describe the relevant arithmetic for each field as it is presented by
Canright. Our contributions are in the arithmetic operations for GF (((22)2)2) (see Section 5.2.3,
which is not discussed in his work). Also, note that despite what base is used, addition always
equates to a simple bitwise XOR of the field elements. Therefore, k logic (XOR) gates required for
this operation, where k is the bitwise length of the pair of field element operands.
5.2.1 GF (22) Combinational Arithmetic
We begin our discussion of GF (22) arithmetic with the complexity of the multiplicative inverse
using a polynomial basis. As we have already shown, computing the inverse of an element δ =
γ1v + γ2 is rather simple. In particular,
δ−1 = (γ1v + γ2)
−1 = γ1v + (γ1 ⊕ γ2),
so computing the inverse requires only one XOR gate. The corresponding circuit for this computa-
tion is shown in Figure 5.4.
γ1 γ3
γ2 γ4
Figure 5.4: Polynomial combinational circuit for computing the multiplicative inverse of an element
δ = γ1v + γ2 in GF (22) (i.e. δ−1).
Multiplication of two elements δ1 = γ1v + γ2 and δ2 = γ3v + γ4 in GF (22) represented in a
polynomial basis is slightly more complex. Following the approach of [67], we may compute the
product δ1 × δ2 as follows:
δ1 × δ2 =(γ1v + γ2)(γ3v + γ4)
=γ1γ3v
2 + γ2γ3v + γ1γ4v + γ2γ4
=γ1γ3(v + 1)γ2γ3v + γ1γ4v + γ2γ4
=(γ1γ3 + γ2γ3 + γ1γ4)v + (γ1γ3 + γ2γ4)
=(γ2γ4 + (γ1 + γ2)(γ3 + γ4))v + (γ2γ4 + γ1γ3)
We may optimize the computation of this product by first computing γ2γ4 since it appears twice
in the expression above, and then computing the rest. This approach would require three AND
(multiplication in GF (2) corresponds to bitwise AND) and four XOR gates, thus totaling seven






Figure 5.5: Polynomial combinational circuit for computing the product of δ1 = γ1v + γ2 and
δ2 = γ3v + γ4 in GF (22).
Scaling can also be implemented quite efficiently in a polynomial basis. Consider the compu-
tation δ1 × δ2, where δ2 is a non-zero constant. If γ3 = γ4 = 1, we may compute this product as
follows:
δ1 × δ2 =(γ1γ3 + γ2γ3 + γ1γ4)v + (γ1γ3 + γ2γ4)
=(γ1 + γ2 + γ1)v + (γ1 + γ2)
=γ2v + (γ1 + γ2)
Similarly, if γ3 = 1 and γ4 = 0, the product reduces to:
δ1 × δ2 =(γ1γ3 + γ2γ3 + γ1γ4)v + (γ1γ3 + γ2γ4)
=(γ1γ3 + γ2γ3)v + γ1γ3
=(γ3(γ1 + γ2))v + γ1γ3
=(γ1 + γ2)v + γ1
Since we only scale by the coefficient Σ in when computing the inverse of an element inGF ((22)2),
and Σ must be chosen such that q(w) is irreducible, we cannot make any further optimizations.
Therefore, for both cases, we see that scaling in GF (22) requires one XOR gate. The circuits for
both scaling computations are shown in Figures 5.6 and 5.7.
γ1 γ5
γ2 γ6
Figure 5.6: Polynomial combinational circuit for scaling an element δ1 = γ1v + γ2 by a constant




Figure 5.7: Polynomial combinational circuit for scaling an element δ1 = γ1v + γ2 by a constant
δ2 = γ3v + γ4 in GF (22).
Finally, we consider squaring in GF (22). Observe that, for this particular field, Fermat’s Little
Theorem tells us that δ2 = δ2
2−2 ≡ δ−1. Therefore, squaring is the same as the inverse, and only
requires one XOR gate to compute (see Figure 5.4). It is also possible to combine the squaring
and scaling steps in the inverse expression for further optimizations. In particular, given an element
δ1 = γ1v + γ2 and constant δ2 = γ3v + γ4, we may compute δ21 × δ2 as follows:
δ21 × δ2 =[γ1v + (γ1 + γ2)][γ3v + γ4]
=γ1γ3v
2 + γ1γ3v + γ2γ3v + γ1γ4v + γ1γ4 + γ2γ4
=γ1γ3 + γ2γ3v + γ1γ4vγ1γ4 + γ2γ4
=(γ2γ3 + γ1γ4)v + (γ1γ3 + γ1γ4 + γ2γ4)
If we consider the two previous cases when γ3 = γ4 = 1 and γ3 = 1, γ4 = 0, then we can make
further reductions. For the former modification, we get the following:
δ21 × δ2 =(γ2γ3 + γ1γ4)v + (γ1γ3 + γ1γ4 + γ2γ4)
=(γ1 + γ2)v + γ2
For the latter reduction, we get the following:
δ21 × δ2 =(γ2γ3 + γ1γ4)v + (γ1γ3 + γ1γ4 + γ2γ4)
=γ2v + γ1
Thus, if we group together squaring and scaling, the combined operation becomes free or only
requires a single XOR gate. The complete circuits for both of these operations are shown in Figures
5.8 and 5.9, respectively.
γ1 γ3
γ2 γ4






Figure 5.10: Normal combinational circuit for computing the product of two elements δ1 = γ1v2 +
γ2v and δ2 = γ3v2 + γ4v in GF (22).
γ1 γ3
γ2 γ4
Figure 5.9: Square-scale circuit in GF (22) when Σ = v + 1
If we change the representation of δ ∈ GF (22) to the normal basis [V, V 2], the algebraic ex-
pressions for these operations change slightly. We will start with multiplication. To compute the
product of two elements δ1 = γ1v2 + γ2v and δ2 = γ3v2 + γ4v, we perform the following:






=γ1γ3v + γ2γ3 + γ1γ4 + γ2γ4v
2
=(γ2γ4 + γ2γ3 + γ1γ4)v
2 + (γ1γ3 + γ2γ3 + γ1γ4)v
=(γ1γ3 + (γ1 + γ2)(γ3 + γ4))v
2 + (γ2γ4 + (γ1 + γ2)(γ3 + γ4))v
Since there is a redundant computation of f = (γ1 + γ2)(γ3 + γ4), we compute this product first,
which requires two XOR gates and one AND gate, and then substitute it into the above expression.
This results in the following:
δ1 × δ2 = (γ1γ3 + f)v2 + (γ2γ4 + f)v
Which only requires two additional XOR gates and two AND gates. Therefore, four XOR and three
AND gates are required, just as with the polynomial basis multiplication calculation. The circuit for
this computation is shown in Figure 5.10.
Since squaring is “free” for elements in a field of any degree extension of GF (2) when repre-
sented in a normal basis, we do not discuss it here. Scaling, however, is not free. Given elements
δ1 = γ1v
2 + γ2v and δ2 = γ3v2 + γ4v, where δ2 is a constant, the product can be computed as
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follows:
δ1 × δ2 =(γ2γ4 + γ2γ3 + γ1γ4)v2 + (γ1γ3 + γ2γ3 + γ1γ4)v
As before, we make the observation that since δ2 is a constant, we are free to fix γ3 and γ4 with
the restriction that q(w) must be irreducible. Therefore, we consider only the two cases where
γ3 = 0, γ4 = 1 (Σ) and γ3 = 1, γ4 = 0 (Σ2). The reduction based on the former modification of δ2
is as follows:
δ1 × δ2 =(γ2γ4 + γ2γ3 + γ1γ4)v2 + (γ1γ3 + γ2γ3 + γ1γ4)v
=(γ2 + γ1)v
2 + γ1v
And the reduction based on the latter modification is as follows:
δ1 × δ2 =(γ2γ4 + γ2γ3 + γ1γ4)v2 + (γ1γ3 + γ2γ3 + γ1γ4)v
=γ2v
2 + (γ1 + γ2)v
Therefore, regardless of what constant we use for scaling, this operation will require one XOR gate.
As before, we may combine the squaring and scaling operations as they appear in the inverse
expression for GF ((22)2). Since squaring an element δ = γ1v2 + γ2 in GF (22) corresponds to
a cyclic shift, which is the same as swapping the two bits γ1 and γ2, the combined operations for
scaling by Σ and Σ2 are the equivalent to (γ1 + γ2)v2 + γ2v and γ1v2 + (γ1 + γ2)v, respectively.
To summarize, we list the combinational complexity of each of these operations for both poly-
nomial and normal bases in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Required XOR gates for GF (22) arithmetic operations using polynomial and normal
bases. Note that each multiplication operation requires three AND gates.






Square-Scale 0 (Σ = v) or 1 (Σ = v + 1) 1
5.2.2 GF ((22)2) Combinational Arithmetic
The inverse of an element ε ∈ GF ((22)2) can be efficiently computed in the following three steps:









Figure 5.11: Polynomial basis multiplier for GF ((22)2).
Therefore, altogether, we we only need to perform two additions, one square, four multiplications,
and one inverse operation in the subfield.
Multiplication in GF ((22)2) is very similar to its counterpart in GF (22). Given two elements
ε1 = δ1w + δ2 and ε2 = δ3w + δ4, we may compute the product ε1 × ε2 as follows:
ε1 × ε2 =(δ1w + δ2)(δ3w + δ4)
=δ1δ3w
2δ1δ4w + δ2δ3w + δ2δ4
=δ1δ3w + δ1δ3Σ + δ1δ4w + δ2δ3w + δ2δ4
=(δ1δ3 + δ1δ4 + δ2δ3)w + (δ1δ3Σ + δ2δ4)
=(δ2δ4 + (δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4))w + (δ1δ3Σ + δ2δ4)
Again, we have the redundancy of computing the product δ2δ4. If we only compute this once, then
the multiplication procedure only requires four additions, three multiplications, and one scaling
operation in the subfield. The circuit for this operation is shown in Figure 5.11.
Scaling an element ε1 = δ1w + δ2 by a constant ε2 = δ3w + δ4 in GF ((22)2) can be done as
follows:
ε1 × ε2 =(δ1w + δ2)(δ3w + δ4)
=δ1δ3w
2 + δ1δ4w + δ2δ3w + δ2δ4
=(δ2δ4 + (δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4))w + (δ1δ3Σ + δ2δ4)
Without any optimizations, this operation requires three addition and five multiplication operations
in the subfield if we only compute δ1δ3 once. However, given the freedom of selecting ε2, we may
fix δ3 and δ4 to be any elements in GF (22) such that r(x) is irreducible. Following the approach
in the previous section, we cannot set δ3 = 0, but we can, however, set δ4 = 0. This yields the
following simplification:
ε1 × ε2 =(δ1δ3 + δ1δ4 + δ2δ3)w + (δ1δ3Σ + δ2δ4)
=(δ1δ3 + δ2δ3)w + δ1δ3Σ
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At this stage, we now only require one addition and three multiplications in the subfield, which is
a significant improvement. Notice, however, that if δ3 = Σ−1 (or, equivalently, Σ = δ−13 ), the
computation can be reduced further, as follows:
ε1 × ε2 =(δ1δ3 + δ2δ3)w + δ1δ3Σ
=(Σ−1(δ1 + δ2))w + δ1
We now only require one addition, one multiplication, and one inversion operation in the subfield,
which is a further improvement since inversion in GF (22) is cheaper than multiplication (see the
previous section). To provide more comprehensive results for the complexity of this operation, we
also considered all eight possible values for Π (see Appendix A) and simplified the corresponding
algebraic expression of ε×Π. The results from this step are summarized in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Optimized costs of polynomial scaling in GF ((22)2).
Coefficients for Polynomial GF ((22)2) Basis XOR Gate Counts
Π = ε1 ×Π = Pol. GF (22) Norm.
δ3w + δ4 (δ2δ4 + (δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4))w + (δ2δ4 + δ1δ3Σ) Σ = v Σ = v
2 GF (22)
Σ 0 (Σ(δ1 + δ2))w + (δ1Σ
2) 4 4 4
Σ2 0 (Σ2(δ1 + δ2))w + (δ1) 3 3 3
Σ Σ (δ2Σ)w + (δ2Σ + δ1Σ
2) 4 4 4
Σ2 Σ2 (δ2Σ
2)w + (δ2Σ
2 + δ1) 3 3 3
Σ 1 (δ2 + Σ
2δ1 + Σ
2δ2)w + (δ2 + Σ
2δ1) 6 6 6
Σ2 Σ (δ2Σ + δ1 + δ2)w + (δ2Σ + δ1) 5 5 5
Σ Σ2 (δ2Σ
2 + δ1 + δ2)w + (Σ
2(δ1 + δ2)) 6 6 6
Σ2 1 (δ2 + Σ(δ1 + δ2))w + (δ2 + δ1) 5 5 5
Squaring an element ε = δ1w + δ2 in GF ((22)2) can be done as follows:








We cannot simplify this equation any further, and so the operation requires two squaring, one scal-
ing, and one addition operation in the subfield.
Similar to the square-scale combined operation inGF (22), we may again combine squaring and
scaling to yield a more efficient computation in GF ((22)2). Given an element ε1 = δ1w + δ2 and
constant ε2 = δ3w + δ4, the product ε21 × ε2 can be computed as follows:
ε21 × ε2 =(δ1w + δ)(δ1w + δ2)(δ3w + δ4)
=(δ21w






































At this level of optimization, taking into account shared subexpressions, this computation requires a
total of two square, six multiplication, and five addition operations in the subfield. As in the single
scaling operation, we can simplify ε2 by setting δ4 = 0, resulting in the following:













This requires only two square, four multiplication, and two addition operations in the subfield. We
may make the further optimization by fixing δ3 = Σ−1 (or equivalently, Σ = δ−33 ), which reduces
the computation as follows:
ε21 × ε2 =(δ21(δ3 + δ3Σ) + δ22δ3)w + δ21δ3Σ
=(δ21(Σ
−1 + 1) + δ22Σ
−1)w + δ21
=(δ21(Σ






This compact expression requires three square, two multiplication, and one addition operation in
the subfield. Following the approach of Canright [13] and our evaluation of all scaling possibilities,
we again considered all eight possible values for Π and simplified the corresponding algebraic
expressions to reduce the number of subfield operations. Our derivations match that of Canright,
and are shown in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Optimized costs of polynomial square-scaling in GF ((22)2) [13].
Coefficients for Polynomial GF ((22)2) Basis XOR Gate Counts
Π = ε21 ×Π = Pol. GF (22) Norm.
δ3w + δ4 (δ
2
1(δ3Σ




1Σ(δ3 + δ4) + δ
2
2δ4) Σ = v Σ = v
2 GF (22)





2) 4 4 4
Σ2 0 (δ21Σ + δ
2
2Σ
2)w + (δ21) 4 4 4
Σ Σ (δ21Σ
2 + δ22Σ)w + (δ
2
2Σ) 3 3 4




2) 4 3 3
Σ 1 (δ22Σ)w + ((δ1 + δ2)
2) 3 4 3
Σ2 Σ (δ22Σ
2)w + (Σ(δ1 + δ2)
2) 3 3 4
Σ Σ2 (Σ(δ1 + δ2)
2)w + (Σ(δ1 + δ2)
2 + δ22) 5 6 5
Σ2 1 (Σ2(δ1 + δ2)
2)w + (Σ2(δ1 + δ2)
2 + δ22Σ) 5 5 6
Now we will represent all elements in the normal basis [W,W 4] and reconsider all of the previ-
ous arithmetic operations. Multiplying two elements ε1 = δ1w4 + δ2w and ε2 = δ3w4 + δ4w can
be done following the same derivation technique we used for the inverse in GF ((22)2), as shown
below.
ε1 × ε2 =(δ1w4 + δ2w)(δ3w4 + δ4w)
=(δ1δ3 + (δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4)Σ)w







Figure 5.12: Normal basis multiplier for GF ((22)2).
Taking common subexpressions into account, we may compute this product as follows:
A =(δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4)Σ
ε1 × ε2 =(δ1δ3 +A)w4 + (δ2δ4 +A)w
Therefore, this operation requires four addition, three multiplication, and one scaling operation in
the subfield.




=(δ21 + (δ1 + δ2)
















ε2 =(A+ C)w4 + (B + C)w
This requires three addition, two squaring, and one scaling operation in the subfield.
Scaling an element ε1 = δ1w4 + δ2w by a constant ε2 = δ3w4 + δ4w can be done as follows:
ε1 × ε2 =(δ1δ3 + (δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4)Σ)w4 + (δ2δ4 + (δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4)Σ)w
Without any optimizations, this requires the same number of operations as the multiplication proce-
dure. However, as before, we may set δ4 = 0, which reduces the expression to the following:
ε1 × ε2 =(δ1δ3 + (δ1 + δ2)δ3Σ)w4 + (δ1 + δ2)δ3Σw
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If we compute (δ1 + δ2)δ3Σ only once, then this computation now requires two addition and three
multiplication operations in the subfield. Since we are also free to pick Σ, we can further reduce
this complexity if we set δ3 = Σ−1 (or, equivalently, Σ = δ−13 ), which yields the following:
ε1 × ε2 =(δ1Σ−1 + (δ1 + δ2))w4 + (δ1 + δ2)w
This computation now only requires two addition, one multiplication, and one inversion operation
in the subfield.
As with the polynomial basis, we know that the there are eight unique values of Π that make
r(x) irreducible over GF (22). Using these values, we algebraically derived compact expressions
for the scale operation in terms of the required number of subfield operations. Table 5.4 lists these
results in full detail.
Table 5.4: Optimized costs of normal scaling in GF ((22)2).
Coefficients for Normal GF ((22)2) Basis XOR Gate Counts
Π = ε1 ×Π = Pol. GF (22) Norm.
δ3w
4 + δ4w (δ1δ3 + (δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4)Σ)w
4+ Σ = v Σ = v2 GF (22)
(δ2δ4 + (δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4)Σ)w
Σ 0 (δ1Σ + (δ1 + δ2)Σ
2)w + ((δ1 + δ2)Σ
2)w 6 6 6
0 Σ ((δ1 + δ2)Σ
2)w + (δ2Σ + (δ1 + δ2)Σ
2)w 6 6 6
Σ2 0 (δ1Σ
2 + δ1 + δ2)w + (δ1 + δ2)w 5 5 5
0 Σ2 (δ1 + δ2)w + (δ2Σ
2 + δ1 + δ2)w 5 5 5
Σ 1 (δ1Σ + δ1 + δ2)w + (δ1)w 5 5 5
0 Σ (δ2)w + (δ2Σ + δ1 + δ2)w 5 5 5
Σ2 1 (δ2Σ
2)w + (δ2 + Σ
2(δ1 + δ2))w 6 6 6
1 Σ2 (δ1 + Σ
2(δ1 + δ2))w + (δ1Σ
2)w 6 6 6
We can again build an optimized circuit for squaring and scaling if we combine these two
operations together. In particular, given an element ε1 = δ1w4 +δ2w and constant ε2 = δ3w4+δ4w,
we may compute ε21 × ε2 as follows:



















































































For convenience, let A = (δ21 + δ
2
2)Σ). We now have:
ε21 × ε2 =δ21δ3w4 + δ3Aw4 + Σδ21δ3 + Σδ3A+
Σδ22δ3 + Σδ3A+ Σδ
2
































=(δ21(δ3 + Σδ4) + Σδ
2
2δ4)w
4 + (δ22(δ4 + Σδ3) + Σδ
2
1δ3)w





ε21 × ε2 =(C(δ3 +A) +AD)w4 + (D(δ4 +B) +BC)w
This requires only four addition, two squaring, and six multiplication operations in the subfield. If
we let δ3 = Σδ4, then this computation reduces significantly to the following:
ε21 × ε2 =(Σδ22δ4)w4 + (δ22(δ4(1 + Σ2)) + Σ2δ21δ4)w
=Σδ22δ4w
4 + (Σδ22δ4 + Σ
2δ21δ4)w
This can be efficiently computed in the following steps:
A =Σδ22δ4
ε21 × ε2 =Aw4 + (A+ Σ2δ21δ4)w
which requires one addition, two square-scale, one squaring, and three multiplication operations in
the subfield. The last optimization we can make is to let δ4 = Σ−1, which yields the following:
ε21 × ε2 =δ22w4 + (δ22 + Σδ21)w
This optimized expression now only requires two squares, one multiplication, and one addition
subfield operation. Table 5.5 gives the exact gate counts for all possible square-scale operations
given a normal basis for GF ((22)2) as derived by Canright.
A summary of all arithmetic results for GF ((22)2) is given in Table 5.6.
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Table 5.5: Optimized costs of normal square-scaling in GF ((22)2) [13].
Coefficients for Normal GF ((22)2) Basis XOR Gate Counts
Π = ε1 ×Π = Pol. GF (22) Norm.
δ3w
4 + δ4w (δ
2
1(δ3 + Σδ4) + Σδ
2
2δ4)w
4 + (δ22(δ4 + Σδ3) + Σδ
2
1δ3)w Σ = v Σ = v
2 GF (22)
Σ 0 (δ21Σ)w
4 + (Σ2(δ1 + δ2)
2)w 3 3 4
0 Σ (Σ2(δ1 + δ2)
2)w4 + (Σδ22)w 3 3 4
Σ2 0 (δ21Σ
2)w4 + ((δ1 + δ2)
2)w 4 3 3
0 Σ2 ((δ1 + δ2)
2)w4 + (δ22Σ
2)w 4 3 3
Σ 1 (δ22Σ)w
4 + (δ21Σ
2 + δ22Σ)w 3 3 4
0 Σ (δ21Σ + δ
2
2Σ
2)w4 + (δ21Σ)w 3 3 4
Σ2 1 (δ21 + δ
2
2Σ)w
4 + (δ21)w 3 4 3
1 Σ2 (δ22)w
4 + (δ21Σ + δ
2
2)w 3 4 3
Table 5.6: Subfield arithmetic costs ((A)dditions, (M)ultiplications, (Sq)uares, (I)nversions,
(SS)quare-scales, (Sc)ales) for finite field arithmetic operations in GF ((22)2) using polynomial
and normal bases.
Operation Polynomial Basis Normal Basis
Inverse 3M + 2A+ I + 1SS 3M + 2A+ I + 1SS
Add 2A 2A
Multiply 3M + 4A+ 1Sc 3M + 4A+ Sc
Square 2Sq + Sc+A 3A+ 2Sq + Sc
5.2.3 GF (((22)2)2) Combinational Arithmetic
Algebraic expressions for arithmetic inGF (((22)2)2) can be easily generalized from the derivations
used in GF ((22)2). Therefore, we summarize the results for GF (((22)2)2) below.
• Polynomial multiplication (basis [1, X])
ζ1 × ζ2 =(ε1x+ ε2)(ε3x+ ε4)
=(ε2ε4 + (ε1 + ε2)(ε3 + ε4))x+ (ε1ε3Π + ε2ε4)
Cost: four additions, three multiplications, and one scale operation in the subfield.
• Polynomial squaring (basis [1, X]):






Cost: two square, one scale, and one addition operation in the subfield.
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• Polynomial scaling (basis [1, X]):
ζ1 × ζ2 =(ε1x+ ε2)(ε3x+ ε4)
=(ε2ε4 + (ε1 + ε2)(ε3 + ε4))x+ (ε1ε3Π + ε2ε4)
Cost: four additions and four multiplication operations in the subfield.
Optimization: ε4 = 0
ζ1 × ζ2 = (ε1ε3 + ε2ε3)x+ ε1ε3Π
Cost: one addition, two multiplications, and one scaling operation in the subfield.
Optimization: ε3 = Π−1
ζ1 × ζ2 =(ε1ε3 + ε1ε4 + ε2ε3)x+ (ε1 + ε2ε4)
=(ε2ε4 + (ε1 + ε2)(ε3 + ε4))x+ (ε1 + ε2ε4)
Cost: four addition and two multiplication operations in the subfield.
Optimization: ε4 = 0 and ε3 = Π−1
ζ1 × ζ2 = (ε3(ε1 + ε2))x+ ε1
Cost: one addition and one multiplication operation in the subfield.
• Polynomial squaring-scaling (basis [1, X]):














Cost: two square, five multiplication, five addition, and one scale operations in the subfield.
Optimization: ε4 = 0
ζ1 × ζ2 = (ε21ε3Π + ε3(ε21 + ε22))x+ ε21ε3Π
Cost: two square, two multiplication, two addition, and one scale operations in the subfield.
Optimization: ε3 = Π−1
















Cost: five addition, two square, three multiplication, and one scale operations in the subfield.
Optimization: ε4 = 0 and ε3 = Π−1
ζ1 × ζ2 = (ε3(ε21 + ε22) + ε21)x+ ε21
Cost: two addition, two square, one multiplication operations in the subfield.
• Normal multiplication (basis [X,X16]):
ζ1 × ζ2 =(ε1x16 + ε2x)(ε3x16 + ε4x)
=(ε1ε3 + (ε1 + ε2)(ε3 + ε4)Π)x
16 + (ε2ε4 + (ε1 + ε2)(ε3 + ε4)Π)x
Cost: four addition, three multiplication, and one scale operations in the subfield.
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Cost: three addition, two squaring, and one scale operations in the subfield.
• Normal scaling (basis [X,X16]):
ζ1 × ζ2 =(ε1x16 + ε2x)(ε3x16 + ε4x)
=(ε1ε3 + (ε1 + ε2)(ε3 + ε4)Π)x
16 + (ε2ε4 + (ε1 + ε2)(ε3 + ε4)Π)x
Cost: four addition, three multiplication, and one scale operations in the subfield.
Optimization: ε4 = 0
ζ1 × ζ2 =ε1 × ε2 = (ε1ε3 + (ε1 + ε2)ε3Π)x16 + (ε1 + ε2)ε3Πx
Cost: two addition, two multiplication, and one scale operations in the subfield.
Optimization: ε3 = Π−1
ζ1 × ζ2 =(ε1ε3 + ε1 + ε2 + ε1ε4Π + ε2ε4Π)x16 + (ε2ε4 + ε1 + ε2 + ε1ε4Π + ε2ε4Π)x
=(ε1ε3 + ε1 + ε2 + ε4Π(ε1 + ε2))x
16 + (ε2ε4 + ε1 + ε2 + ε4Π(ε1 + ε2))x
Cost: four addition, one scale, and three multiplication operations in the subfield.
Optimization: ε3 = Π−1 and ε4 = 0
ζ1 × ζ2 =ε1 × ε2 = (ε1ε3 + ε1 + ε2)x16 + (ε1 + ε2)x
Cost: two addition and one multiplication operations in the subfield.
• Normal squaring-scaling (basis [X,X16]):















Cost: three addition, two squaring, two scaling, and four multiplication operations in the
subfield.
Optimization: ε3 = Πε4
ζ21 × ζ2 =(ε4ε22Π)x16 + (ε3Π(ε21 + ε22) + ε22ε4)x
Cost: two squaring, one scaling, two addition, one square-scale, and three multiplication
operations in the subfield.
Optimization: ε4 = Π−1
ζ21 × ζ2 =(ε21 + ε22 + ε21ε3)x16 + (ε3Π(ε21 + ε22) + ε22ε4)x
Cost: two squaring, one scaling, three multiplication, and three addition operations in the
subfield.
Optimization: ε3 = Πε4 and ε4 = Π−1
ζ21 × ζ2 =(ε22)x16 + (Π(ε21 + ε22) + ε22ε4)x
Cost: two squaring, one addition, one scaling, and one multiplication operation in the subfield.
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Algorithm 14 Itoh-Tsujii Inversion Algorithm
Require: α ∈ GF (qk)
Ensure: α−1 ∈ GF (qk)
1: r ← (qk − 1)/(q − 1)
2: compute αr−1
3: compute αr = αr−1α
4: compute (αr)−1 in GF (p) (base field)
5: compute α−1 = (αr)−1 · αr−1
6: return α−1
Itoh-Tsujii Algorithm
In 1988, Itoh and Tsujii published a very clever way of reducing the multiplicative inverse com-
putation in a field GF (qk) to operations in the subfield GF (q) [40]. Since it is easier to compute
the inverse in smaller fields, this enables us to compute the inverse in the field GF (qk) using arith-
metic operations in GF (qk) and a single inversion operator in GF (q). The algorithm relies on the
following theorem:
Theorem 5. ([40]) Let α ∈ GF (qk) \ {0} and r = (qk − 1)/(q − 1). Then, the multiplicative
inverse of an element α can be computed as
α−1 = (αr)−1αr−1
The exact computation of the multiplicative inverse using this theorem, as presented in [40], is
shown in Algorithm 14. It relies on the fact that α(q
k−1)/(q−1) will always be an element in the sub-
fieldGF (q) [48]. Itoh and Tsujii relied on a normal basis representation for efficient exponentiation
in their algorithm. To show this, let α ∈ GF (qk), where q = 2n, be represented with the normal
basis [θ, θq, . . . , θq
k




















This requires only m cyclic shifts to compute. Notice also that
r − 1 = qk−1 + · · ·+ q2 + q,
which means that αr−1 = αq
k−1 × · · · × αq2 × q, which only requires k − 1 exponentiations to
a power of q (which are free), and blog2(k − 1)c + HW (k − 1) − 1 multiplications, where HW
denotes the Hamming weight of the parameter. Since αr and (αr)−1 are in the subfield GF (q), this
means that both the products αr−1 × α and (αr)× αr−1 become trivial (i.e. they are performed in
the subfield GF (q)).
Guajardo and Paar revised (optimized) this algorithm for elements represented in a polynomial
basis in [37]. In doing so, they proved that the process of raising an element α to the r − 1 power
requires blog2(k−1)c+HW (k−1)−1 multiplications and blog2(k−1)c+HW (k−1) exponen-
tiations in GF (qk). They note that this these complexities are upper bounds; one may compute the
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exponentiation to r − 1 using fewer multiplications and q-power exponentiations [18]. They pre-
sented the following three classes of finite field extensions that yield lower complexities for e-power
operations than that of multiplication in GF (qk):
1. Fields GF (qm) (q = 2n) with binary field polynomials (i.e. binary polynomials q(w) that
are irreducible over GF (2) and GF (2n), which only exist if gcd{n,m} = 1).
2. Fields GF (qk) with binomials as field polynomials of odd characteristic.
3. Fields GF (qsm) with binary s-ESP (Equally Spaced) field polynomials (i.e. gcd{n, sm} =
1).
It is easy to see that the field GF (216) is not isomorphic to any of these field types because it
has even (2) characteristic and there does not exist values n and m such that gcd{n,m} = 1 and
GF ((2n)m) is isomorphic to GF (216). Therefore, for the field GF (216), the Itoh-Tsujii algorithm
is more expensive in a polynomial basis because it does not have the same efficiencies that come
with normal bases, such as free cyclic shifts.
Given the field GF (qk) = GF ((2n)m), let us denote the required number of GF (qk) multi-
plications as NM1, GF (qk) exponentiations as NS1, GF (q) multiplications as NM2, and GF (q)
exponentiations as NS2. As shown in [40], these values can be computed with the following equa-
tions:
• NM1 = blog2(m− 1)c+HW (m− 1)
• NS1 = m− 1
• NM2 = blog2(n− 1)c+HW (n− 1)− 1
• NS2 = n− 1
Given the possible decompositions of GF (216) shown in Figure 5.1, we know that GF (216) is
isomorphic toGF ((22)8), GF ((24)2), andGF ((28)2). The values ofNM1, NS1, NM2, andNS2
for each of these fields are summarized in Table 5.2.3.
Table 5.7: Total arithmetic operations using the Itoh-Tsujii inversion algorithm for varied parameters
n and m that define the composite field GF ((2n)m) isomorphic to GF (216).
m NM1 NS1 n NM2 NS2
2 0 1 8 5 7
4 2 3 4 3 3
8 4 7 2 1 1
Intuitively, the best choice of n and m is the one that minimizes NM1 and NS1, as these are
operations in the extension field GF ((2n)m). Therefore, we recommend the the selection of n = 8
and m = 2. Using the results from the previous section, we know that squaring in GF ((2n)m)
requires three addition, two squaring, and one scaling operation in the subfield GF (2n). To date,
the best known circuit for multiplication in GF (28) was found by the Circuit Minimization Team
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[20] and contains a total of 69 XOR and 48 AND gates. It is generally known that normal basis mul-
tiplication is more computationally expensive than polynomial basis multiplication, and therefore
for this discussion we assume at least 69 XOR and 48 AND gates are required for the multiplication
procedure. Furthermore, assuming that the same multiplication circuit is used for subfield squaring
and scaling, then the total number of XOR gates is at least 69 × (5 + 2 + 1) = 552. Taking into
account the number of AND gates that would also be needed, it is clear that this approach is not
as area-efficient as the design discussed in the previous chapter. However, we have not explored
combinational implementations of normal basis arithmetic in GF (28), which is a task we leave to
future work.
5.3 Change of Basis Representations
Before discussing the method for changing between bases between GF (216) and the isomorphic
field GF ((((22)2)2)2), we discuss a more general example of establishing isomorphic mappings
between a field GF (2k) and GF ((2n)m), k = nm. As an isomorphic mapping, all operations (ad-
dition and multiplication) performed on elements inGF (2k) are equivalent to operations performed
on elements in GF ((2n)m). As Galois fields are isomorphic to 〈F,+, ·〉, where F is a finite set, this
means that both multiplicative and additive homomorphism must hold. As an example, consider
a mapping F (α) → β, where α ∈ GF (2k) and β ∈ GF ((2n)m) and F is homomorphic with
respect to both addition and multiplication. Then, if we have two elements αi, αj ∈ GF (2k) and
βi, βj ∈ GF ((2n)m), it is easy to see that field isomorphism holds:
αi + αj = αt → βt = βi + βj
αi × αj = αi+j → βi+j = βi + βj
To establish this mapping, we only need to map the basis elements of GF (2k) (or GF ((2n)m)) into
the basis elements of GF ((2n)m) (or GF (2k)) using an additive and multiplicative homomorphic
mapping. To find this mapping, first consider the standard bases B1, B2, and B3 for GF (2k),
GF (2n), and GF ((2n)m), respectively. We let B1 = [1, z, . . . , zk−1], B2 = [1, x, . . . , xn−1], and
B3 = [1, y, . . . , y
nm−1], where R(z) = 0, P (x) = 0, and Q(y) = 0 (i.e. x, y, and z are all roots of
their respective field polynomials).
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Now, consider an element α ∈ GF (2k) where α = gk−1zk−1+gk−2zk−2+· · ·+g2z2+g1z+g0,
where gi ∈ GF (2) for all 0 ≤ i < k. We want to derive an additive and multiplicative isomorphic
mapping to an element β ∈ GF ((2n)m) such that
α =gk−1z
k−1 + gk−2z
k−2 + · · ·+ g1z + g0
=[b(m−1)(k/m)+n−1x
n−1 + b(m−1)(k/m)+n−2x
n−2 + · · ·+
b(m−1)(k/m)+1x+ b(m−1)(k/m)]y
m−1 + · · ·+
[b(k/m)+n−1x
n−1 + bn−2x
n−2 + · · ·+
b(n/m)+1x+ b(n/m)]y + [bn−1x
n−1 + bn−2x
n−2 + · · ·+ b1x+ b0]
=b(m−1)(k/m)+n−1x
n−1ym−1 + b(m−1)(k/m)+n−2x
n−2ym−1 + · · ·+
b(m−1)(k/m)+1xy
m−1 + b(m−1)(k/m)y
m−1 + · · ·+
b(k/m)+n−1x
n−1y + bn−2x
n−2y + · · ·+ b(n/m)+1xy + b(n/m)y+
bn−1x
n−1 + bn−2x
n−2 + · · ·+ b1x+ b0
Using the fact that GF (2k) contains a subfield isomorphic to GF ((2n)m) as well as a subfield
isomorphic to GF (2n), we may represent both x and y as elements in GF (2k). Then, the elements
of the new basis forGF ((2n)m) becomeB4 = [1, x, . . . , xn−2ym−1, xn−1ym−1]. The basis change
matrix T can be computed as follows:
T = [xn−1ym−1, xn−2y
m−1, . . . , x, 1]
Using T, we have that Tβi = αi and T−1αi = βi for all 0 ≤ i ≤ 2k − 1.
5.3.1 A Small Example - Basis Change Matrices for GF (24) and GF ((22)2)
To illustrate the basis change technique, we consider a small example of mapping from GF (24) to
GF ((22)2). Let P (v),Q(w), andR(x) be the irreducible polynomials forGF (22),GF ((22)2), and
GF (24), respectively. Furthermore, we note that P (v) = v2 + v + 1 (the only degree 2 irreducible
polynomial) and Q(w) = w2 + w + Σ, where Σ ∈ GF (22), and we let R(x) = x4 + x + 1
(we may choose other irreducible polynomials for R(x) and follow the same process to obtain a
corresponding basis change matrix). We know that P (v) has two conjugate roots, namely, v and
v2 = v+1. Thus, elements inGF (22) may be represented using the standard bases [1, V ] or [1, V 2].
However, we may also represent these elements in the normal basis [V, V 2]. For this example, we
will consider the basis [1, V ].
If we consider all elements Σ ∈ GF (22) that make Q(w) irreducible, we will see that there are
only two. Namely, Σ ∈ {v, v + 1}. For Q(w) = w2 + w + Σ there exists two distinct conjugate
roots w and w2 = w+Σ, and similarly forQ(w) = w2 +w+Σ2 there exists two distinct conjugate
roots w and w2 = w+ Σ2. Therefore, we may represent elements in GF ((22)2) using the standard
or normal bases implied by the choice of polynomial Q(w). For this example, we will consider the
basis [1,W + 1 = W 4] with Q(w) = w2 + w + Σ, where Σ = v.
If we coerce V and W , elements of GF (22) and GF ((22)2), respectively, into GF (24), one
proper embedding may yield V = z2 + z and W = z. Now, using the technique described in the
previous section, we may define the new basisB4 = [v(w+1), (w+1), v, 1] = [z3+z2, z, z2+z, 1],
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and obtain the following basis change matrix.
T =

1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1
T−1 =

1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1

To verify the correctness of the homomorphic mapping obtained by this basis change matrix,
we will perform arithmetic operations on elements in GF (24) and verify that the same result is
obtained on elements on GF ((22)2). Consider the element α = z3 + z2, α ∈ GF (24). We may
compute α2 as follows:
α2 =(z3 + z2)(z3 + z2)
=z6 + 2z5 + z4
=z3 + z2 + z + 1
Now we compute T−1α as
T−1α =

1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0














Thus, β = T−1α = v(w + 1). From this, we compute β2 as follows:
β2 =(v(w + 1))(v(w + 1))
=v2(w + 1)2
=(v + 1)(w + 1)(w + 1)
=(v + 1)(w2 + 2w + 1)
=(v + 1)(w + v + 1)
=vw + v2 + v + w + v + 1
=vw + v + w
=v(w + 1) + (w + 1) + 1
After squaring we want to map back to an element in GF (24), so we compute Tβ2 as follows:
Tβ2 =

1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0














Thus, Tβ2 = z3 + z2 + z + 1, and so α2 = T(T−1α)2, as expected.
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5.4 Generalized Optimizations
One of our main contributions in this work is a methodology to programmatically count the number
of gates for computing the multiplicative inverse over various composite fields, extended from Can-
right’s original work [13]. As such, we only apply a couple of general optimizations to each of the
inversion circuits. As Satoh [67] mentions, it is possible to save on the number of gates required for
a circuit of there exists two GF ((2m)2) multipliers that have a common input. This is because both
the polynomial and normal multipliers need to compute the sum of the two coefficients for the input
elements. Therefore, every shared input factor will save one addition in the subfield. In addition,
polynomial and normal multipliers for elements in GF ((22)2) and GF (((22)2)2) each have three
subfield multipliers that will share a common factor, thus saving additional sub-subfield addition
operations. Canright gives the example of two GF ((22)2) multipliers that share a common factor,
whose coefficients are then shared among three subfield multipliers, thus saving two XORs for the
GF (22) addition and three XORs for the GF (2) additions from the subfield multipliers, totaling
five XOR gates that are saved. This is easily generalized to GF (((22)2)2) multipliers, which save
10 XOR gates for a single shared factor. Therefore, for a polynomial multiplier which has two
GF (((22)2)2) multipliers with a shared factor, a total of 20 XOR gates are saved. Similarly, for a
normal multiplier which has three GF (((22)2)2) multipliers with a shared factor, a total of 30 XOR
gates are saved.
We also make use of the optimizations to the square-scale operations performed by Canright
[13], as shown in Section 5.2. At a high level, such optimizations are used to derive compact
expressions for the square-scale operations given particular values of Π, which can only take a fixed
number of values in order to make r(x) irreducible overGF ((22)2). We refer the reader to his work
for more discussion on these optimizations.
We do not perform any further optimizations to remove common subexpressions. This is primar-
ily due to the very time consuming task of searching for common subexpressions in all 432 possible
inversion and square-scale expressions over GF (((22)2)2). Future work will explore programmati-
cally deriving such compact expressions in order to achieve lower gate counts. Also, it is important
to note that, because we do not automatically apply the full set of Canright’s optimizations, our gate
counts will be upper bounds on the total number of gates. That is, the software that was written to
count the number of gates for each field representation and basis selection will produce a result that
is larger than or equal to what is presented in Canright’s own work, and as shown in his detailed
report, other optimizations can be applied to lower this bound even further.
Putting these optimizations together, we now illustrate the algorithmic approach used to count
the total number of required gates for a particular GF (((22)2)2) field representation. Assume we
use the bases [1, V ], [W,W 4], and [X,X16] to represent each element ζ ∈ GF (((22)2)2). Then,
following the aforementioned optimizations, we attain the following gate counts for the GF ((22)2)
inversion, square-scale, and multiplication operations:
• Inversion: 2× 2 + 3× 4 + 1 = 17 gates
• Multiplication: 4× 2 + 3× 4 + 1 = 21 gates
• Square-scale: between 3− 5 gates, depending on the coefficient Π
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Based on the equation for the inversion operation inGF (((22)2)2) which uses a total of one subfield
inversion, three multiplications, and two additions, and assuming that the square-scale operation
requires only three gates if the coefficient Π is equal to Σw4 +w, the total number of required gates
for the inverse circuit is:
17(inversion) + 3× 21(multiplication) + 2× 4(addition) + 3(square-scale)− 15(shared) = 76
The following code shows the output from the Magma procedure used to count the gates for the
inversion circuit using this input data. Note that since Magma does not support finite field arithmetic
when elements are represented in normal bases, we had to manually map elements in a polynomial
basis to what they “should be” in a normal basis. Details on this technique are documented in the
Magma program that counts the number of required gates, which is shown in Appendix C.
Listing 5.8 Gate counting results for the GF (((22)2)2) representation example.
> F2 := GF(2);
> Poly2<V> := PolynomialRing(F2);
> P := Vˆ2 + V + 1;
> F4<v> := ext<F2 | P>;
> Poly4<W> := PolynomialRing(F4);
> Q := Wˆ2 + W + v;
> F16<w> := ext<F4 | Q>;
> Poly16<X> := PolynomialRing(F16);
> R := Xˆ2 + X + (v + 1)*w + v;
> F256<x> := ext<F16 | R>;
> newSigma := changeSigmaRoot(1, v, F4, v);
> newPi := changePiRoot(1, v, w, wˆ4, F4, F16, (v + 1)*w + v);
> gatesInv8(P, Q, R, newSigma, newPi, 1, v, w, wˆ4, x, xˆ16);
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To illustrate an example for inversion over GF (216), assume we have a tower of polynomial
bases [1, V ], [1,W ], [1, X], and [1, Y ] to represent an element θ ∈ GF ((((22)2)2)2). If we define
this field with the polynomials p(v) = v2 + v + 1, q(w) = w2 + w + v, r(x) = x2 + x + ((v +
1)w + v), and s(y) = y2 + y + (vwx + (w + v)), such that Σ = v, Π = (v + 1)w + v, and
Λ = vwx + (w + v). Then, we obtain the following gate counts for the GF (((22)2)2) inversion,
square-scale, and multipliers:
• Inversion: 78 gates
• Multiplication: 4× 4(addition) + 3× (4× 2 + 3× 4)(multiplication) + 5(scale) = 81 gates
• Square-scale: 81 gates, since none of our optimizations apply
Thus, based on the equation for the inversion operation in GF ((((22)2)2)2) which uses a total of
one subfield inversion, three multiplications, and two additions, the total number of required gates
for the inverse circuit is:
78(inversion) + 3× 81(multiplication) + 2× 8(addition) + 81(square-scale)− 20(shared) = 398
The snippet of code that computes this value using our program is shown in Listing 5.9.
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Listing 5.9 Gate counting results for the GF ((((22)2)2)2) representation example.
> F2 := GF(2);
> Poly2<V> := PolynomialRing(F2);
> P := Vˆ2 + V + 1;
> F4<v> := ext<F2 | P>;
> Poly4<W> := PolynomialRing(F4);
> Q := Wˆ2 + W + v;
> F16<w> := ext<F4 | Q>;
> Poly16<X> := PolynomialRing(F16);
> R := Xˆ2 + X + ((v + 1)*w + v);
> F256<x> := ext<F16 | R>;
> Poly256<Y> := PolynomialRing(F256);
> S := Yˆ2 + Y + (v*w*x + (w + v));
> F6K<y> := ext<F256 | S>;



















Figure 5.13: High-level diagram for a merged S-box circuit.
In addition to these algebraic optimizations, we also follow in the footsteps of Satoh [67] and
Canright [13] by making use of the fact that performing logic minimizations on merged S-box de-
signs can yield better gate counts. The merged S-box design simply pairs the forward and inverse
S-box operations into the same circuit, where the output is determined by a simple 2:1 multiplexer.
A high-level overview of the merged circuit is shown in Figure 5.13. With this approach, we may
attempt to optimize the matrices T−1/(MT)−1 (recall that M−1T−1 = (MT)−1) and MT/T
separately, with the caveat that doing so increases the average running time for each of the opti-




Low-area hardware of these inversion circuits are most efficient when the basis change matrices
have small weights (i.e. number of non-zero entries), as these correspond to a small number of logic
gates required to perform the mappings. Since we are free to choose any basis for every subfield
of GF (216), an exhaustive search for an optimal inversion circuit should generate all such bases
and consider the complexity of the basis change transformation and the impact of the underlying
arithmetic operations due to such selections. Algorithm 15 presents the exhaustive search technique
we used for finding all such mixed basis combinations. This could be greatly simplified by finding
one root of each irreducible polynomial and then selecting its unique conjugate as the second root.
However, we chose to be more thorough when finding all possible basis combinations. From these
bases, we use the approach outlined in the previous sections to construct the basis change matrices
and their respective inverses.
Also, since we are programmatically generating these basis change matrices in Magma, we
had to perform two basis changes to account for the fact that there is no support for normal basis
arithmetic. More specifically, we first had to map elements in GF (216) represented in a polynomial
basis to elements in GF ((((22)2)2)2) represented in the tower of polynomial basesA [1, V ], [1,W ],
[1, X], and [1, Y ]. Then, using the roots generated using Algorithm 15, we perform another mapping
between the standard polynomial basis and the target mixed basis. However, rather than count the
cost of both basis change matrices separately, we multiply them together to form a single matrix,
which we effectively treat as T and T−1.
For low-area combinational implementations of the S-box containing the inversion circuits, we
measure the complexity, or cost, as the total number of gates required. To formulate this as an opti-
mization problem, we first denote the set of all possible basis combinations as B, where a particular
element in this set is denoted as β. For example, a strictly polynomial basis element in this set can be
β = {[1, V ], [1,W ], [1, X], [1, Y ]}. We also define the set of all 2048 degree-16 irreducible polyno-
mials T (z) overGF (2) asP . With these two sets, we let the function Tr(β, T ) : B×P → {0, 1}256
be one that outputs the transformation (i.e. basis change matrix T) given a particular set of basis
elements and the polynomial T (z) defining the field GF (216). The cost of each of these matrices
is equal to the number of non-zero entries in each one. As such, we let Ct(T) : {0, 1}256 → N be
a function that returns the cost of a particular transformation matrix. With coefficients Σ, Π, and Λ
for q(w), r(x), and s(y), respectively, we define the function Ci(β,Σ,Π,Λ) : B → N as one that
returns the cost of the inverse calculation given a particular basis and set of coefficients. The cost
of a particular S-box construction given a basis, coefficient set, affine transformation matrix A, and
constant c that is not implemented as a merged design is then defined by the following cost function:
c(β,Σ,Π,Λ, T ) =Ct(Tr(βT )
−1) + Ct(A× Tr(β, T )) + Ct((A× Tr(β, T ))−1)+
Ct(Tr(β, T )) + 2× (Ci(β,Σ,Π,Λ) + C(A) +HW (c))
If we follow the merged S-box design, then this cost function changes as shown below. We use || to
denote the concatenation of two n× n matrices together to form a single 2n× n matrix.
c(β,Σ,Π,Λ, T ) =Ct(Tr(β, T )
−1||(A× Tr(β, T ))−1)+
Ct(A×Tr(β,T)||Tr(β, T )) + Ci(β,Σ,Π,Λ) + 2×HW (c)
Our goal of the exhaustive search is to minimize these cost functions by considering all bases β ∈ B,
coefficients Σ, Π, and Λ, and the GF (216) field polynomial T .
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When considering all subfield polynomial and normal bases that have a trace of unity, there
128 choices for s(y), eight choices for r(x), two choices for q(w), and only one choice for p(v)
(see Appendix A for a list of all such polynomials). Since each of these polynomials has two
distinct conjugate roots, where either one of the roots can be used to form a polynomial basis and
both are required for a normal basis, there are three possible choices of a basis for elements in all
subfields of GF (216) formed by degree 2 extensions. Therefore, there is a total of (128 × 3) ×
(8× 3)× (2× 3)× (1× 3) = 165888 possible cases to consider for a single polynomial T (v) that
defines the field GF (216). Since the basis change matrices depend on the field representation of
GF (216), and there are 4080 degree 16 irreducible polynomials, this means that we must consider
4080×165888 = 676823040 possible cases to find the minimal transformation. Unfortunately, this
proved too much of a computational task to tackle for this work, so we selectively focused on the
21 smallest minimal polynomials T (z) when searching for a 16-bit S-box.
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Algorithm 15 Exhaustive Basis Generation.
1: roots = []
2: P (v) = v2 + v + 1
3: Define GF (22) with P (v)
4: pRoots = ZEROS(P )
5: for δ ∈ GF (22) do
6: Q(w) = w2 + w + δ
7: if Q(w) is irreducible then
8: Define GF ((22)2) with Q(w)
9: qRoots = ZEROS(Q)
10: for ε ∈ GF ((22)2) do
11: R(x) = x2 + x+ ε
12: if R(x) is irreducible then
13: Define GF (((22)2)2) with R(x)
14: rRoots = ZEROS(R)
15: for ζ ∈ GF (((22)2)2) do
16: S(y) = y2 + y + ζ
17: if S(y) is irreducible then
18: Define GF ((((22)2)2)2) with S(y)
19: sRoots = ZEROS(S)
20: for each tuple (pr, qr, rr, sr) for P (v), Q(w), R(x), S(y) do











Results and Proposed S-Box Constructions
In this chapter we provide a discussion of our experimental results in finding optimized combina-
tional implementations of 8- and 16-bit S-boxes. We begin with our experiments for alternative AES
S-boxes, discussing all related work in the process. We then present the 16-bit S-box constructions
that we found with our experiments.
6.1 AES S-Box Alternatives
One of the first applications of composite Galois field arithmetic to minimize the area footprint of the
AES S-box was performed by Rudra et al. in 2001 [65]. In their work, the inversion operation was
performed in the isomorphic field GF ((24)2) defined by the pair of polynomials p(v) = v4 + v+ 1
and q(w) = w2 + w + λ, where λ = v14, noting that GF (24) was small enough to compute the
inverse with a lookup-table or with the Itoh-Tsujii method. Independently, Satoh et al. [67] studied
the area savings of performing the S-box inversion in GF (((22)2)2) defined by the polynomials
p(v) = v2 +v+1, q(w) = w2 +w+φ, and r(x) = x2 +x+λ, where φ = v and λ = (v+1)w and
each element was represented in a polynomial basis. This S-box construction used 20% less logic
gates than the one proposed in [65].
In 2005, Mentens et al. [53] showed that the selection of the λ coefficient for r(x) in the
work of [67] was less than optimal with regards to the cost of the basis change matrix. In fact, the
basis change matrices from [67] required 61 XOR gates to implement. However, Mentens et al.
state that there are in fact eight unique basis change matrices between GF (((22)2)2) and GF (28)
(as a result of the algorithm presented in Paar’s PhD thesis in [59]), and after exploring all eight
possible matrices that result from all eight unique values of λ, they found that λ = vw contained
a transformation matrix with a minimal weight of 54 XOR gates. This reduced the AES gate area
from Satoh’s optimized result of 286 two-input NAND GEs to a lower value of 272 GEs.
The next significant leap forward was made by Canright in [13], where he systematically ex-
plored all 432 mixed basis (i.e. polynomial and normal) representations for elements inGF (((22)2)2)
and all subfields. His merged S-box circuit, which used a tower of normal bases and was optimized
using the exhaustive factorization technique discussed in Chapter 4, required only 104 XOR gates
and 36 AND gates to implement, which was a significant improvement over [67] and [53]. Years
later, Nikova et al. [55] studied a similar inverse decomposition from GF (28) to GF ((24)2) where
each element was represented in a normal as opposed to a polynomial basis. Their main focus was
on direct inversion in GF (24) using optimal and non-optimal normal bases, from which they found
that the optimal normal basis required fewer GEs than Canright’s inversion circuit over GF ((22)2).
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However, they did not perform a full comparison of the S-box sizes, including both the GF (24)
inverter and corresponding multiplication circuits, noting that the overall S-box area cost depends
on the inversion, multiplication, and basis change selections.
Nogami et al. built off of Canright’s results by optimizing the S-box for its critical path and
area [56]. As area was our only concern in this work, we did not investigate the specifics of their
techniques in further detail. Continuing this work further, Boyar and Peralta [9] recently published
a depth 16 S-box circuit with only 128 logic gates by applying their novel linear and nonlinear
heuristic-based optimization techniques to reduce Canright’s S-box design, and then a greedy tech-
nique for creating minimum depth circuits for linear components of a circuit. This work built off
their previous results in [10, 8] in which they found an S-box (not optimized for depth) that required
only 32 AND and 83 XOR/XNOR gates, falling below the 36 AND gate count by Canright.
To date, Boyar and Peralta’s AES S-box construction is the most area-efficient circuit known.
Using the combinational minimization techniques discussed in Chapter 4, they replaced Canright’s
GF ((22)2) inversion circuit with one that used requires five AND and eleven XOR gates, as op-
posed to nine AND and fourteen XOR (eight NAND, two NOR, and nine XOR/XNOR after opti-
mizations) that were used in Canright’s circuit. Then, Boyar and Peralta divided the resulting S-box
circuit into three components: a top linear transformation U , middle nonlinear transformation, and
bottom linear transformation B. Referring to personal communication with Peralta [11], the pro-
cess of partitioning the circuit into these three circuits was done such that U contained every linear
component with no nonlinear decedents, and, similarly, B contained no nonlinear decedents. With
the recent pattern of using SAT solvers to prove the optimal length of linear SLPs, Fuhs et al. [34]
verified Boyar and Peralta’s top linear circuit U , but they and the rest of the SAT community was
unable to do so for the bottom linear circuit B [20]. The most recent improvement on Boyar and
Peralta’s circuit for the AES S-box was due to Visconti and Schiavo, who, in 2013, showed that
the bottom B circuit could be improved by a single XOR gate. The corrected S-box circuit that
takes this improvement into account is hosted at [20]. Given the highly non-trivial nature of these
optimizations, we leave the investigation of similar techniques to future research.
In our work we we simply use Canright’s GF (((22)2)2) optimized inversion circuit when ex-
haustively searching for AES S-box alternatives. As previously stated, reproducing the work of
Boyar and Peralta was outside the scope of this research. So, to actually perform this search, we
consider all inverters which have a normal basis for GF (28)/GF (24) because the shared multipli-
cation factor saves 5 XOR gates over inverters with a polynomial basis for GF (28)/GF (24). After
Canright’s optimizations, these S-boxes have anywhere from 66 to 68 XOR gates and 36 AND gates
for the inverter [13]. Since theGF (28) irreducible polynomial determines the number of XOR gates
required for the basis change matrices T and T−1, we then considered all 30 degree 8 irreducible
polynomials for GF (28) (including the AES field polynomial) to programmatically derive such ba-
sis change matrices. For each candidate inversion circuit and pair of basis change matrices, we then
applied the linear circuit minimization techniques described in Chapter 4 to reduce the number of
XOR gates needed for the basis change components in the circuits. For each irreducible polynomial
p(v) for GF (28), we then recorded the basis representation that yielded the smallest number of
XOR and AND gates required. Recall that, given our use of Canright’s construction technique, each
inversion circuit will have exactly 36 AND gates. Our results from this experiment for un-merged
and merged S-box designs are summarized in Tables 6.1 and 6.1.
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Based on this data, we were able to improve upon Canright’s S-box design using the AES
polynomial p(v) = v8 +v4 +v3 +v+1 by a single XOR gate, before logic gate optimizations such
as replacing NAND/NOR instead of AND/XOR gates. Using the same normal bases and coefficients
Π and Σ, we found a different embedding of GF (((22)2)2) into GF (28) that yielded basis change
matrices able to be implemented in only 37 XOR gates, as opposed to 38 (our unoptimized matrices
T and T−1 have a total of 61 nonzero elements, just as in Canright’s work). This single gate is
saved in our field isomorphism and by applying Boyar and Peralta’s optimization technique for the
merged matrices T−1/(MT)−1 and MT/T. For completeness, the basis change matrices that are
used to map between elements in each of these isomorphic fields are shown below, along with the
two SLPs that are used to change bases and perform the affine transformation in the merged S-box
circuit, i.e. T−1/(MT)−1 and MT/T.
T =

0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0




1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1

1) y5 = x7
2) t8 = x1 + x7
3) t9 = x2 + t8
4) y6 = t9
5) t10 = x6 + t9
6) y2 = t10
7) t11 = x0 + x3
8) y8 = t11
9) t12 = x2 + t10
10) t13 = x4 + t12
11) y11 = t13
12) t14 = x1 + t11
13) y12 = t14
14) t15 = x0 + x5
15) t16 = x0 + t9
16) y3 = t16
17) t17 = x0 + t14
18) y10 = t17
19) t18 = x2 + t15
20) y13 = t18
21) t19 = x3 + t9
22) y1 = t19
23) t20 = x3 + t10
24) y15 = t20
25) t21 = x2 + t20
26) y9 = t21
27) t22 = x5 + t13
28) y7 = t22
29) t23 = t10 + t15
30) y0 = t23
31) t24 = t13 + t14
32) y4 = t24
33) t25 = x0 + x6
34) t26 = t24 + t25
35) y14 = t26
1) y15 = x5
2) t8 = x2 + x4
3) y0 = t8
4) t9 = x3 + x6
5) y8 = t9
6) t10 = x1 + t8
7) t11 = x5 + t10
8) t12 = x2 + t9
9) y6 = t12
10) t13 = x7 + t11
11) y5 = t13
12) t14 = x0 + t13
13) y10 = t14
14) t15 = x0 + x4
15) y1 = t15
16) t16 = x0 + t8
17) y3 = t16
18) t17 = x0 + t12
19) y13 = t17
20) t18 = x1 + x6
21) y11 = t18
22) t19 = t16 + t18
23) t20 = x1 + x7
24) y2 = t20
25) t21 = x1 +t 9
26) y7 = t21
27) t22 = x2 + x6
28) y14 = t22
29) t23 = x7 + t19
30) y9 = t23
31) t24 = t9 + t11
32) y12 = t24
33) t25 = t9 + t19
34) y4 = t25























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































These basis change matrices are different because Magma found a different isomorphic embed-
ding of GF (((22)2)2) into GF (28). The details of this process are outside the scope of this work,
though we note the investigation of the field embedding technique as an area of future work (see
Chapter 7).
To illustrate the correctness of this technique, consider the element α = v7 +v6 +v5 +v4 +v3 +
v2 + v + 1 and its inverse α−1 = v4 + v3 + v2, which are elements in the field GF (28) defined by
the AES irreducible polynomial. Multiplying α and α−1 by T−1 to map to a pair of elements β and
β−1 in GF (((22)2)2) represented using the tower of normal basis [V, V 2], [W,W 4], and [X,X16]
yields:
β =((v2 + v)w4 + (v2 + v)w)x
β−1 =((v2 + v)w4)x16
Assuming our basis change matrix is correct, we should find that β × β−1 = 1. To verify this we
simply compute the product using the fact that Σ = v2 and Π = vw (i.e. Π = Σ2w, as in Canright’s
construction). Also, recall that for p(v), q(w), and r(x) we have a trace of unity, and for the norms
we have v(v2) = 1, w(w4) = Σ = v2, and x(x16) = Π = vw. With this information we then
obtain the following:
β × β−1 =[((v2 + v)w4 + (v2 + v)w)x]× [((v2 + v)w4)x16]
=(v2)2(w4)2x(x16) + v(v2)(w4)2x(x16) + (v2)2w(w4)x(x16) + v(v2)w(w4)x(x16)+
v(v2)(w4)2x(x16) + v2(w4)2x(x16) + v(v2)w(w4)x(x16) + v2w(w4)x(x16)
=(v2)2(w4)2x(x16) + (v2)2w(w4)x(x16) + v2(w4)2x(x16) + v2w(w4)x(x16)
=v(w4)2x(x16) + vw(w4)x(x16) + v2(w4)2x(x16) + v2w(w4)x(x16)





Thus, the mapping is correct for this input element. In addition to the fact that the same code was
used to programmatically generate the (merged) basis change matrices for all candidate irreducible
polynomials, which leads us to believe that all other mappings are also correct, we also implemented
the inversion operation in software using the relevant tower-field arithmetic. The complete source
code for this program, which checks that βi × β−1i = 1 for all 0 ≤ i < 256, is shown in Appendix
C.
Using this technique to search for low-area AES S-box alternatives, we found that an S-box
construction with the polynomial s(v) = v8 + v6 + v5 + v4 + v2 + v + 1 yields a circuit that
surpasses Canright’s construction before applying logic gate optimizations. Furthermore, if one
were to apply Boyar and Peralta’s nonlinear and linear minimization techniques to this particular
inversion circuit, we would likely see further improvements that surpass the best known results in
the literature. Unfortunately, because this choice of s(v) is not the AES standard field polynomial
it will not be adopted for widespread use. It may however serve as a useful reference for new 8-bit
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S-boxes in future cryptosystems. Details of the S-box candidate that witnessed this improved area
are stated below, starting with the actual definition of the S-box function and its inverse.
S(x) =

0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0



























1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1














All 256 precomputed values of this S-box and its inverse are shown in Tables 6.3 and 6.4.
The basis change matrices to map an element α ∈ GF (28) represented in a polynomial basis to
β ∈ GF (((22)2)2) represented in the bases [1, V ], [W,W 4], and [X,X16], where this tower field
uses the coefficients Σ = v and Π = (v+ 1)w4 +w. Together they require a total of 25 XOR gates
to implement and in the merged S-box design with the above affine transformation they only require
35 XOR gates, as indicated by the subsequent SLP for the merged S-box design.
T =

1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0




0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1

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1) y0 = x6
2) y9 = x2
3) t8 = x0 + x4
4) t9 = x6 + t8
5) y11 = t9
6) t10 = x1 + x7
7) t11 = x5 + t9
8) y4 = t11
9) y15 = t11
10) t12 = x3 + t10
11) t13 = x4 + t12
12) y7 = t13
13) y14 = t13
14) t14 = x0 + t10
15) y3 = t14
16) t15 = x2 + t9
17) y2 = t15
18) t16 = x2 + x7
19) y5 = t16
20) t17 = t8 + t16
21) t18 = x1 + t11
22) y6 = t18
23) t19 = x3 + t9
24) y12 = t19
25) t20 = x6 + t12
26) y8 = t20
27) t21 = t10 + t17
28) y13 = t21
29) t22 = t11 + t17
30) y1 = t22
31) t23 = t14 + t15
32) y10 = t23
1) y2 = x1
2) y14 = x0
3) t8 = x0 + x1
4) t9 = x2 + x4
5) t10 = x3 + x6
6) t11 = x5 + t8
7) y13 = t11
8) t12 = t8 + t9
9) y15 = t12
10) t13 = x0 + t10
11) y0 = t13
12) t14 = t12 + t13
13) y6 = t14
14) t15 = x3 + x4
15) y3 = t15
16) t16 = x6 + t12
17) t17 = x3 + x7
18) y5 = t17
19) t18 = x4 + t11
20) y7 = t18
21) t19 = x2 + t18
22) y10 = t19
23) t20 = x3 + t12
24) y4 = t20
25) t21 = x4 + x6
26) y9 = t21
27) t22 = t11 + t14
28) y12 = t22
29) t23 = t11 + t16
30) y1 = t23
31) t24 = t15 + t16
32) y8 = t24
33) t25 = x0 + t17
34) t26 = t18 + t25
35) y11 = t26
Forward SLP for T−1/(MT)−1 Inverse SLP for MT/T.
The cryptographic properties of this S-box are shown below, with the bitwise representation of
its SAC properties shown in Table 6.5:
• δ = 4
• NL = 112
• Bn = 2
• AIc = 4
• Γ (biaffine) = 10509.45
• Γ (quadratic) = 7633154.49
• Γ′ (biaffine) = 86004.73
• Γ′ (quadratic) = 139884357715364.61
• Number of linearly independent biaffine equations = 23 = (3n− 1) (see [23])
• Number of linearly independent quadratic equations = 39 = (5n− 1) (see [23])
• CI = 0
• Resiliency = 0
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Table 6.3: Precomputed values for the forward of the alternative AES S-box.
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
00 8 F8 37 68 FE 44 57 1E F5 67 1B 59 A1 48 2E 8A
10 34 CF 41 93 B2 65 FC C4 5C 2 53 3D CE 18 99 3E
20 A0 E7 5E EB 87 6B A9 AE E6 66 54 8F E0 D0 9F 56
30 60 8B 82 FD 76 D9 74 91 15 0 EC DE 23 AF 2A 70
40 17 28 C5 33 75 81 8D B1 9A 9B 9 C2 C3 21 4A E
50 8E 7F A B5 FF 96 5 2F 4C 94 AC 2B E1 E9 EA 92
60 C8 DA D2 B7 6 F9 AB F3 EE CB 78 6C FB F0 BC 73
70 EF 61 97 DF 4 30 F1 22 CD AA 1 47 19 31 2C 7B
80 FA D5 C 3F D4 B6 29 9E B0 1A 58 4F 10 BD B8 6D
90 7D 63 36 F4 43 5B 5D D 16 F D8 50 46 F7 CA E4
A0 4E 42 3A A5 1D DD 6F CC BE 95 35 D1 B E5 85 12
B0 84 1F 20 4D 5F 49 52 A2 7 24 98 79 C6 C0 E2 71
C0 D7 2D 26 88 B9 D3 7A 1C 55 14 7C 39 D6 9C F6 32
D0 11 C1 89 C7 B3 3 80 38 69 E8 A8 13 BB C9 72 AD
E0 5A A3 83 64 7E A4 BA B4 40 62 77 6A E3 BF 86 6E
F0 4B 8C 9D 51 DC 90 45 25 A7 3B 3C A6 DB F2 ED 27
The VHDL design for the forward S-box function is shown in Appendix C. One may easily
extend this code to implement the inverse or merged S-box functions. In the interest of time, we did
not complete such designs. The combinational circuit corresponding to this design, as generated
from Synopsys, is shown in Figure 6.1. We present both the top-level design, which includes the
logic for the basis change matrices before and after the inversion circuit, as well as the top-level
design of said inversion circuit. One may synthesize our code in Synopsys to drill down to lower-
level schematics.
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Table 6.4: Precomputed values for the inverse of the alternative AES S-box.
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
00 39 7A 19 D5 74 56 64 B8 0 4A 52 AC 82 97 4F 99
10 8C D0 AF DB C9 38 98 40 1D 7C 89 A C7 A4 7 B1
20 B2 4D 77 3C B9 F7 C2 FF 41 86 3E 5B 7E C1 E 57
30 75 7D CF 43 10 AA 92 2 D7 CB A2 F9 FA 1B 1F 83
40 E8 12 A1 94 5 F6 9C 7B D B5 4E F0 58 B3 A0 8B
50 9B F3 B6 1A 2A C8 2F 6 8A B E0 95 18 96 22 B4
60 30 71 E9 91 E3 15 29 9 3 D8 EB 25 6B 8F EF A6
70 3F BF DE 6F 36 44 34 EA 6A BB C6 7F CA 90 E4 51
80 D6 45 32 E2 B0 AE EE 24 C3 D2 F 31 F1 46 50 2B
90 F5 37 5F 13 59 A9 55 72 BA 1E 48 49 CD F2 87 2E
A0 20 C B7 E1 E5 A3 FB F8 DA 26 79 66 5A DF 27 3D
B0 88 47 14 D4 E7 53 85 63 8E C4 E6 DC 6E 8D A8 ED
C0 BD D1 4B 4C 17 42 BC D3 60 DD 9E 69 A7 78 1C 11
D0 2D AB 62 C5 84 81 CC C0 9A 35 61 FC F4 A5 3B 73
E0 2C 5C BE EC 9F AD 28 21 D9 5D 5E 23 3A FE 68 70
F0 6D 76 FD 67 93 8 CE 9D 1 65 80 6C 16 33 4 54
Table 6.5: Strict Avalanche Criteria (SAC) visualization for the alternative AES S-box.
Bit 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 116 140 124 132 120 124 136 132
1 136 136 136 140 132 120 128 140
2 120 132 124 120 132 132 132 132
3 128 128 132 140 132 132 120 136
4 132 124 132 132 120 132 128 128
5 132 124 140 132 140 120 124 120
6 140 136 124 136 132 140 124 124


































































































































In addition to studying alternative irreducible polynomials that could be used to define the
GF (28) field, we also analyzed the differential uniformity and nonlinearity of all other bijective
power mappings for the AES polynomial to determine if there exists suitable candidates that could
be studied. These results are summarized in Table 6.6. There are 8 distinct power mapping expo-
nents d that yielded δ = 4 andNL = 112. While these may be suitable candidates for the encryption
step of a cryptosystem, they must be inverted in the decryption step. According to Fermat’s theo-
rem, which states that d × d−1 ≡ 1 mod φ(28), the inversion exponents d−1 for each of these 8
candidates are below:
• d = 127, d−1 = 253
• d = 191, d−1 = 251
• d = 223, d−1 = 247
• d = 239, d−1 = 239
• d = 247, d−1 = 223
• d = 251, d−1 = 191
• d = 253, d−1 = 127
• d = 254, d−1 = 254
Therefore, both the forward and inverse exponents yield cryptographically significant power
mappings. In order to determine a single candidate from these remaining exponents we analyzed
their cryptographic properties using the metrics discussed in Chapter 2. The results of this analysis
are summarized in Table 6.7. We did not explore combinational implementations of S-boxes based
on these power mappings. This is a task that may be pursued further in the future.
6.2 16-Bit S-Box Constructions
Following the same methodology for finding suitable AES S-box alternatives, we considered a sub-
set of all possible 16-bit S-box circuits constructed using the inversion power map. Given compu-
tation both memory and computation resources for processing all mixed basis candidates, we were
forced to limit our analysis. For example, it requires approximately 0.5GB of storage to hold the
output from the gate counting program for a single degree 16 irreducible polynomial over GF (2).
With a total of 4080 such polynomials, this would have consumed approximately 2,040GB, or 2TB.
Thus, we had to be selective in which S-boxes we examined. Also, as noted in the previous chapter,
we did not consider all of the low-level algebraic optimizations of Canright because we could not
programmatically check for all such optimizations. The sheer number of candidate basis selections
ruled out the possibility of evaluating all cases by hand. As such, we leave such optimizations for
future work, as described in Chapter 7.
For the 21 smallest degree 16 irreducible polynomials over GF (2), we identified several S-
box constructions from the set of all candidates that yielded the smallest gate counts without logic
optimization. Our results for each polynomial are summarized in Tables B.1, B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5,
B.6, B.7, B.8, B.9, and B.10 of Appendix B. Again, due to the massive number of possibilities, we
did not optimize the basis change matrices shown in these tables. Here we report the best candidate
for the polynomial t(v) = v16 + v5 + v3 + v + 1 which has a total of 1238 XOR and 144 AND
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Table 6.6: Differential uniformity and nonlinearity of all bijective power mappings over GF (28)
defined by the AES irreducible polynomial p(v) = v8 + v4 + v3 + v + 1.
d δ NL d δ NL d δ NL d δ NL
1 256 0 64 256 0 128 256 0 193 6 96
2 256 0 67 12 96 131 6 96 194 10 96
4 256 0 71 10 96 133 10 96 196 16 104
7 6 96 73 6 96 134 12 96 197 16 96
8 256 0 74 6 96 137 16 104 199 16 112
11 10 96 76 16 104 139 16 96 202 30 80
13 12 96 77 16 96 142 10 96 203 16 104
14 6 96 79 16 96 143 16 112 206 12 96
16 256 0 82 6 96 146 6 96 208 12 96
19 16 104 83 16 96 148 6 96 209 10 96
22 10 96 86 30 80 149 30 80 211 16 96
23 16 96 88 10 96 151 16 104 212 16 96
26 12 96 89 30 80 152 16 104 214 16 112
28 6 96 91 16 112 154 16 96 217 12 96
29 10 96 92 16 96 157 12 96 218 16 112
31 16 112 94 16 104 158 16 96 223 4 112
32 256 0 97 10 96 161 12 96 224 6 96
37 6 96 98 16 104 163 10 96 226 16 96
38 16 104 101 30 80 164 6 96 227 16 112
41 6 96 103 12 96 166 16 96 229 16 104
43 30 80 104 12 96 167 16 96 232 10 96
44 10 96 106 16 96 169 16 96 233 16 96
46 16 96 107 16 112 172 30 80 236 12 96
47 16 104 109 16 112 173 16 112 239 4 112
49 16 104 112 6 96 176 10 96 241 16 112
52 12 96 113 16 96 178 30 80 242 16 104
53 16 96 116 10 96 179 12 96 244 16 96
56 6 96 118 12 96 181 16 112 247 4 112
58 10 96 121 16 104 182 16 112 248 16 112
59 12 96 122 16 96 184 16 96 251 4 112
61 16 96 124 16 112 188 16 104 253 4 112
62 16 112 127 4 112 191 4 112 254 4 112
gates. This candidate uses the basis sets [1, V ], [1,W ], [1, X], [Y 256, Y ] to represent elements in
GF ((((22)2)2)2), where Σ = v, Π = vw + v, and Λ = (vw + v)x+ w. The affine transformation
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and constant for this candidate shown below. Also, rather than provide a complete hardware design




0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0











































0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1























The basis change matrices used in this S-box candidate are shown below.
T =

0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0




1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1

In the current state of this work, we are optimizing all 165,888 basis combinations on the Open
Science Grid. Future work will consist of using these results to present an S-box candidate with an










































































































































































































































































































































































































Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
In this work we conducted an in-depth study of techniques to construct cryptographically strong
S-boxes with efficient combinational implementations. Motivated by the potential need for large
substitution boxes in the future, we hope that our preliminary results will be useful in the construc-
tion of cryptographic primitives with larger state sizes.
We started with a discussion of the attacks on cryptographic primitives that exploit the under-
lying S-box, and followed with methods for measuring the resilience of an S-box to said attacks.
This included source code to perform each computation and time complexities for each algorithm to
see how computationally difficult it becomes to do these computations for large S-boxes. We then
presented methods for constructing cryptographically strong S-boxes based on power mappings us-
ing their nonlinearity and differential uniformity as primary selection criteria, and then presented a
method for finding a suitable invertible affine transformation that may be composed of the power
mapping and its inverse for encryption and decryption purposes, respectively.
Our next section of work focused on how to improve the efficiency of known combinational
logic minimization techniques through parallel programming. Our experimental results showed
substantial speedups for Boyar and Peralta’s technique, which is known as the most effective al-
gorithm for optimizing combinational logic, as well as moderate improvements for the exhaustive
factorization technique. We also derived all 18 inversion circuits from all possible element represen-
tations of GF ((22)2), and then used Synopsys to optimize the respective circuits for reduced area.
One interesting result was that there were only 8 that were unique circuits out of all 18 possibilities,
and the smallest inverter circuit did not match the one used by Canright in his S-box implementation.
Next, we presented an extension of Canright’s tower field algebraic optimizations for
GF (((22)2)2) in both polynomial and normal bases, which are required when computing the inverse
in
GF ((((22)2)2)2). This was followed by a discussion of the exact optimization cost function we
were minimizing by exhaustive search for both merged and un-merged S-box designs. The results
of these experiments for S-boxes over GF (28) and GF (216) are then presented in the previous
chapter. We were able to find a pair of basis change matrices for the AES S-box that had lower
weight than that of Canright’s. If this new S-box implementation is pursued further we may be
able to produce a gate count that drops below the best result in the literature. In addition to the
results for the AES S-box, we also presented an S-box over GF (28) that used a field polynomial
different from the one identified in the AES specification [28]. While it is highly unlikely that this
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will be adopted for use in the AES, it may become useful for future cryptographic primitives that
use similar size S-boxes. Finally, we presented our gate counts for 16-bit S-boxes with a variety of
choices for reduced area implementations.
7.2 Future Work
Through the course of this work there were many areas of research that fell outside our original
scope. The most important items are captured in this section as tasks to be studied in the future.
Task 1: Explore all candidate embeddings of GF (((22)2)2) into the isomorphic field
GF (28) and measure the effect on the weight of the corresponding basis change matrices.
With the discovery of an embedding of GF (((22)2)2) into the isomorphic field GF (28) found
using Magma that was different than the embedding used by Canright and others for low-area S-
boxes [13, 10], we believe a very fruitful research problem is to study the effect of all possible
embeddings. Bosma et al. [5] discuss the criteria for which a finite field may be embedded in the
lattice of another, and provide an algorithm for performing such embeddings (as implemented in
Magma). We will study this particular procedure to determine if the number of unique embeddings
can be enumerated, and if so, exhaustively explore all possible basis change matrices from GF (28)
toGF (((22)2)2). Even with our preliminary results, we expect that by applying Boyar and Peralta’s
logic minimization techniques discussed in [10] it may be possible to lower the best-known area
requirement for the S-box, which today stands at 32 AND and 83 XOR/XNOR gates with a depth
of 28. We will then also try to minimize the depth of the circuit for still more throughput-efficient
implementations.
Task 2: Programmatic multivariate polynomial evaluation for algebraic optimizations
and searches for common subexpressions.
One of the impediments to applying fine-grained algebraic optimizations to our inversion cir-
cuits over GF (216) was the large number of cases to consider, prohibiting manual derivations to
find simplified square-scale expressions. While we could have used Magma’s robust multivariate
polynomial simplification and evaluation features, we did not have enough time to learn the tool well
enough to explore this possibility in sufficient detail. Therefore, future work will include attempting
to replicate Canright’s low-level optimizations by systematically evaluating all square-scale expres-
sions as multivariate polynomials in terms of the coefficients Π and Σ. See Section 5.2 of Chapter
5 for more details on these particular optimizations.
Task 3: Modified circuit optimization goals to search for the NAND/NOT gate complexity of
small circuits.
The combinational logic minimization techniques studied in this work enforce the constraint that
all logic should be implemented in AND or XOR gates. A more useful constraint is to optimize such
logic with NAND and NOT gates, as these are the cheapest to implement in CMOS technologies.
For example, it is well understood that NAND, AND, and XOR gates can be implemented with
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4, 6, and 8 transistors, respectively. If we change the GF (2) operators that are available in the
randomized nonlinear circuit optimization technique to NAND and NOT gates we may be able to
tailor the resulting circuits specifically to low area and GE ASIC implementations.
Task 4: Improved nonlinear circuit optimization heuristics with the Circuit Minimization
Team (e.g. using SAT solvers for exact multiplicative complexity measures).
As briefly discussed at the end of Section 4.1.1 in Chapter 4, there has already been substan-
tial work done on moving beyond linear and nonlinear circuit optimizations based on heuristic
techniques. The SAT-based encoding of SLPs by Fuhs and Schneider-Kamp [34] stimulated the
clever application of SAT solvers to solve for exact multiplicative complexities. For this task, the
SAT-based circuit optimization techniques explored by Courtois et al. [25] to find the exact mul-
tiplicative and gate complexity of nonlinear circuits will be studied and, hopefully, improved. The
gate complexity is the minimum number of any type of logic gate required to implement a particular
nonlinear circuit. These researchers explored several techniques for encoding the algebraic expres-
sion of S-boxes into an equivalent SAT formula, such as the MQ-to-CNF technique pioneered by
Courtois, Bard, and Jefferson in [24], to find the multiplicative and gate complexities of several
S-boxes in block ciphers such as GOST, PRESENT, and C2C2.
Building upon this thread of active research, we hope to apply SAT-based optimizations to
many of the nonlinear circuits studied in this work, including inversion over GF (24), GF ((22)2),
GF (28), and GF (((22)2)2). We expect that some algebraic expressions for the inversion operation
in higher-order fields may lead to the corresponding SAT formulas that are too difficult to solve. We
hope to explore this problem in more detail to prove (or disprove) this hypothesis.
Task 5: Complete security analysis of all bijective 16-bit S-boxes and integration of
Boolean function analysis code into the Cryptography package in SAGE [71].
Normal computers are not suited to compute the S-box security metrics discussed in Chapter
2. As such, we have started and will continue to utilize the Open Science Grid to compute metrics
such as the nonlinearity, differential uniformity, correlation immunity, and resiliency, in addition
to the linear approximation and difference distribution tables, for all bijective power mappings over
GF (216). In the current state of this work, the nonlinearity calculations for all 215 = 32768 bijective
power mappings are running on the OSG with very low priority. We are currently working with the
Pegasus team to improve the performance and job scheduling policy of this work-flow to finish the
computation as soon as possible, though this will not be finished for this work.
We will also attempt to integrate our analysis code into the SAGE library where needed so as to
aid other researchers.
Task 6: Implement normal basis arithmetic in our Galois field library.
Having the ability to easily perform normal basis arithmetic in software would have proven very
useful throughout the course of this work. Consequently, we plan on developing such functionality
in our Galois field library to serve as both an educational reference and research aid for future work.
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A.1 Tower Field Irreducible Polynomials
Table A.1: Irreducible Polynomials for GF (22)
v2 + v + 1
Table A.2: Irreducible Polynomials for GF (24)/GF (22)
w2 + w + v
w2 + w + v + 1
Table A.3: Irreducible Polynomials forGF (28)/GF (24)/GF (22)
x2 + x+ (v + 1)w + v
x2 + x+ vw
x2 + x+ vw + v + 1
x2 + x+ vw + v
x2 + x+ (v + 1)w
x2 + x+ (v + 1)w + 1
x2 + x+ vw + 1
x2 + x+ (v + 1)w + v + 1
Table A.4: Irreducible Polynomials for
GF (216)/GF (28)/GF (24)/GF (22)
y2 + y + (vw + v)x+ 1
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y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + v)x+ (v + 1)w
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + v)x+ vw + 1
y2 + y + (vw + 1)x+ (v + 1)w + v + 1
y2 + y + vwx+ vw
y2 + y + vwx+ 1
y2 + y + vwx+ w + v
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + v)x+ vw
y2 + y + (v + 1)wx+ w + v
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + v)x+ w
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + 1)x+ (v + 1)w
y2 + y + vwx+ vw + 1
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + 1)x
y2 + y + (vw + 1)x+ w + 1
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + 1)x+ w
y2 + y + vwx+ w + v + 1
y2 + y + (vw + (v + 1))x+ 1
y2 + y + (vw + (v + 1))x+ w + v
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + (v + 1))x+ vw + 1
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + (v + 1))x
y2 + y + (vw + (v + 1))x+ v + 1
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + (v + 1))x+ (v + 1)w + v
y2 + y + vwx+ (v + 1)w
y2 + y + (vw + v)x+ w + v
y2 + y + (vw + v)x+ w + 1
y2 + y + (vw + (v + 1))x+ v
y2 + y + vwx+ (v + 1)w + v
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + 1)x+ (v + 1)w + 1
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + 1)x+ vw
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + 1)x+ w + v + 1
y2 + y + (vw + v)x+ (v + 1)w + 1
y2 + y + (v + 1)wx+ w + 1
y2 + y + (v + 1)wx+ vw
y2 + y + vwx+ vw + v + 1
y2 + y + (vw + v)x+ vw + v + 1
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + v)x+ w + v
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + (v + 1))x+ (v + 1)w + v + 1
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + 1)x+ w + 1
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + (v + 1))x+ w + v + 1
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + v)x
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + (v + 1))x+ v + 1
y2 + y + (v + 1)wx+ (v + 1)w + v + 1
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + v)x+ vw + v + 1
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + 1)x+ (v + 1)w + v + 1
y2 + y + (vw + 1)x+ vw
y2 + y + (vw + 1)x+ w + v + 1
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y2 + y + (v + 1)wx+ vw + v
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + (v + 1))x+ vw
y2 + y + (vw + 1)x+ w
y2 + y + vwx+ (v + 1)w + 1
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + 1)x+ w + v
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + (v + 1))x+ w
y2 + y + (vw + 1)x+ (v + 1)w
y2 + y + (vw + (v + 1))x+ vw
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + 1)x+ vw + v
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + v)x+ (v + 1)w + v
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + v)x+ (v + 1)w + 1
y2 + y + (vw + (v + 1))x
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + v)x+ (v + 1)w + v + 1
y2 + y + (vw + (v + 1))x+ (v + 1)w
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + (v + 1))x+ w + 1
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + 1)x+ vw + 1
y2 + y + (vw + v)x+ w + v + 1
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + (v + 1))x+ (v + 1)w
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + v)x+ v + 1
y2 + y + (vw + v)x
y2 + y + (vw + v)x+ vw + 1
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + v)x+ v
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + (v + 1))x+ 1
y2 + y + (v + 1)wx+ v + 1
y2 + y + (vw + (v + 1))x+ vw + v + 1
y2 + y + (vw + (v + 1))x+ w
y2 + y + (v + 1)wx
y2 + y + (vw + (v + 1))x+ (v + 1)w + v
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + 1)x+ (v + 1)w + v
y2 + y + (v + 1)wx+ 1
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + v)x+ w + v + 1
y2 + y + vwx+ (v + 1)w + v + 1
y2 + y + vwx+ w
y2 + y + (vw + 1)x+ (v + 1)w + 1
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + v)x+ 1
y2 + y + (vw + v)x+ vw + v
y2 + y + (vw + (v + 1))x+ (v + 1)w + v + 1
y2 + y + (vw + v)x+ (v + 1)w + v
y2 + y + (vw + 1)x
y2 + y + (vw + v)x+ v
y2 + y + vwx+ vw + v
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + (v + 1))x+ v
y2 + y + (vw + 1)x+ w + v
y2 + y + (vw + (v + 1))x+ vw + v
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + v)x+ w + 1
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y2 + y + vwx+ w + 1
y2 + y + (v + 1)wx+ (v + 1)w
y2 + y + (vw + v)x+ w
y2 + y + (v + 1)wx+ v
y2 + y + (v + 1)wx+ vw + v + 1
y2 + y + (vw + (v + 1))x+ (v + 1)w + 1
y2 + y + (vw + v)x+ (v + 1)w
y2 + y + (vw + (v + 1))x+ w + 1
y2 + y + (vw + 1)x+ vw + 1
y2 + y + (v + 1)wx+ (v + 1)w + v
y2 + y + (vw + 1)x+ vw + v + 1
y2 + y + (vw + 1)x+ vw + v
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + v)x+ vw + v
y2 + y + (vw + v)x+ (v + 1)w + v + 1
y2 + y + (v + 1)wx+ vw + 1
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + 1)x+ v
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + 1)x+ vw + v + 1
y2 + y + (vw + (v + 1))x+ w + v + 1
y2 + y + (vw + v)x+ vw
y2 + y + (vw + 1)x+ v
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + 1)x+ 1
y2 + y + (v + 1)wx+ w
y2 + y + (vw + 1)x+ 1
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + (v + 1))x+ vw + v + 1
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + (v + 1))x+ vw + v
y2 + y + (vw + v)x+ v + 1
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + 1)x+ v + 1
y2 + y + vwx+ v
y2 + y + (v + 1)wx+ w + v + 1
y2 + y + vwx
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + (v + 1))x+ w + v
y2 + y + (vw + (v + 1))x+ vw + 1
y2 + y + vwx+ v + 1
y2 + y + (vw + 1)x+ (v + 1)w + v
y2 + y + (v + 1)wx+ (v + 1)w + 1
y2 + y + ((v + 1)w + (v + 1))x+ (v + 1)w + 1
y2 + y + (vw + 1)x+ v + 1
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Appendix B
16-Bit S-Box Constructions and Gate Counts
B.1 16-Bit S-Box Gate Counts (Without Logic Minimization)
In this section we present the 16-bit AES-like S-box candidates that we found for 21 distinct irre-
ducible polynomials over GF (2). Each count refers to the number of XOR gates required. Each
candidate also requires approximately 144 AND gates, depending on what basis is used. We do
not provide this information though, as XOR gates are more expensive to implement in CMOS
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C.1 Galois Field Composite Arithmetic Library
In this section we provide a brief tutorial on how to use the “toy” Galois field composite arithmetic
library. As a whole, it only supports basic arithmetic for GF (p) and GF (qn), q = pm. Even with
this limitation, it can be quite useful for those trying to understand the mathematical concepts of
composite fields and the corresponding arithmetic, as seemingly simple as it may be.
Consider the field GF (24) defined by the irreducible polynomial p(x) = x4 + x + 1. Let
α = x3 + 1 be an element in this field. We can create this Galois field element and perform
arithmetic in the field GF (24) as follows:
>>> from galois import *
>>> ip = GFElem([1,0,0,1,1])
>>> F = GF(2, 4, ip)
>>> print(F)
GF(2ˆ4), P(x) = (1xˆ4 + 1xˆ1 + 1xˆ0)
>>> x = GFElem([1,0,0,1])
>>> print(x)
(1xˆ3 + 1xˆ0)
>>> xa = F.g_add(x, x)
>>> print(xa)
0
>>> xs = F.g_mult(x, x)
>>> print(xs)
(1xˆ3 + 1xˆ2 + 1xˆ0)
>>> print(F.g_mult(F.inverse(x), x))
(1xˆ0)
Creation of Galois field elements is as simple as providing a list of coefficients in the ground
field. Also, even though the example works with binary fields only, the library can support any
prime p as the field characteristic.
Now assume we wish to create the a degree-2 extension of this field, i.e. GF ((24)2), using the
irreducible polynomial y2 + y + (x3 + x2). Notice that the coefficients of each term are elements
of the field GF (24), as per our earlier definition. Let β = (x2 + 1)y + (x2 + x+ 1) be an element
in GF ((24)2). We can create this field and element to perform basic arithmetic as in the base field
as follow.
>>> eIp = GFExtensionElem([GFElem([1]), GFElem([1]), GFElem([1,1,0,0])])
>>> F2 = GFExtension(F, 2, eIp)
>>> print(F2)
2 degree extension of: GF(2ˆ4)
>>> b = GFExtensionElem([GFElem([1,0,1]),GFElem([1,1,1])])
>>> print(b)
[(1xˆ2 + 1xˆ0)yˆ1 + (1xˆ2 + 1xˆ1 + 1xˆ0)yˆ0]




>>> bs = F2.g_mult(b, b)
>>> print(bs)
[(1xˆ1)yˆ1 + (1xˆ3 + 1xˆ2 + 1xˆ0)yˆ0]
>>> bi = F2.power(b, 254) # Fermat’s Little Theorem says this should be the inverse
>>> print(bi)
[(1xˆ0)yˆ0] # And so it is...
The reader is welcome to browse the library source code and play with additional features (e.g.
finding generators for a field) at their own leisure.
C.2 Circuit Minimization Programs
Here we provide relevant snippets from the parallel implementations of logic minimization pro-
grams. The full versions will be available with the distribution of this work.
C.2.1 Parallel Factorization Program (snippet)
public void compute() throws Exception
{
ArrayList<Pair> pairs = new ArrayList<Pair>();
for (int i = 0; i <= lastcol - 1; i++)
{
for (int j = i + 1; j <= lastcol; j++)
{
if (!(i < oldi && j != oldi && j != oldj && j < lastcol))
{
int[] coli = currMatrix.getColumn(i);
int[] colj = currMatrix.getColumn(j);
int wt = weight(AND(coli, colj));







if (pairs.size() > 0)
{
exhaustiveOptimize(pairs); // breadth first
}
}
public void exhaustiveOptimize(ArrayList<Pair> pairs) throws Exception
{
int wt = 0;
int hmax = 0;
HashSet<ParallelMatrixOptimize> tasks = new HashSet<ParallelMatrixOptimize>();
for (Pair p : pairs)
{
int i = p.i;
int j = p.j;
int[] coli = currMatrix.getColumn(i);
int[] colj = currMatrix.getColumn(j);
int[] newcol = AND(coli, colj);
Matrix newMatrix = new Matrix(currMatrix);
newMatrix.appendColumn(newcol);
for (int k = 0; k < n; k++)
{






ParallelSolution sol = new ParallelSolution(newMatrix.getGateCount(),
127
newMatrix, i, j, n, lastcol + 1);
tasks.add(new ParallelMatrixOptimize(sol));
}
invokeAll(tasks); // fork & join
for (ParallelMatrixOptimize result : tasks)
{






C.2.2 Parallel Boyar-Peralta Program (snippet)












p_slp = new ArrayList<String>();
// Create the initial base
int[][] b = new int[c][c];
for (int i = 0; i < c; i++)
{
for (int j = 0; j < c; j++)
{






p_base = new Matrix(b, c);
// Initialize the distance array and then get the ball rolling
p_dist = computeDistance(p_base, m);
for (int f = 0; f < p_dist.length; f++)
{
if (p_dist[f] == 0)
{
int[] row = m.getRow(f);
for (int cc = 0; cc < row.length; cc++)
{
if (row[cc] == 1)
{





p_newDist = new int[m.getDimension()];
p_i = m.getLength();
final int nVars = m.getLength();
p_n = p_base.getDimension();
p_d = sum(p_dist);
p_optimalBase = new int[p_base.getLength()];
p_optimalBases = new ArrayList<int[]>();
p_optimalDistances = new ArrayList<int[]>();
p_pairs = new ArrayList<Pair>();
// Create the parallel team so everything isn’t anonymous
ParallelTeam team = new ParallelTeam();





public void run() throws Exception
{
execute (0, p_n - 1, new IntegerForLoop()
{
int t_d = p_d;
ArrayList<int[]> t_optimalBases = new ArrayList<int[]>();
ArrayList<int[]> t_optimalDistances = new ArrayList<int[]>();





public void run (int first, int last) throws Exception
{
for (int t_ii = first; t_ii <= last; t_ii++)
{
for (int t_jj = t_ii + 1; t_jj < p_n; t_jj++)
{
if (t_ii != t_jj)
{
// t_newDist = new int[m.getDimension()];
int[] ssum = addMod(p_base.getRow(t_ii), p_base.getRow(t_jj), 2);
if (!(p_base.containsRow(ssum)) && !isZero(ssum))
{
int[] t_newDist = optimizedComputeDistance(p_base, m, ssum, p_dist);
int newDistSum = sum(t_newDist);
if (newDistSum < t_d)
{
t_d = newDistSum;
t_optimalBases = new ArrayList<int[]>();
t_optimalDistances = new ArrayList<int[]>();

















public void finish() throws Exception
{














// Resolve using norms
int mi = 0;
int mj = 0;
double maxNorm = Double.MAX_VALUE;
switch (tieBreaker)
{
// Omitted for brevity
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}
// Generate & save the new base
BasePair newBase = new BasePair(p_optimalBase, p_newDist, new Pair(mi, mj));
p_base.appendRow(newBase.base);
// Insert the new line into the program
String c1 = newBase.p.i < nVars ? "x" : "t";
String c2 = newBase.p.j < nVars ? "x" : "t";
p_slp.add("t_" + p_i + " = " + c1 + newBase.p.i + " XOR " + c2 + newBase.p.j);
p_xorCount++;












p_optimalBase = new int[p_base.getLength()]; // was dimension
p_optimalBases = null;
p_optimalBases = new ArrayList<int[]>();
p_optimalDistances = null;
p_optimalDistances = new ArrayList<int[]>();
p_pairs = null;
p_pairs = new ArrayList<Pair>();





return new SLP(p_slp, p_xorCount, 0);
}
C.3 S-Box Gate Counting Program
C.3.1 gateCount.m (snippet)
// File: gateCount.m
// Author: Christopher Wood
// Description: Count gates for the inverse mapping using ’algebraic’
// and some common subexpression optimizations.




/// GATE COUNTS FOR POLYNOMIAL/NORMAL ARITHMETIC IN GF(2ˆ2)
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
gatesPolyInv2 := function()
return 1; // 1 XOR
end function;
gatesPolyAdd2 := function()
return 2; // 2 XORs
end function;
gatesPolyMult2 := function()
// return 7; // 4 XORs, 3 ANDs
return 4; // ONLY COUNT XOR GATES HERE
end function;
gatesPolySquare2 := function()




return 1; // 1 XOR
end function;
gatesPolySquareScale2 := function(pr, sigma, scalar)
if pr eq sigma and pr eq scalar then
return 0;







return 0; // 1 XOR
end function;
gatesNormAdd2 := function()
return 2; // 2 XORs
end function;
gatesNormMult2 := function()
// return 7; // 4 XORs, 3 ANDs















/// GATE COUNTS FOR POLYNOMIAL ARITHMETIC IN GF(2ˆ4)/GF(2ˆ2)
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
gatesInv4 := function(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2)
if (qr1 eq 1) then
if (pr1 eq 1) then
sum := 2 * gatesPolyAdd2();
sum := sum + gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigma);
sum := sum + (3 * gatesPolyMult2());
sum := sum + gatesPolyInv2();
return sum;
else
sum := 2 * gatesNormAdd2();
sum := sum + gatesNormSquareScale2();
sum := sum + (3 * gatesNormMult2());




if (pr1 eq 1) then
sum := 2 * gatesPolyAdd2();
sum := sum + gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigma);
sum := sum + (3 * gatesPolyMult2());
sum := sum + gatesPolyInv2();
return sum;
else
sum := 2 * gatesNormAdd2();
sum := sum + gatesNormSquareScale2();
sum := sum + (3 * gatesNormMult2());









gatesMult4 := function(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2)
if (qr1 eq 1) then
if (pr1 eq 1) then
sum := (4 * gatesPolyAdd2());
sum := sum + (3 * gatesPolyMult2());
return sum;
else
sum := (4 * gatesNormAdd2());




if (pr1 eq 1) then
sum := (4 * gatesPolyAdd2());
sum := sum + (3 * gatesPolyMult2());
sum := sum + (gatesPolyScale2());
return sum;
else
sum := (4 * gatesNormAdd2());
sum := sum + (3 * gatesNormMult2());





gatesSquare4 := function(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2)
if (qr1 eq 1) then
if (pr1 eq 1) then
sum := (2 * gatesPolySquare2());
sum := sum + gatesPolyAdd2();
sum := sum + gatesPolyScale2();
return sum;
else
sum := (2 * gatesNormSquare2());
sum := sum + gatesNormAdd2();




if (pr1 eq 1) then
sum := (3 * gatesPolyAdd2());
sum := sum + (2 * gatesPolySquare2());
sum := sum + gatesPolyScale2();
return sum;
else
sum := (3 * gatesNormAdd2());
sum := sum + (2 * gatesNormSquare2());





gatesScale4 := function(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, pi)









































gatesSquareScale4 := function(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, pi)
if (qr1 eq 1) then // polynomial basis (z)
case Eltseq(pi):
when [0, sigma]:
if (pr1 eq 1) then
return (1 * gatesPolySquare2()) + (1 * gatesPolyAdd2()) +
(1 * gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigma)) +
(1 * gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigmaˆ2));
else
return (1 * gatesNormSquare2()) + (1 * gatesNormAdd2()) +
(1 * gatesNormSquareScale2()) + (1 * gatesNormSquareScale2());
end if;
when [0, sigmaˆ2]:
if (pr1 eq 1) then
return (1 * gatesPolyAdd2()) + (1 * gatesPolySquare2()) +
(1 * gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigma)) +
(1 * gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigmaˆ2));
else
return (1 * gatesNormAdd2()) + (1 * gatesNormSquare2()) +
(1 * gatesNormSquareScale2()) + (1 * gatesNormSquareScale2());
end if;
when [sigma, sigma]:
if (pr1 eq 1) then
return (1 * gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigma)) +
(1 * gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigmaˆ2)) + (1 * gatesPolyAdd2());
else
return (1 * gatesNormSquareScale2()) +
(1 * gatesNormSquareScale2()) + (1 * gatesNormAdd2());
end if;
when [sigmaˆ2, sigmaˆ2]:
if (pr1 eq 1) then
return (1 * gatesPolySquare2()) +
(1 * gatesPolyAdd2()) +
(1 * gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigmaˆ2));
else
return (1 * gatesNormSquare2()) +
(1 * gatesNormAdd2()) + (1 * gatesNormSquareScale2());
end if;
when [1, sigma]:
if (pr1 eq 1) then
return (1 * gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigma)) +
(1 * gatesPolyAdd2()) + (1 * gatesPolySquare2());
else
return (1 * gatesNormSquareScale2()) +
(1 * gatesNormAdd2()) + (1 * gatesNormSquare2());
end if;
when [sigma, sigmaˆ2]:
if (pr1 eq 1) then
return gatesPolyAdd2() +
gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigmaˆ2) +
gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigma);
else




if (pr1 eq 1) then
return (2 * gatesPolyAdd2()) +
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(1 * gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigma)) +
gatesPolySquare2();
else
return (2 * gatesNormAdd2()) +
(1 * gatesNormSquareScale2()) + gatesNormSquare2();
end if;
when [1, sigmaˆ2]:
if (pr1 eq 1) then
return (2 * gatesPolyAdd2()) +
(1 * gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigma)) +
(1 * gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigmaˆ2));
else
return (2 * gatesNormAdd2()) +
(1 * gatesNormSquareScale2()) + (1 * gatesNormSquareScale2());
end if;
end case;
else // Normal basis
case Eltseq(pi):
when [0, sigma]:
if (pr1 eq 1) then
return gatesPolyAdd2() +
gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigma) +
gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigmaˆ2);
else




if (pr1 eq 1) then
return gatesPolyAdd2() +
gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigma) +
gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigmaˆ2);
else




if (pr1 eq 1) then
return gatesPolyAdd2() + gatesPolySquare2() +
gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigmaˆ2);
else




if (pr1 eq 1) then
return gatesPolyAdd2() + gatesPolySquare2() +
gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigmaˆ2);
else




if (pr1 eq 1) then
return gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigma) +







if (pr1 eq 1) then
return gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigma) +







if (pr1 eq 1) then
return gatesPolySquare2() + gatesPolyAdd2() +
gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigma);
else





if (pr1 eq 1) then
return gatesPolySquare2() + gatesPolyAdd2() +
gatesPolySquareScale2(pr2, sigma, sigma);
else





print("ERROR - gatesSquareScale4"); // We will not get here.
quit;
end function;
/// GATE COUNTS FOR ARITHMETIC IN GF(2ˆ8)/GF(2ˆ4)
canrightInv8 := function(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, pi)
if (qr1 eq 1) then // polynomial basis (z)
case Eltseq(pi):
when [0, sigma]:
if (pr1 eq 1) then









if (pr1 eq 1) then









if (pr1 eq 1) then









if (pr1 eq 1) then









if (pr1 eq 1) then









if (pr1 eq 1) then










if (pr1 eq 1) then









if (pr1 eq 1) then














gatesInv8 := function(P, Q, R, sigma, pi, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, rr1, rr2)
if (rr1 eq 1) then
sum := 2 * gatesAdd4();
sum := sum + gatesSquareScale4(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, pi);
sum := sum + (3 * gatesMult4(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2));
sum := sum + gatesInv4(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2);
return sum - 10;
else // normal basis
sum := 2 * gatesAdd4();
sum := sum + gatesSquareScale4(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, pi);
sum := sum + (3 * gatesMult4(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2));
sum := sum + gatesInv4(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2);






gatesMult8 := function(P, Q, R, sigma, pi, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, rr1, rr2)
if (rr1 eq 1) then // polynomial basis
sum := (4 * gatesAdd4());
sum := sum + (3 * gatesMult4(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2));
sum := sum + (gatesScale4(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, pi));
return sum;
else // normal basis
sum := (4 * gatesAdd4());
sum := sum + (3 * gatesMult4(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2));




gatesSquare8 := function(P, Q, R, sigma, pi, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, rr1, rr2)
if rr1 eq 1 then // polynomial basis
sum := (2 * gatesSquare4(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2));
sum := sum + gatesAdd4();
sum := sum + gatesScale4(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, pi);
return sum;
else // normal basis
sum := (3 * gatesAdd4());
sum := sum + (2 * gatesSquare4(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2));








if (rr1 eq 1) then
if (e4 eq 0) and (e3 eq piˆ(-1)) then
sum := 2 * gatesSquare4(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2);
sum := sum + (2 * gatesMult4(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2));
sum := sum + (2 * gatesAdd4());
sum := sum + gatesScale4(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, pi);
return sum;
elif (e3 eq piˆ(-1)) then
sum := 5 * gatesAdd4();
sum := sum + (2 * gatesSquare4(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2));
sum := sum + (3 * gatesMult4(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2));
sum := sum + gatesScale4(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, pi);
return sum;
elif (e4 eq 0 and e3 eq piˆ(-1)) then
sum := 2 * gatesAdd4();
sum := sum + (2 * gatesSquare4(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2));
sum := sum + gatesMult4(P, Q, sigma, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2);
return sum;
else // regular multiplication
return gatesMult8(P, Q, R, sigma, pi, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, rr1, rr2);
end if;
else
return gatesMult8(P, Q, R, sigma, pi, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, rr1, rr2);
end if;
end function;
/// GATE COUNTS FOR ARITHMETIC IN GF(2ˆ16)/GF(2ˆ8)
gatesInv16 := function(P, Q, R, S, sigma, pi, lambda, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, rr1, rr2, sr1, sr2)
if (sr1 eq 1) then
sum := 2 * gatesAdd8();
sum := sum + gatesSquareScale8(P, Q, R, sigma, pi, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, rr1, rr2, lambda);
sum := sum + (3 * gatesMult8(P, Q, R, sigma, pi, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, rr1, rr2));
sum := sum + gatesInv8(P, Q, R, sigma, pi, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, rr1, rr2);
return sum - 20;
else // normal basis
sum := 2 * gatesAdd8();
sum := sum + gatesSquareScale8(P, Q, R, sigma, pi, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, rr1, rr2, lambda);
sum := sum + (3 * gatesMult8(P, Q, R, sigma, pi, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, rr1, rr2));
sum := sum + gatesInv8(P, Q, R, sigma, pi, pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, rr1, rr2);
return sum - 30;
end if;
end function;
pad := function(S, n)
for i := 1 to n do




buildRoot4Row := function(element, subfield)
if element eq 1 then
return [0,0,0,1];
end if;
elem := Eltseq(element, subfield);














buildRoot8Row := function(element, subfield)
if element eq 1 then
return [0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1];
end if;
elem := Eltseq(element, subfield);
if #elem eq 1 then
tmp := Eltseq(elem[1]);
tmp1 := Eltseq(tmp)[1]; // lower
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buildRoot16Row := function(element, F16, F256)
if element eq 1 then
return [0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1];
end if;
elem := Eltseq(element, F256);
if #elem eq 1 then // no upper 8 bits










upper := buildRoot8Row(elem[2], F16);















// sigma in GF(2ˆ2)
changeSigmaRoot := function(pr1, pr2, F4, sigma)
if pr2 eq 1 then




if pr1 eq 1 then




M := Matrix(GF(2), [ r1, r2 ]);
if sigma eq 0 then
evector := [0,0];






ev := Transpose(Matrix(GF(2), [ evector ]));
prod := Transpose(M)ˆ(-1) * ev;
newSigma := Seqelt([prod[2][1], prod[1][1]], F4);
return newSigma;
end function;
// sigma in GF(2ˆ2)
changeSigmaRoot_bin := function(pr1, pr2, F4, sigma)
if pr2 eq 1 then




if pr1 eq 1 then




M := Matrix(GF(2), [ r1, r2 ]);
if sigma eq 0 then
evector := [0,0];





ev := Transpose(Matrix(GF(2), [ evector ]));
prod := Transpose(M)ˆ(-1) * ev;
return Transpose(prod);
end function;
// pi in GF(2ˆ4)/GF(2ˆ2)
changePiRoot := function(pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, F4, F16, pi)
q1p1 := pr1 * qr1;
q2p1 := pr1 * qr2;
q1p2 := pr2 * qr1;
q2p2 := pr2 * qr2;
r1 := buildRoot4Row(q2p2, F4);
r2 := buildRoot4Row(q2p1, F4);
r3 := buildRoot4Row(q1p2, F4);
r4 := buildRoot4Row(q1p1, F4);








ev := Transpose(Matrix(GF(2), [evector]));








// pi in GF(2ˆ4)/GF(2ˆ2)
changePiRoot_bin := function(pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, F4, F16, pi)
q1p1 := pr1 * qr1;
q2p1 := pr1 * qr2;
q1p2 := pr2 * qr1;
q2p2 := pr2 * qr2;
r1 := buildRoot4Row(q2p2, F4);
r2 := buildRoot4Row(q2p1, F4);
r3 := buildRoot4Row(q1p2, F4);
r4 := buildRoot4Row(q1p1, F4);









ev := Transpose(Matrix(GF(2), [evector]));
prod := Transpose(M)ˆ(-1) * ev;
return Transpose(prod);
end function;
// lambda in GF(2ˆ8)/GF(2ˆ4)/GF(2ˆ2)
changeLambdaRoot_matrix := function(pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, rr1, rr2, F4, F16, F256)
p1q1r1 := F256 ! (pr1 * qr1 * rr1);
p1q2r1 := F256 ! (pr1 * qr2 * rr1);
p2q1r1 := F256 ! (pr2 * qr1 * rr1);
p2q2r1 := F256 ! (pr2 * qr2 * rr1);
p1q1r2 := F256 ! (pr1 * qr1 * rr2);
p1q2r2 := F256 ! (pr1 * qr2 * rr2);
p2q1r2 := F256 ! (pr2 * qr1 * rr2);
p2q2r2 := F256 ! (pr2 * qr2 * rr2);
r1 := buildRoot8Row(F256!p2q2r2, F16);
r2 := buildRoot8Row(F256!p1q2r2, F16);
r3 := buildRoot8Row(F256!p2q1r2, F16);
r4 := buildRoot8Row(F256!p1q1r2, F16);
r5 := buildRoot8Row(F256!p2q2r1, F16);
r6 := buildRoot8Row(F256!p1q2r1, F16);
r7 := buildRoot8Row(F256!p2q1r1, F16);
r8 := buildRoot8Row(F256!p1q1r1, F16);
// Create the inverse basis change matrix...
M := Matrix(GF(2), [ r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8 ]);
return Transpose(M);
end function;
// lambda in GF(2ˆ8)/GF(2ˆ4)/GF(2ˆ2)
changeLambdaRoot_bin := function(pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, rr1, rr2, F4, F16, F256, lambda)
p1q1r1 := F256 ! (pr1 * qr1 * rr1);
p1q2r1 := F256 ! (pr1 * qr2 * rr1);
p2q1r1 := F256 ! (pr2 * qr1 * rr1);
p2q2r1 := F256 ! (pr2 * qr2 * rr1);
p1q1r2 := F256 ! (pr1 * qr1 * rr2);
p1q2r2 := F256 ! (pr1 * qr2 * rr2);
p2q1r2 := F256 ! (pr2 * qr1 * rr2);
p2q2r2 := F256 ! (pr2 * qr2 * rr2);
r1 := buildRoot8Row(F256!p2q2r2, F16);
r2 := buildRoot8Row(F256!p1q2r2, F16);
r3 := buildRoot8Row(F256!p2q1r2, F16);
r4 := buildRoot8Row(F256!p1q1r2, F16);
r5 := buildRoot8Row(F256!p2q2r1, F16);
r6 := buildRoot8Row(F256!p1q2r1, F16);
r7 := buildRoot8Row(F256!p2q1r1, F16);
r8 := buildRoot8Row(F256!p1q1r1, F16);














ev := Transpose(Matrix(GF(2), [evector]));
prod := Transpose(M)ˆ(-1) * ev;
return Transpose(prod);
end function;
// lambda in GF(2ˆ8)/GF(2ˆ4)/GF(2ˆ2)
changeLambdaRoot := function(pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, rr1, rr2, F4, F16, F256, lambda)
p1q1r1 := pr1 * qr1 * rr1;
p1q2r1 := pr1 * qr2 * rr1;
p2q1r1 := pr2 * qr1 * rr1;
p2q2r1 := pr2 * qr2 * rr1;
p1q1r2 := pr1 * qr1 * rr2;
p1q2r2 := pr1 * qr2 * rr2;
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p2q1r2 := pr2 * qr1 * rr2;
p2q2r2 := pr2 * qr2 * rr2;
r1 := buildRoot8Row(F256!p2q2r2, F16);
r2 := buildRoot8Row(F256!p1q2r2, F16);
r3 := buildRoot8Row(F256!p2q1r2, F16);
r4 := buildRoot8Row(F256!p1q1r2, F16);
r5 := buildRoot8Row(F256!p2q2r1, F16);
r6 := buildRoot8Row(F256!p1q2r1, F16);
r7 := buildRoot8Row(F256!p2q1r1, F16);
r8 := buildRoot8Row(F256!p1q1r1, F16);














ev := Transpose(Matrix(GF(2), [evector]));
















// psi in GF(2ˆ16)/GF(2ˆ8)/GF(2ˆ4)/GF(2ˆ2)
changePsiRoot_matrix := function(pr1, pr2, qr1, qr2, rr1, rr2, sr1, sr2, F4, F16, F256, F6K)
p1q1r1s1 := pr1 * qr1 * rr1 * sr1;
p1q2r1s1 := pr1 * qr2 * rr1 * sr1;
p2q1r1s1 := pr2 * qr1 * rr1 * sr1;
p2q2r1s1 := pr2 * qr2 * rr1 * sr1;
p1q1r2s1 := pr1 * qr1 * rr2 * sr1;
p1q2r2s1 := pr1 * qr2 * rr2 * sr1;
p2q1r2s1 := pr2 * qr1 * rr2 * sr1;
p2q2r2s1 := pr2 * qr2 * rr2 * sr1;
p1q1r1s2 := pr1 * qr1 * rr1 * sr2;
p1q2r1s2 := pr1 * qr2 * rr1 * sr2;
p2q1r1s2 := pr2 * qr1 * rr1 * sr2;
p2q2r1s2 := pr2 * qr2 * rr1 * sr2;
p1q1r2s2 := pr1 * qr1 * rr2 * sr2;
p1q2r2s2 := pr1 * qr2 * rr2 * sr2;
p2q1r2s2 := pr2 * qr1 * rr2 * sr2;
p2q2r2s2 := pr2 * qr2 * rr2 * sr2;
r1 := buildRoot16Row(F6K ! p2q2r2s2, F16, F256);
r2 := buildRoot16Row(F6K ! p1q2r2s2, F16, F256);
r3 := buildRoot16Row(F6K ! p2q1r2s2, F16, F256);
r4 := buildRoot16Row(F6K ! p1q1r2s2, F16, F256);
r5 := buildRoot16Row(F6K ! p2q2r1s2, F16, F256);
r6 := buildRoot16Row(F6K ! p1q2r1s2, F16, F256);
r7 := buildRoot16Row(F6K ! p2q1r1s2, F16, F256);
r8 := buildRoot16Row(F6K ! p1q1r1s2, F16, F256);
r9 := buildRoot16Row(F6K ! p2q2r2s1, F16, F256);
r10 := buildRoot16Row(F6K ! p1q2r2s1, F16, F256);
r11 := buildRoot16Row(F6K ! p2q1r2s1, F16, F256);
r12 := buildRoot16Row(F6K ! p1q1r2s1, F16, F256);
r13 := buildRoot16Row(F6K ! p2q2r1s1, F16, F256);
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r14 := buildRoot16Row(F6K ! p1q2r1s1, F16, F256);
r15 := buildRoot16Row(F6K ! p2q1r1s1, F16, F256);
r16 := buildRoot16Row(F6K ! p1q1r1s1, F16, F256);
M := Matrix(GF(2), [ r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9, r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15, r16 ]);
return Transpose(M);
end function;
// basis change matrices using in GF(2ˆ8)/GF(2ˆ4)/GF(2ˆ2)
totalGateCount8 := function(invCount, v, w, x, prr1, prr2, qrr1, qrr2, rrr1, rrr2,
F4, F16, F256, field, AFFINE, C, CINV)
// Map to isomorphic elements in GF(2ˆ8)
pr1 := field ! 1;
pr2 := field ! v;
qr1 := field ! 1;
qr2 := field ! w;
rr1 := field ! 1;
rr2 := field ! x;
// Build the basis change matrix rows
p1q1r1 := Reverse(Eltseq(pr1 * qr1 * rr1));
p1q1r1 := pad(p1q1r1, 8 - #p1q1r1);
p1q2r1 := Reverse(Eltseq(pr1 * qr2 * rr1));
p1q2r1 := pad(p1q2r1, 8 - #p1q2r1);
p2q1r1 := Reverse(Eltseq(pr2 * qr1 * rr1));
p2q1r1 := pad(p2q1r1, 8 - #p2q1r1);
p2q2r1 := Reverse(Eltseq(pr2 * qr2 * rr1));
p2q2r1 := pad(p2q2r1, 8 - #p2q2r1);
p1q1r2 := Reverse(Eltseq(pr1 * qr1 * rr2));
p1q1r2 := pad(p1q1r2, 8 - #p1q1r2);
p1q2r2 := Reverse(Eltseq(pr1 * qr2 * rr2));
p1q2r2 := pad(p1q2r2, 8 - #p1q2r2);
p2q1r2 := Reverse(Eltseq(pr2 * qr1 * rr2));
p2q1r2 := pad(p2q1r2, 8 - #p2q1r2);
p2q2r2 := Reverse(Eltseq(pr2 * qr2 * rr2));









// Create the basis change matrix to go from GF(2ˆ8) to GF(((2ˆ2)ˆ2)ˆ2)
M := Transpose(Matrix(GF(2), [ r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8 ])); // M == X
MI := Mˆ(-1);
// Create the basis change in GF(((2ˆ2)ˆ2)ˆ2)
M2 := changeLambdaRoot_matrix(prr1, prr2, qrr1, qrr2, rrr1, rrr2, F4, F16, F256);
M := M * M2;
MI := M2ˆ(-1) * MI;




// Display all of the basis change matrices and the
// important combinations








// merged decryption sbox








cCount := 2 * NumberOfNonZeroEntries(Matrix(GF(2),[Eltseq(C)]));
Reverse(Eltseq(C));
cCount;
// Display the unoptimized totals
// Forward S-box = mInvCount + inv + maCount + cCount
mInvCount + invCount + maCount + cCount;
// Inverse S-box = maInvCount + inv + mCount + cCount
maInvCount + invCount + mCount + cCount;
// Merged = (mInvCount + maInvCount) + inv + (maCount + mCount) + cCount
(mInvCount + maInvCount) + invCount + (maCount + mCount) + cCount;
return 0;
end function;
totalGateCount16 := function(invCount, v, w, x, y, prr1, prr2, qrr1, qrr2, rrr1, rrr2, srr1, srr2,
F4, F16, F256, F6K, field, AFFINE, C, CINV)
// Map to isomorphic elements in GF(2ˆ8)
pr1 := field ! 1;
pr2 := field ! v;
qr1 := field ! 1;
qr2 := field ! w;
rr1 := field ! 1;
rr2 := field ! x;
sr1 := field ! 1;
sr2 := field ! y;
// Build the basis change matrix rows
p1q1r1sr1 := Reverse(Eltseq(pr1 * qr1 * rr1 * sr1));
p1q1r1sr1 := pad(p1q1r1sr1, 16 - #p1q1r1sr1);
p1q2r1sr1 := Reverse(Eltseq(pr1 * qr2 * rr1 * sr1));
p1q2r1sr1 := pad(p1q2r1sr1, 16 - #p1q2r1sr1);
p2q1r1sr1 := Reverse(Eltseq(pr2 * qr1 * rr1 * sr1));
p2q1r1sr1 := pad(p2q1r1sr1, 16 - #p2q1r1sr1);
p2q2r1sr1 := Reverse(Eltseq(pr2 * qr2 * rr1 * sr1));
p2q2r1sr1 := pad(p2q2r1sr1, 16 - #p2q2r1sr1);
p1q1r2sr1 := Reverse(Eltseq(pr1 * qr1 * rr2 * sr1));
p1q1r2sr1 := pad(p1q1r2sr1, 16 - #p1q1r2sr1);
p1q2r2sr1 := Reverse(Eltseq(pr1 * qr2 * rr2 * sr1));
p1q2r2sr1 := pad(p1q2r2sr1, 16 - #p1q2r2sr1);
p2q1r2sr1 := Reverse(Eltseq(pr2 * qr1 * rr2 * sr1));
p2q1r2sr1 := pad(p2q1r2sr1, 16 - #p2q1r2sr1);
p2q2r2sr1 := Reverse(Eltseq(pr2 * qr2 * rr2 * sr1));
p2q2r2sr1 := pad(p2q2r2sr1, 16 - #p2q2r2sr1);
p1q1r1sr2 := Reverse(Eltseq(pr1 * qr1 * rr1 * sr2));
p1q1r1sr2 := pad(p1q1r1sr2, 16 - #p1q1r1sr2);
p1q2r1sr2 := Reverse(Eltseq(pr1 * qr2 * rr1 * sr2));
p1q2r1sr2 := pad(p1q2r1sr2, 16 - #p1q2r1sr2);
p2q1r1sr2 := Reverse(Eltseq(pr2 * qr1 * rr1 * sr2));
p2q1r1sr2 := pad(p2q1r1sr2, 16 - #p2q1r1sr2);
p2q2r1sr2 := Reverse(Eltseq(pr2 * qr2 * rr1 * sr2));
p2q2r1sr2 := pad(p2q2r1sr2, 16 - #p2q2r1sr2);
p1q1r2sr2 := Reverse(Eltseq(pr1 * qr1 * rr2 * sr2));
p1q1r2sr2 := pad(p1q1r2sr2, 16 - #p1q1r2sr2);
p1q2r2sr2 := Reverse(Eltseq(pr1 * qr2 * rr2 * sr2));
p1q2r2sr2 := pad(p1q2r2sr2, 16 - #p1q2r2sr2);
p2q1r2sr2 := Reverse(Eltseq(pr2 * qr1 * rr2 * sr2));
p2q1r2sr2 := pad(p2q1r2sr2, 16 - #p2q1r2sr2);
p2q2r2sr2 := Reverse(Eltseq(pr2 * qr2 * rr2 * sr2));


















// Create the inverse basis change matrix
M := Transpose(Matrix(GF(2),
[
r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8,
r9, r10, r11, r12, r13, r14, r15, r16
])); // M == X
MI := Mˆ(-1);
// Create the basis change in GF((((2ˆ2)ˆ2)ˆ2)ˆ2)
M2 := changePsiRoot_matrix(prr1, prr2, qrr1, qrr2, rrr1, rrr2, srr1, srr2, F4, F16, F256, F6K);
M := M * M2;
MI := M2ˆ(-1) * MI;





// Display all of the basis change matrices and the important combinations








// merged decryption sbox







cCount := 2 * NumberOfNonZeroEntries(Matrix(GF(2),[Eltseq(C)]));
Reverse(Eltseq(C));
cCount;
// Display the unoptimized totals
// Forward S-box = mInvCount + inv + maCount + cCount
mInvCount + invCount + maCount + cCount;
// Inverse S-box = maInvCount + inv + mCount + cCount
maInvCount + invCount + mCount + cCount;
// Merged = (mInvCount + maInvCount) + inv + (maCount + mCount) + cCount
(mInvCount + maInvCount) + invCount + (maCount + mCount) + cCount;
return 0; // dummy result
end function;
coeffMap2 := function(sigma, F, F4)
// these are the only two possibilities for p(v) to be irreducible
if Eltseq(sigma) eq [1,0] then
return Seqelt([F ! 0,F ! 1], F4); // if sigma = 1, then we want to return v
elif Eltseq(sigma) eq [0,1] then
return Seqelt([F ! 1,F ! 1], F4); // if sigma = v, then we want to return vˆ2 (v + 1)
end if;
end function;
// Map the normal basis coefficients to those in polynomial
// Magma doesn’t use normal bases
coeffMap4 := function(sigma, pi, F4, F16)
// pi and sigma are in a normal basis representation
// this function exists because Magma doesn’t have support for operations on GF elements in normal bases
// The mapping for each pi coefficient is defined as follows:
// [0,0] (0) -> [0,0]
// [0,1] (v) -> sigma if sigma = [0,1], else sigmaˆ2
// [1,0] (vˆ2) -> sigmaˆ2 if sigma = [0,1], else sigma
// [1,1] (vˆ2+v) -> 1 (vˆ2 + v \equiv 1 by p(v))
c1 := F4 ! 0; // upper coefficient (c2 wˆ4 + c1 w) -> [c1, c2]
c2 := F4 ! 0; // lower coefficient (c2 wˆ4 + c1 w) -> [c1, c2]
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case Eltseq(sigma):
when [0, 1]: // sigma (v)
















when [1,1]: // sigmaˆ2 (vˆ2)

















return Seqelt([c1, c2], F16);
end function;
// Generate all tuples of basis elements (p, r, q, s)
allGen_8 := function(embed, field, S, AFFINE, C, CINV)
F:=GF(2);
pol2<V>:=PolynomialRing(F); // polynomial ring over F
P:=Vˆ2+V+1; // the only irreducible polynomial for GF(2ˆ2)
F4<v>:=ext<F | P>; // create GF(2ˆ2)/GF(2)




print("Embedding already done. No harm no foul.");
end try;
// Generate all roots of P
pRoots:=[];
for e in F4 do
if Evaluate(P, e) eq 0 then












// Find all elements in GF(2ˆ2) that make q(x) irreducible
for sigma in F4 do
pol4<W>:=PolynomialRing(F4);
Q:=Wˆ2 + W + sigma;
if IsIrreducible(Q) then
F16<w>:=ext<F4 | Q>;





print("Embedding already done. No harm no foul.");
end try;
// Find the roots of q(x) - GF(2ˆ4)/GF(2ˆ2)
qRoots:=[];
for e1 in F16 do
if Evaluate(Q, e1) eq 0 then












// Find all elements in GF(2ˆ4)/GF(2ˆ2) that make r(y) irreducible
for pi in F16 do
pol8<X>:=PolynomialRing(F16);
R:=Xˆ2 + X + pi;
if IsIrreducible(R) then
F256<x>:=ext<F16 | R>;




print("Embedding already done. No harm no foul.");
end try;
// Find the roots of r(y) - GF(2ˆ8)/GF(2ˆ4)/GF(2ˆ2)
rRoots:=[];
for e2 in F256 do
if Evaluate(R, e2) eq 0 then












newPi := changePiRoot(pRoots[1], pRoots[2], 1, qRoots[1], F4, F16, pi);
newSigma := changeSigmaRoot(pRoots[1], pRoots[2], F4, sigma);
newSigma := coeffMap2(newSigma, F, F4);
newPi := coeffMap4(newSigma, newPi, F4, F16);
invCount := canrightInv8(P, Q, newSigma, pRoots[1], pRoots[2], 1, qRoots[1], newPi);
toss := totalGateCount8(invCount, v, w, x, pRoots[1], pRoots[2], 1, qRoots[1],





return [* pIps, qIps, rIps *];
end function;
allGen_16 := function(embed, field, T, AFFINE, C, CINV)
F:=GF(2);
pol2<V>:=PolynomialRing(F); // polynomial ring over F
P:=Vˆ2+V+1; // the only irreducible polynomial for GF(2ˆ2)
F4<v>:=ext<F | P>; // create GF(2ˆ2)/GF(2)
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print("Embedding already done. No harm no foul.");
end try;
// Generate all roots of P
pRoots:=[];
for e in F4 do
if Evaluate(P, e) eq 0 then












// Find all elements in GF(2ˆ2) that make q(x) irreducible
for sigma in F4 do
pol4<W>:=PolynomialRing(F4);
Q:=Wˆ2 + W + sigma;
if IsIrreducible(Q) and Q notin qIps then
F16<w>:=ext<F4 | Q>;
// qIps:=Append(qIps, Q);




print("Embedding already done. No harm no foul.");
end try;
// Find the roots of q(x) - GF(2ˆ4)/GF(2ˆ2)
qRoots:=[];
for e1 in F16 do
if Evaluate(Q, e1) eq 0 then







// Find all elements in GF(2ˆ4)/GF(2ˆ2) that make r(y) irreducible
for pi in F16 do
pol8<X>:=PolynomialRing(F16);
R:=Xˆ2 + X + pi;
if IsIrreducible(R) and R notin rIps then
F256<x>:=ext<F16 | R>;
// rIps:=Append(rIps, R);




print("Embedding already done. No harm no foul.");
end try;
// Find the roots of r(y) - GF(2ˆ8)/GF(2ˆ4)/GF(2ˆ2)
rRoots:=[];
for e2 in F256 do
if Evaluate(R, e2) eq 0 then








for lambda in F256 do
pol16<Y> := PolynomialRing(F256);
S := Yˆ2 + Y + lambda;
if IsIrreducible(S) and S notin sIps then












for e3 in F6K do
if Evaluate(S, e3) eq 0 then










newPi := changePiRoot(1,pRoots[1],1,qRoots[1], F4, F16, pi);
newSigma := changeSigmaRoot(1,pRoots[1], F4, sigma);
invCount := gatesInv16(P, Q, R, S, newSigma, newPi, lambda, 1,pRoots[1],1,
qRoots[1],1,rRoots[1],1,sRoots[1]);
toss := totalGateCount16(invCount,v,w,x,y, 1,pRoots[1],1,qRoots[1],1,
rRoots[1],1,sRoots[1], F4, F16, F256, F6K, field, AFFINE, C, CINV);







return [* pIps, qIps, rIps, sIps *];
end function;
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////




S := Vˆ8 + Vˆ4 + Vˆ3 + V + 1; // fixed affine for AES polynomial
F256<x>:=ext<F | S>;
if PrimitiveElement(F256) ne x + 1 then
quit;
end if;











constant := xˆ6 + xˆ5 + x + 1;
cinv := constantAffineInv(affine, constant, F256);
p := allGen_8(0, F256, S, affine, constant, cinv);
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////








P := Vˆ2 + V + 1;
F4<v> := ext<F2 | P>;
Poly4<W> := PolynomialRing(F4);
Q := Wˆ2 + W + v;
F16<w> := ext<F4 | Q>;
Poly16<X> := PolynomialRing(F16);
R := Xˆ2 + X + (v + 1)*w + v;
F256<x> := ext<F16 | R>;
newSigma := changeSigmaRoot(1, v, F4, v);
newPi := changePiRoot(1, v, w, wˆ4, F4, F16, (v + 1)*w + v);
gatesInv8(P, Q, R, newSigma, newPi, 1, v, w, wˆ4, x, xˆ16);
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
/////////////// END THESIS TEST CASE 1 ///////////////
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////




P := Vˆ2 + V + 1;
F4<v> := ext<F2 | P>;
Poly4<W> := PolynomialRing(F4);
Q := Wˆ2 + W + v;
F16<w> := ext<F4 | Q>;
Poly16<X> := PolynomialRing(F16);
R := Xˆ2 + X + ((v + 1)*w + v);
F256<x> := ext<F16 | R>;
Poly256<Y> := PolynomialRing(F256);
S := Yˆ2 + Y + (v*w + v)*x + w;
F6K<y> := ext<F256 | S>;
gatesInv16(P, Q, R, S, v, ((v + 1)*w + v), (v*w*x + (w + v)), 1, v, 1, w, 1, x, 1, y);
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
/////////////// END THESIS TEST CASE 2 ///////////////
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////





* Author: Christopher A. Wood, caw4567@rit.edu (www.christopher-wood.com)
* Description: Implementation of GF(2ˆ8) and GF(2ˆ16) arithmetic
* in standard polynomial basis and towers of normal bases. The ability
* to use polynomial bases for the tower field representation is also
* supported, pending the inclusion of an appropriate pair of basis
* transformation matrices T and TINV (see comments). Furthermore,
* the "standard" field (e.g. the AES field) irreducible polynomials
* are fixed here. They may be easily changed, however.
*/
#include "galois.h"
// Toggle these macros to set what’s being tested in this module
// Read the comments for specifics on each tower-field construction











* Standard test for GF(2ˆ16) inverse calculation.
* -> T(v) = vˆ16 + vˆ5 + vˆ3 + v + 1
* -> Sigma = v
* -> Pi = vwˆ4 + vˆ2 + v
* -> Lambda = (vˆ2 + v)wxˆ16 + vwˆ4x








#define FPX_16 0x1002B // include the MSB (1) Vˆ16 + Vˆ5 + Vˆ3 + V + 1
#define PX_8 0x77 // NOT USED
#define FPX_8 0x177 // NOT USED
static uint16_t TINV[16] =
{
0xa01a, 0x599f, 0x9eb4, 0x52e9, 0xc3c4, 0xb5a4, 0x018a, 0x4a64,
0xce25, 0x98ba, 0x8dfa, 0xa16b, 0x3fd1, 0x8649, 0x7871, 0xffff
};
static uint16_t T[16] =
{
0xd31e, 0xfcf5, 0x5f95, 0x63ea, 0x26b9, 0xc683, 0xc6db, 0x6621,
0x957c, 0xc328, 0x0ffa, 0xfdd6, 0xc75f, 0xd145, 0x3602, 0xd735
};






* Test for GF(2ˆ8) inverse calculation using AES polynomial.
* This uses an alternate isomorphic mapping from GF(2ˆ8) to GF(((2ˆ2)ˆ2)ˆ2).
* See the thesis document for details.
* -> S(v) = vˆ8 + vˆ4 + vˆ3 + v + 1
* -> Sigma = vˆ2
* -> Pi = vw







#define PX_16 0x002B // NOT USED
#define FPX_16 0x1002B // NOT USED
#define PX_8 0x1B
#define FPX_8 0x11B // include the MSB (1)
static uint8_t TINV[8] =
{
0x98, 0xf3, 0xf2, 0x48, 0x09, 0x81, 0xa9, 0xff
};
static uint8_t T[8] =
{
0x64, 0x78, 0x6e, 0x8c, 0x68, 0x29, 0xde, 0x60
};
// Define the coefficient values
#define SIGMA 0x2
#define PI 0x1
#define LAMBDA 0x34 // NOT USED
#endif
/**
* Test for GF(2ˆ8) inverse calculation using new AES polynomial
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* -> S(v) = vˆ8 + vˆ6 + vˆ5 + vˆ4 + vˆ2 + v + 1
* -> Sigma = v
* -> Pi = (v + 1)wˆ4 + vw







#define PX_16 0x002B // NOT USED
#define FPX_16 0x1002B // NOT USED
#define PX_8 0x77
#define FPX_8 0x177 // include the MSB (1)
static uint8_t TINV[8] =
{
0x3a, 0x13, 0x64, 0x01, 0x2b, 0x4a, 0xea, 0x55
};
static uint8_t T[8] =
{
0xaf, 0xb5, 0xa9, 0x98, 0x79, 0x3c, 0xc8, 0x10
};
// Define the coefficient values
#define SIGMA 0x2
#define PI 0xD
#define LAMBDA 0x0 // UNUSED
#endif
uint8_t g8_add(uint8_t x, uint8_t y)
{
return x ˆ y;
}
uint8_t g8_mul(uint8_t x, uint8_t y)
{
int i;
uint8_t sum = 0;
int msbSet;
for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i)
{
if (1 & y) sum ˆ= x;
msbSet = x & MSB_8;
x <<= 1;





QR g8_div(uint16_t ai, uint8_t b)
{
uint8_t a = ai;
int msb = MSB_8;
int d = 0;
QR result = {0, 0};





if (ai & HMSB_8)
{
result.q ˆ= 1 << (d+1);
a ˆ= b << 1;
}
for (;d > -1; d--)
{
if ((a & msb) && (b & msb))
{












if (x == 0) return 0;
if (x == 1) return 1;
uint8_t r0 = PX_8; // rem[i - 2]
uint8_t r1 = x; // rem[i - 1]
uint8_t a0 = 0; // aux[i - 2]
uint8_t a1 = 1; // aux[i - 1]
uint8_t tmp;
QR qr;
int firstRun = 0;
while (r1 > 0)
{
if (firstRun != 0) qr = g8_div(r0, r1);
else
{
qr = g8_div(FPX_8, r1);
firstRun++;
}
r0 = r1; r1 = qr.r;
tmp = a0; a0 = a1;




uint16_t g16_add(uint16_t x, uint16_t y)
{
return x ˆ y;
}
uint16_t g16_sub(uint16_t x, uint16_t y)
{
return x ˆ y;
}
uint16_t g16_mul(uint16_t x, uint16_t y)
{
uint16_t accum = 0;
uint16_t msb = 0;
uint16_t i;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
{
if (y & LSB) accum ˆ= x;
msb = (x & MSB_16); // fetch the MSB
x <<= 1;






* Polynomial division in GF(2ˆ16).
*/
QR g16_div(uint32_t ai, uint16_t b)
{
uint16_t a = (uint16_t)ai;
int msb = MSB_16;
int d = 0;
QR result = {0, 0};
// Align the denominator with the numerator




// If the polynomial MSB is set (17th bit), increment
// the quotient and reduce the numerator.
if (ai & HMSB_16) {
result.q ˆ= 1 << (d+1);
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a ˆ= b << 1;
}
for (;d > -1; d--) {
if ((a & msb) && (b & msb)) {














// Trivial special cases.
if (x == 0) return 0;
if (x == 1) return 1;
uint16_t r0 = PX_16; // rem[i - 2]
uint16_t r1 = x; // rem[i - 1]
uint16_t a0 = 0; // aux[i - 2]
uint16_t a1 = 1; // aux[i - 1]
uint16_t tmp;
QR qr;
int firstRun = 0;
while (r1 > 0)
{
if (firstRun != 0) qr = g16_div(r0, r1);
else
{
qr = g16_div(FPX_16, r1);
firstRun++;
}
r0 = r1; r1 = qr.r;
tmp = a0; a0 = a1;




uint16_t g16_change_basis(uint16_t x, uint16_t* M)
{
int32_t i;
uint16_t y = 0;
for (i = 15; i >= 0; i--)
{





uint8_t g8_change_basis(uint8_t x, uint8_t* M)
{
int32_t i;
uint8_t y = 0;
for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--)
{









uint8_t a, b, c, d, e, p, q;
a = (x & 0x2) >> 1;
b = (x & 0x1);
c = (y & 0x2) >> 1;
d = (y & 0x1);
e = (a ˆ b) & (c ˆ d);
p = (a & c) ˆ e;
q = (b & d) ˆ e;
return ((p << 1) | q);
#else // POLYNOMIAL_BASIS
uint8_t a, b, c, d, e, p, q;
a = (x & 0x2) >> 1;
b = (x & 0x1);
c = (y & 0x2) >> 1;
d = (y & 0x1);
e = (a ˆ b) & (c ˆ d);
p = (b & d) ˆ e;
q = (a & c) ˆ (b & d);







uint8_t g222_mul(uint8_t x, uint8_t y)
{
#ifdef GF16_NORMAL_BASIS
uint8_t a, b, c, d, e, p, q;
a = (x & 0xC) >> 2;
b = (x & 0x3);
c = (y & 0xC) >> 2;
d = (y & 0x3);
e = g22_mul(a ˆ b, c ˆ d);
e = g22_mul(e, SIGMA);
p = g22_mul(a, c) ˆ e;
q = g22_mul(b, d) ˆ e;
return ((p <<2 ) | q);
#else // POLYNOMIAL_BASIS
uint8_t a, b, c, d, e, f, p, q;
a = (x & 0xC) >> 2;
b = (x & 0xC);
c = (y & 0xC) >> 2;
d = (y & 0xC);
e = gf22_mul(a ˆ b, c ˆ d);
f = gf22_mul(a ˆ c, SIGMA);
p = gf22_mul(b, d) ˆ e;
q = gf22_mul(b, d) ˆ f;










uint8_t a, b, c, d, e, p, q;
a = (x & 0xC) >> 2;
b = (x & 0x3);
c = g22_mul(g22_sq(a ˆ b), SIGMA);
d = g22_mul(a, b);
e = g22_sq(c ˆ d);
p = g22_mul(e, b);
q = g22_mul(e, a);
return ((p << 2) | q);
#else // POLYNOMIAL_BASIS
uint8_t a, b, c, d, e, p, q;
a = (x & 0xC) >> 2;
b = (x & 0x3);
c = g22_mul(g22_sq(a ˆ b), SIGMA);
d = a ˆ b;
e = g22_sq(c ˆ g22_mul(d, b)); // inverse
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p = g22_mul(e, a);
q = g22_mul(e, d);
return ((p << 2) | q);
#endif
}
uint8_t g2222_mul(uint8_t x, uint8_t y)
{
#ifdef GF256_NORMAL_BASIS
uint8_t a, b, c, d, e, p, q;
a = (x & 0xF0) >> 4;
b = (x & 0x0F);
c = (y & 0xF0) >> 4;
d = (y & 0x0F);
e = g222_mul(a ˆ b, c ˆ d);
e = g222_mul(e, PI);
p = g222_mul(a, c) ˆ e;
q = g222_mul(b, d) ˆ e;
return ((p << 4) | q);
#else // POLYNOMIAL_BASIS
uint8_t a, b, c, d, e, f, p, q;
a = (x & 0xF0) >> 2;
b = (x & 0x0F);
c = (y & 0xF0) >> 2;
d = (y & 0x0F);
e = gf222_mul(a ˆ b, c ˆ d);
f = gf222_mul(a ˆ c, PI);
p = gf222_mul(b, d) ˆ e;
q = gf222_mul(b, d) ˆ f;






uint8_t a, b, c, d, e, p, q;
a = (x & 0xF0) >> 4;
b = (x & 0x0F);
c = g222_mul(g222_mul(a ˆ b, a ˆ b), PI);
d = g222_mul(a, b);
e = g222_inv(c ˆ d);
p = g222_mul(e, b);
q = g222_mul(e, a);
return ((p << 4) | q);
#else // POLYNOMIAL_BASIS
uint8_t a, b, c, d, e, p, q;
a = (x & 0xC) >> 2;
b = (x & 0x3);
c = g222_mul(g222_mul(a ˆ b, a ˆ b), SIGMA);
d = a ˆ b;
e = g222_inv(c ˆ g222_mul(d, b)); // inverse
p = g222_mul(e, a);
q = g222_mul(e, d);






uint16_t a, b, c, d, e, p, q;
a = (x & 0xFF00) >> 8;
b = (x & 0x00FF);
c = g2222_mul(g2222_mul(a ˆ b, a ˆ b), LAMBDA);
d = g2222_mul(a, b);
e = g2222_inv(c ˆ d);
p = g2222_mul(e, b);
q = g2222_mul(e, a);
return ((p << 8) | q);
#else // POLYNOMIAL_BASIS
uint16_t a, b, c, d, e, p, q;
a = (x & 0xFF00) >> 8;
b = (x & 0x00FF);
c = g2222_mul(g2222_mul(a ˆ b, a ˆ b), LAMBDA);
d = a ˆ b;
e = g2222_inv(c ˆ g2222_mul(d, b)); // inverse
p = g2222_mul(e, a);
q = g2222_mul(e, d);
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return ((p << 8) | q);
#endif
}
//// MAIN ENTRY POINT ////
// Toggling the macros below plugs in the appropriate base change matrices and
// coefficients to make the arithmetic work out in the respective basis.
// See the comments for each macro for a description of the tower field construction.
int main()
{
#if VERSION_GF256_1 | VERSION_GF256_2 // GF(2ˆ8) test options
uint8_t inv = 0;
uint8_t cinv = 0;
int x;




cinv = g8_change_basis(x, TINV);
cinv = g2222_inv(cinv);
cinv = g8_change_basis(cinv, T);







printf("GF(((2ˆ2)ˆ2)ˆ2) with basis [v,vˆ2],[w,wˆ4],[xˆ16,x] inverse success.\n");
#elif VERSION_GF256_2
printf("GF(((2ˆ2)ˆ2)ˆ2) with basis [1,v],[w,wˆ4],[xˆ16,x] inverse success.\n");
#endif
#elif VERSION_GF6K_1 // GF(2ˆ16) tests options
uint16_t inv = 0;
uint16_t cinv = 0;
int x;




cinv = g16_change_basis(x, TINV);
cinv = g22222_inv(cinv);
cinv = g16_change_basis(cinv, T);
































// Polynomial arithmetic in GF(2ˆ8)
uint8_t g8_add(uint8_t x, uint8_t y);
uint8_t g8_mul(uint8_t x, uint8_t y);
QR g8_div(uint16_t ai, uint8_t b);
uint8_t g8_inv(uint8_t x);
// Polynomial arithmetic in GF(2ˆ16)
uint16_t g16_add(uint16_t x, uint16_t y);
uint16_t g16_sub(uint16_t x, uint16_t y);
uint16_t g16_mul(uint16_t x, uint16_t y);
QR g16_div(uint32_t ai, uint16_t b);
uint16_t g16_inv(uint16_t x);
// Basis change functions (bit-matrix multiplication).
uint16_t g16_change_basis(uint16_t x, uint16_t* M);
uint8_t g8_change_basis(uint8_t x, uint8_t* M);
// Arithmetic in GF(2ˆ2)
uint8_t g22_mul(uint8_t x, uint8_t y);
uint8_t g22_sq(uint8_t x); // same as inverse according to FLT
// Arithmetic in GF((2ˆ2)ˆ2)
uint8_t g222_mul(uint8_t x, uint8_t y);
uint8_t g222_sq(uint8_t x);
uint8_t g222_inv(uint8_t x);
// Arithmetic in GF(((2ˆ2)ˆ2)ˆ2)
uint8_t g2222_inv(uint8_t x);
uint8_t g2222_mul(uint8_t x, uint8_t y);
// Arithmetic in GF((((2ˆ2)ˆ2)ˆ2)ˆ2)
uint16_t g22222_inv(uint16_t x);
#endif /* GALOIS_H_ */
C.5 Alternative AES S-Box Hardware Design
The following VHDL code gives a complete hierarchical design for the forward function of our
alternate AES S-box using the field polynomial s(v) = v8 + v6 + v5 + v4 + v2 + v+ 1. With little
effort one may implement both the inverse and merged designs by inserting the appropriate basis
change matrices and constant additions before and after the inversion operator.
entity GF2_SQ_SCL is -- v = Sigma
Port ( a : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
b : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0));
end GF2_SQ_SCL;
architecture Behavioral of GF2_SQ_SCL is
begin
b <= a(0) & a(1); -- just a swap of the bits!
end Behavioral;
entity GF2_SQ is -- v = Sigma
Port ( a : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
b : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0));
end GF2_SQ;
architecture Behavioral of GF2_SQ is
begin
b <= a(1) & (a(1) XOR a(0));
end Behavioral;
entity GF2_MUL is -- v = Sigma
Port ( a : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
b : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
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c : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0));
end GF2_MUL;
architecture Behavioral of GF2_MUL is
signal e : STD_LOGIC;
signal p : STD_LOGIC;
signal q : STD_LOGIC;
begin
e <= (a(1) XOR a(0)) AND (b(1) XOR b(0));
p <= a(1) AND b(1);
q <= a(0) AND b(0);
c <= (e XOR q) & (p XOR q);
end Behavioral;
entity GF2_MUL_SC is -- v = Sigma
Port ( a : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
b : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
c : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0));
end GF2_MUL_SC;
architecture Behavioral of GF2_MUL_SC is
signal e : STD_LOGIC;
signal p : STD_LOGIC;
signal q : STD_LOGIC;
begin
e <= (a(1) XOR a(0)) AND (b(1) XOR b(0));
p <= e XOR (a(1) AND b(1));
q <= e XOR (a(0) AND b(0));
c <= p & q;
end Behavioral;
entity GF4_INV is -- v = Sigma
Port ( a : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0);
b : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0));
end GF4_INV;
architecture Behavioral of GF4_INV is
component GF2_SQ_SCL port (
a : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
b : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0)
);
end component;
component GF2_MUL port (
a : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
b : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
c : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0)
);
end component;
component GF2_SQ port (
a : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
b : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0)
);
end component;
signal e : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
signal ei : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
signal f : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
signal fi1 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
signal fi2 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
signal g : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
signal gi : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
signal p : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
signal q : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
signal pi : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
signal qi : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
begin
-- Instantiate subfield arithmetic circuits
ei <= (a(3) & a(2)) XOR (a(1) & a(0));
fi1 <= (a(3) & a(2));
fi2 <= (a(1) & a(0));
SQSC : GF2_SQ_SCL port map(ei, e);
MULT1 : GF2_MUL port map(fi1, fi2, f);
gi <= e XOR f;
INVV : GF2_SQ port map(gi, g); -- square is the same as inverse in GF(2ˆ2)
pi <= a(1) & a(0);
qi <= a(3) & a(2);
MULT2 : GF2_MUL port map(g, pi, p);
MULT3 : GF2_MUL port map(g, qi, q);
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-- Assign the output
b <= p & q;
end Behavioral;
entity GF4_SQ_SCL is -- v = Sigma
Port ( a : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0);
b : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0));
end GF4_SQ_SCL;
architecture Behavioral of GF4_SQ_SCL is
component GF2_SQ_SCL port (
a : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
b : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0)
);
end component;
component GF2_SQ port (
a : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
b : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0)
);
end component;
signal e : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
signal f : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
signal g : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
signal h : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
begin
-- Instantiate subfield arithmetic circuits
g <= a(1) & a(0);
SQSC : GF2_SQ_SCL port map(g, e);
h <= a(3) & a(2);
SQ : GF2_SQ port map(h, f);
-- Assign the output
b <= (f XOR e) & f;
end Behavioral;
entity GF4_MUL is -- v = Sigma
Port ( a : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0);
b : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0);
c : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0));
end GF4_MUL;
architecture Behavioral of GF4_MUL is
component GF2_MUL_SC port (
a : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
b : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
c : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0)
);
end component;
component GF2_MUL port (
a : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
b : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
c : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0)
);
end component;
signal e : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
signal g : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
signal h : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
signal mid1 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
signal mid2 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
signal top1 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
signal top2 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
signal bot1 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
signal bot2 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(1 downto 0);
begin
-- Instantiate subfield arithmetic circuits
mid1 <= (a(3) & a(2)) XOR (a(1) & a(0));
mid2 <= (b(3) & b(2)) XOR (b(1) & b(0));
top1 <= (a(3) & a(2));
top2 <= (b(3) & b(2));
bot1 <= (a(1) & a(0));
bot2 <= (b(1) & b(0));
MIDDLE : GF2_MUL_SC port map(mid1, mid2, e);
TOP : GF2_MUL port map(top1, top2, g);
BOTTOM : GF2_MUL port map(bot1, bot2, h);
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-- Assign the output
c <= (e XOR g) & (e XOR h);
end Behavioral;
entity GF8_INV is -- v = Sigma
Port ( a : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(7 downto 0);
b : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(7 downto 0));
end GF8_INV;
architecture Behavioral of GF8_INV is
component GF4_SQ_SCL port (
a : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0);
b : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0)
);
end component;
component GF4_MUL port (
a : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0);
b : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0);
c : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0)
);
end component;
component GF4_INV port (
a : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0);
b : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0)
);
end component;
signal e : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0);
signal ei : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0);
signal f : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0);
signal fi1 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0);
signal fi2 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0);
signal g : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0);
signal gi : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0);
signal p : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0);
signal pi : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0);
signal q : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0);
signal qi : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(3 downto 0);
begin
-- Instantiate subfield arithmetic circuits
ei <= (a(7) & a(6) & a(5) & a(4)) XOR (a(3) & a(2) & a(1) & a(0));
SQSC : GF4_SQ_SCL port map(ei, e);
fi1 <= (a(7) & a(6) & a(5) & a(4));
fi2 <= (a(3) & a(2) & a(1) & a(0));
MULT1 : GF4_MUL port map(fi1, fi2, f);
gi <= e XOR f;
INVV : GF4_INV port map(gi, g);
pi <= a(3) & a(2) & a(1) & a(0);
MULT2 : GF4_MUL port map(g, pi, p);
qi <= a(7) & a(6) & a(5) & a(4);
MULT3 : GF4_MUL port map(g, qi, q);
-- Assign the output
b <= p & q;
end Behavioral;
entity SBOX_8_FORWARD is
Port ( x : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(0 to 7);
y : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(0 to 7);
test : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(0 to 7));
end SBOX_8_FORWARD;
architecture Behavioral of SBOX_8_FORWARD is
-- The inversion component in the middle
component GF8_INV port (
a : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(0 to 7);
b : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(0 to 7)
);
end component;
-- SLP signals for T
signal t8 : STD_LOGIC;
signal t9 : STD_LOGIC;
signal t10 : STD_LOGIC;
signal t11 : STD_LOGIC;
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signal t12 : STD_LOGIC;
signal t13 : STD_LOGIC;
signal t14 : STD_LOGIC;
signal t15 : STD_LOGIC;
signal t16 : STD_LOGIC;
signal t17 : STD_LOGIC;
signal t18 : STD_LOGIC;
signal t19 : STD_LOGIC;
signal t20 : STD_LOGIC;
signal tout : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(0 to 7);
-- Temporary signal
signal invout : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(0 to 7);
-- SLP signals for Tˆ-1
signal ti8 : STD_LOGIC;
signal ti9 : STD_LOGIC;
signal ti10 : STD_LOGIC;
signal ti11 : STD_LOGIC;
signal ti12 : STD_LOGIC;
signal ti13 : STD_LOGIC;
signal ti14 : STD_LOGIC;
signal ti15 : STD_LOGIC;
signal ti16 : STD_LOGIC;
signal ti17 : STD_LOGIC;
signal ti18 : STD_LOGIC;
signal ti19 : STD_LOGIC;
signal tiout : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(0 to 7);
begin
-- Map to element in GF(((2ˆ2)ˆ2)ˆ2)
ti8 <= x(0) XOR x(4);
ti9 <= x(6) XOR ti8;
ti10 <= x(5) XOR ti9;
ti11 <= x(2) XOR x(7);
ti12 <= x(1) XOR x(7);
ti13 <= x(0) XOR ti12;
ti14 <= x(1) XOR ti10;
ti15 <= x(2) XOR ti9;
ti16 <= x(3) XOR x(4);
ti17 <= ti12 XOR ti16;
ti18 <= x(5) XOR x(6);
ti19 <= ti11 XOR ti18;
-- Logic for inversion in GF(((2ˆ2)ˆ2)ˆ2)
tiout <= x(6) & ti19 & ti15 & ti13 & ti10 & ti11 & ti14 & ti17;
MINV : GF8_INV port map(tiout, invout);
tout <= invout;
-- Map back to element in GF(2ˆ8), combined with the inverse
t8 <= tout(3) XOR tout(4);
t9 <= tout(0) XOR tout(1);
t10 <= tout(2) XOR t8;
t11 <= tout(3) XOR tout(6);
t12 <= tout(0) XOR t11;
t13 <= tout(3) XOR tout(7);
t14 <= t9 XOR t10;
t15 <= tout(0) XOR tout(6);
t16 <= t14 XOR t15;
t17 <= tout(4) XOR tout(5);
t18 <= t9 XOR t17;
t19 <= tout(2) XOR tout(6);
t20 <= t17 XOR t19;
-- Persist the output (and test vector)





architecture Behavioral OF SBOX_8_TB IS
-- Component Declaration for the Unit Under Test (UUT)
component SBOX_8
port (
x : IN std_logic_vector(0 to 7);
y : OUT std_logic_vector(0 to 7);
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signal tx : std_logic_vector(0 to 7) := (others => ’0’);
-- Outputs
signal ty : std_logic_vector(0 to 7);
signal tt : std_logic_vector(0 to 7);
signal EXPECTED_OUTPUT : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(7 downto 0) := (others => ’0’);
begin
-- Instantiate the S-box component




-- Test case #1
EXPECTED_OUTPUT <= X"08";
tx <= X"00";
wait for 100 us;
IF EXPECTED_OUTPUT = ty THEN
REPORT "Passed case 1" SEVERITY NOTE;
END IF;
ASSERT (ty = EXPECTED_OUTPUT)
REPORT "Failed case 1" SEVERITY error;
-- Test case #2
EXPECTED_OUTPUT <= X"ED";
tx <= X"FE";
wait for 100 us;
IF EXPECTED_OUTPUT = ty THEN
REPORT "Passed case 2" SEVERITY NOTE;
END IF;
ASSERT (ty = EXPECTED_OUTPUT)
REPORT "Failed case 2" SEVERITY error;
-- Test case #3
EXPECTED_OUTPUT <= X"AD";
tx <= X"DF";
wait for 100 us;
IF EXPECTED_OUTPUT = ty THEN
REPORT "Passed case 3" SEVERITY NOTE;
END IF;
ASSERT (ty = EXPECTED_OUTPUT)
REPORT "Failed case 3" SEVERITY error;
-- Test case #4
EXPECTED_OUTPUT <= X"88";
tx <= X"C3";
wait for 100 us;
IF EXPECTED_OUTPUT = ty THEN
REPORT "Passed case 4" SEVERITY NOTE;
END IF;
ASSERT (ty = EXPECTED_OUTPUT)
REPORT "Failed case 4" SEVERITY error;




C.6 16-Bit S-box in C
/**
* File: sbox16_unopt.c
* Author: Christopher A. Wood, caw4567@rit.edu
* Description: Software implementation of our unoptimized 16-bit S-box.




static uint16_t A[16] =
{
0x797b, 0x7c85, 0x9378, 0x151, 0x2312, 0x82f, 0x3f35, 0xe57e,
0x29d, 0x7e12, 0xdc62, 0xadbb, 0xced3, 0x87a0, 0xe900, 0x2d9c
};
static uint16_t AINV[16] =
{
0x6a5e, 0xc863, 0x3b62, 0xec10, 0x3931, 0xb56e, 0xd1e7, 0xa06c,
0x585f, 0x230c, 0xf6e0, 0x5557, 0x577e, 0x4d26, 0x17be, 0xc637
};




uint16_t inv = g16_inv(x);
inv = g16_change_basis(inv, A);




uint16_t inv = x ˆ C;









// Compute the S-box values





if (inverse(forward(x)) != x)
{




// Display the tables for each.
printf("uint16_t S[65536] = {\n");
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
{
for (j = 0; j < 256; j++)
{
if (j == 255) printf("%x\n", forward((256 * i) + j));




printf("uint16_t SI[65536] = {\n");
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
{
for (j = 0; j < 256; j++)
{
if (j == 255) printf("%x\n", inverse((256 * i) + j));
else printf("%x, ", inverse((256 * i) + j));
}
}
printf("};\n");
}
